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AN ANALYSIS OF THE KOREAN POLITICAL BUREAUCRACY IN TERMS
OF RIGGS' THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY AND KOREAN
WITH U.S. BUREAUCRATIC INTERACTION
1945-1953

Jae Jo Lee, M. A.
Western Michigan University, 1995
The administrative, political, and social development
and modernization experience of Korea for the period 1945
through 1953 was examined in this study.

Bureaucratic

transformation was understood as significant to developmen
tal outcomes for all facets of Korean society.
The political and social development theory model of
Fred W. Riggs, the Prismatic Society, was selected for
application in the Korean situation.
itself was first analyzed in detail.

Prismatic theory
Korean bureaucratic

formation was elucidated from multiple perspectives.

The

key factor of analysis was interpreted as being the U.S.
with Korean bureaucratic interaction.
The bureaucratic complexity was subjected to analysis
in terms of the Prismatic Model.

Comparative views were

presented, as were critical evaluations of the applicabili
ty of Riggs to the postwar situation in Korea.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

.

.

.

ii

CHAPTER
I.

II.

III.

IV.

v.

INTRODUCTION

1

RIGGS' THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY .

15

Introduction

15

Underlying Concepts and Terminology

17

Riggs' Theory of Social Change

42

Riggs Reconsidered

56

THE KOREAN BUREAUCRACY:

1945-1953 .

74

Immediate Postwar Situation .

74

Historical Background • . .

78

The Immediate Bureaucratic Impact .

97

The Underlying Effects of U.S.-Korean
Bureaucratic Engagement . • . . • • . •

106

Analysis of the Problem • .

113

THE POSTWAR KOREAN EXPERIENCE IN LIGHT OF
RIGGS' THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY • •

162

CONCLUSION .

193

BIBLIOGRAPHY

.

.

. . . . .

.

.

iii

. . . . . . . . . .

.

222

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Ro (1993) expressed concern that the study of adminis
trative and political development continued to lag behind
analysis of economic change, transformation, and progress.
The

forces

causing

bureaucratic

transformation,

the

movement from traditional to modern organization patterns,
have not been clarified.

Bureaucratic transformational

patterns are not well understood.

Agreement as to contex

tual relationship between bureaucratic development and the
economic and social spheres has not been derived.

Ro's

analysis specifies examination of change from "status
oriented" to "modern" bureaucracies (p. 8) as critical to
understanding 20th Century modernization process as a whole
(1993).
Henderson (1968) characterized Korean politics as a
vortex of centralized power.

The centralized locus of

power draws all elements of the society together in a quest
for legitimacy within a context of power against which they
cannot successfully contend.
Henderson's view,

As a mass society,

in

Korea remained entirely incapable of

creating horizontal power arrangements or groupings of
interest aggregates.

Within the mass society of Korea, all
1
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elements were atomized and experienced exclusively vertical
pressure drawing them to and from the political center.
Henderson saw all Korean political phenomena as emanating
endogenously from an internal pattern which was deep-rooted
and basically unchanging.

This deep-rooted, indigenous

character influenced the forms of Korean government and
bureaucracy

relentlessly.

For

Henderson,

the

Korean

political vortex encapsulated both psychological predilec
tion and historical predominance.
vortex are primary.

Three elements of the

First is lack of local power bases as

determined by extreme centralization.
nance of form over content.

Second is a predomi

And third is a preference for

authority above leadership and bureaucratism over individu
al responsibility {1968).
Extreme centralization came fully into being with the
unification of the Korean Peninsula in 918 during the Koryo
Dynasty.

Total control of all economic resources was given

to the ruling elite.

Chinese models of administrative

systems were established to solidify and regulate control.
Structured, influential institutions, including even the
military until recent decades, were not allowed to develop.
The flow of power passed through merit, achievement, and
influence.

Power could not be politically derived from

below, only protection from above.

Attempts at autonomous

power bases were dismantled through centralization influ-
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ence.

The extreme phenomenon of centralized power remains

through

the

present

structurally

entrenched in the Korean people.

and

psychologically

In terms of form over

content, power access, status, rank, prestige, and the like
precede substantive issues such as economic management,
innovation, passage of laws, and international relations.
Adherence to form soon rendered the Confucian bureaucracy
as merely the guiding mechanism for allocation of status,
with responsible government becoming virtually impossible.
Preference of form over content or function indicated,
also, manifest emphasis on moral precept and predominance
Bureaucratic generalists

of generalists over specialists.

Constant and

were adaptable to many different positions.

rapid ebb and flow of powerholders became characteristic of
Korean politics.

Public interest was in real terms

sacrificed to aristocratic personal interests.

Substantive

administrative programs were impossible, including innova
tion and institutionalization.
established

authority

charismatic

leadership,

as

Central power figures

despotic,

without

orientation, without innovation,

without

rational

resort

guidance

to
and

but instead configured

through belabored collegial discussion, avoidance of direct
personal conflict, stubborn conservatism, factionalism, and
behind the scenes maneuvering.
only powerbrokers.

Leaders were prefigured as

Concern for specific goals, debate of
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pertinent issues and interests, and emergence of qualified
leadership for change or improvement were all denied.
Factions manipulated in opposition to one another defined
leadership orientation.
was out

of the

Even meaningful autocratic rule

picture.

Henderson's vortex thesis,

outlined here as still operational fn Korea, is supported
as theory within Korean political science circles, though
qualified as somewhat exaggerated and overly generalized
(Ro, 1993).

The vortex thesis, nevertheless, with its

emphasis upon the continuing predominance of centralized,
hierarchical, and bureaucratized power and control through
the present time in K-0rea, provides a useful stepping off
point for comprehending Korean modernization and bureaucratic development.

Modernization and development are

largely

carried

shaped

implementations.

and

out

through

bureaucratic

The entire process depends upon efficient

bureaucratic structures and procedures.

This approach to

democratic implementation is essentially more characteris
tic of 20th Century developmental modernization than it had
been of Western democratic development processes during the
previous century in the U.S. and in Europe.

Political

development theory of Riggs (1964), nevertheless, suggests
that bureaucratic structuring must almost always come
before

political development.

Riggs further notes that

the bureaucratic policy implementation process usually is
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predominant

over

institutions

policy-making

within

transformational (i.e., 20th Century developing) societies.
Bureaucrats
positions,

assume
and

preponderantly

the

bureaucracy

exaggerated

itself

assumes

power
highly

complex levels of development even though actual complemen
tary political development is lacking.

This over-arching

bureaucratic structure may be the legacy to the developing
country from the withdrawing colonial administration; that
is, the complex bureaucratic structure used for exploita
tion by the imperial power remains essentially intact once
Just as likely, the complex bureau

that power withdraws.
cracy

develops

expansion,

due

while,

to
on

pressing

the

demands

other

hand,

for

true

economic
political

modernization and capability, especially in any democratiz
ing sense, are inhibited and deliberately restrained and
undercut by politically cautious and defensively rigid
regimes, often of the military type.

Rapid, inverse, 20th

Century modernization almost ineluctably summons forth
bureaucratic authoritarianism,
growth,

and

concentrates

creates uneven political

on stimulating

the

rate

of

economic development (Riggs, 1964; Ro, 1993).
The

Western

development,

modernization

established

in

the

paradigm
previous

of

unilinear

century

and

contemplated in the analysis of advanced Western nations,
created a dichotomy between traditional social aspects and
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values

and

Western

modernization.

paradigms

Eisenstadt

of

advanced

democratic

(1973) suggested that newly

developed nations had established innovative dimensions of
modernization which occupied positions between the tradi
tional and the modern.

Thus, the previously polarized

extremes, of the modern and the traditional, have in some
ways been reconciled.

Ideologically, such manifestations

of reconciliation also pursue compromises between capital
ism and socialism.

Economic, political, and social aspects

of each are uniquely blended (1973).

Lewis (1969) posited

the inverse model of development in contrast to the Western
hypothetical model which had characterized Western democracies.

Western democratic development originated through

private sector activation, commerce, and industrialization.
Private

sector

Western

largely

unrestrained

development

by

central

manifested

guidance

allowing the creation of industrial empire.

or

itself
control,

Such develop

ment appeared to pursue organic processes and goals, though
the course may have been chaotic and oppressive to many,
both as individuals and as socially defined groups.

Social

characteristics of entrepreneurial spirit and rational
pursuit of interests or enterprise had prepared the way for
development, as had resource availability and manageable
populations (1993).
Twentieth

Century

modernization

within

developing
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countries occurs in far different situations from those of
the Western hypothetical model.

To some extent, situations can be said to vary

are many.
from

The sources of difference

country

to

Nevertheless,

country.

differences seem especially critical,

two

primary

when contrasting

Western democratic models with 20th Century development
First, modernization in the 20th Century is

patterns.

carried out with prefigured models emulated for their
success.

Second, in virtually every instance, in the 20th

Century,

it

is an

indigenous elite which wishes the

modernization to transpire, in one leap forward.

The elite

imposes the modern industrial model onto traditional forms,
with full expectations of resultant conflicts and disconti
nuities among associated social, political, and economic
elements.

On the other hand, Western democratic, industri

al development, in the historical process, primarily within
the

19th

Century,

grew

up

endogenously

from

diffuse

elements and points of implantation, coming together to
create a new form.

Industrial development of the 20th

Century instead tends to come together through a central
ized impetus.

The formative directions are downward and

outward, moving from the implanted bureaucratization and
industrial

organization.

Korea's

own

modernization

process, following what Ro (1993) designates as the inverse
model,

was initially powerfully impacted by a complex
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impositional

form,

that

established

through

Japan's

colonization (Lewis, 1969; Ro, 1993). Understanding of the
relationship

between

Japanese

colonial

imposition

and

Korea's long-term modernization process is critical to
analysis of later post-World-War-Two modernization and
bureaucratic development.

At conclusion of the Japanese

colonial experience, with the close of the Second World
War, Korea, led by an indigenous elite, and of course faced
with no alternative but to modernize, found itself with no
internal means of capitalization.

Korea was thrown onto

the international financial community for support.

All

capital formation processes were engineered by the Korean
central

government,

following

military governing forces.

disengagement

of

U.S.

Korea had endured the 35-year

period of Japanese colonialization without development of
its own technicians,
1993).

managers,

and entrepreneurs

(Ro,

Korea did, nevertheless, begin post-World War Two

development having several advantages.
political and social structure,

The premodern

which had endured up

through at least the first decade of the 20th Century, had
eroded,

first due to inwardly working forces of self

destruction,

joined

with

Korea's

initial

probes

into

modernization begun in the 19th Century, then, through the
dismantling and suppression of indigenous Korean struc
tures, both traditional and modern, carried out by the
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Japanese and, finally, by the total destruction of the
colonial regime as a result of the war.

As Ro (1993)

states, "socially, World War II gave Korea a clean-slate
opportunity to leap into the modern age" (p. 35).

In terms

of resolution toward modernization, it is reasonable to
assert that the uprooting and destruction endured over the
first half of the 20th Century opened the way to moderniza
tion in the second.

Additionally, the strong centralizing

tendency viewed as prerequisite, or at least the normal
course for inverse development, had always been inherent to
Korea.

Feudal and other localized power bases had rarely

interrupted or disturbed the centralized flow of power.
For Korea, legacy of centralized dominance remains still
intact at the end of the 20th Century.
rests,

however,

on

a

"top-heavy

This legacy now

government/business

conglomeration, so typical of the modernizing nations of
the 20th Century" (Ro, 1993, p. 35), all of which, unlike
19th Century modernizers (among whom Japan is included),
began within patterns of dependence upon their respective
model developed nation for virtually all beginning where
withal.

For Korea, which is to say, here, South Korea,

that model and source of intensive social,

political,

economic, and importantly, military interaction was the
U.S. (1993).
The period of original, direct, and quite elaborate
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interaction between Korea and the U.S., understood for this
paper to have transpired 1945-1953, has not been suffi
ciently clarified, I believe.

This seems an unfortunate
The

lapse in light of the period's huge significance.

Korean War years themselves, in recent times, have been
overly generalized.
period,

of

what

But the immediate post-World-War-Two

is

designated

here

as

"bureaucratic

interaction" between the two countries, 1945-1950, has been
largely closeted from clarification and understanding.
The

bureaucratic

interaction

initiated

in

1945

continued in different forms and with different intensities
through the Korean War itself, during the years after the
war, and at much reduced levels of intensity through the
present.

Indications of the watershed importance to Korea

of both the years 1945-53 and the integral bureaucratic
interaction with the U.S. during the period have been
suggested somewhat here by way of introduction. Because of
the unusual,

not to say dramatic nature of the Korean

modernization experience, with the special part played by
the U. s. and U. s. military, bureaucratic impact, it is
better to allow the full ramification of these mutually
influencing components to unfold as the background elements
to this paper are taken up.

It may help to clarify matters

at the outset by identifying one or two critical dimensions
necessary for comprehending the importance of both the era
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and the relationship examined.

Korea's modernization

should be understood as a process that was to a consider
able degree the endogenous expression of a highly distinc
tive, and in a communal sense, · individualistic group of
people.

Their move toward modernization and democratiza

tion was engendered as an expression· of a people defining
themselves in a new way, and possibly in a way which after
many centuries of elite,

centralized domination would

realize and release their truer, deeper, and more essential
identity and spirit, as a nation and as a people.
expression

was

cut off by Japanese occupation.

That
The

liberating experience and spirit remained suppressed for
very nearly all of the first half of the 20th Century. The
year of liberation, 1945, for Koreans, possibly in some
ways even more so than for peoples of other nations, was
tumultuous with exhilaration and release from frustration.
What ensued from this point, especially up through the end
of the Korean War, and very specifically and essentially in
terms of the bureaucratic relationship established with the
U.S., as well as the unexpected protraction of the North
south demarcation of the country,

I have attempted to

elaborate upon below. While drawing some conclusions as to
the Korean modernization and bureaucratic experience. up
through our own present time, this paper essentially ends
with the Korean War's cease fire, as a culmination of sorts
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of the U.S. bureaucratic experience and of Korea's estab
lishment of new identity,

no matter how replete with

change, disruption, and problems at that time still to
manifest themselves.
What follows is a kind of survey which will cover many
aspects of U.S. with Korea interaction during the critical
postwar period, and will focus on the concept of bureau
cracy as the key point,

primarily as this institution

relates to the process of modernization.
The opening major section of this study, Chapter Two,
will turn to the theory of Fred Riggs, which considers in
detail the above course of bureaucratization characteristic
of the political, social, and economic development model of
which South Korea is a part, that is, transitional, or what
Riggs (1964) terms, "Prismatic" society.
second major section,
Korean

bureaucratic

The study in its

Chapter Three, will then analyze
development,

as

suggested

above,

primarily in the context of relationship with the U.S. The
third major section, Chapter Four, will review the Korean
bureaucratic interaction and development within its U.S.
relationship context in light of Riggs' theory; that is, it
will draw together the considerations of Chapters Two and
Three.

Other general considerations will be suggested in

the concluding part, Chapter Five.
Riggs'

Prismatic

Society

Model

is

given

primary
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emphasis for understanding Korean bureaucratic development
for several reasons.

The first of these is simply that as

a Korean interested in the political and social development
of my country and of the East Asian world region, and
having academically studied this subject, both as under
graduate and graduate student, I had never been exposed to
a

theory

which

comprehensively

explained

the

postwar

developmental experience of my country, as understood and
in part experienced by myself, until broached with Riggs'
analysis of bureaucracy. Riggs' findings and insights rang
true to the contexts of Korea familiar to my understanding.
Riggs provided also a universal model, one applicable in a
scientifically founded and generalizable sense to the
bureaucratic dimensions and experience, not only of Korea,
but of all bureaucratic development.

Other approaches

seemed either not to fit very well at all, or to offer
merely limited, culturally relativist perspectives. Riggs'
analysis rang true to my own hypothetical judgment, if only
in embryonic state,
formation,

that the crucible of bureaucratic

especially

in

Korea's

case,

the

formation

engendered in the u.s.-with-Korea 1945-1953 experience, was
in fact the nucleus of virtually all social modernization
and

change.

Riggs'

insight

and

rigorous,

detailed,

probing, systematic, and, what one might almost designate,
conclusive

analysis

of

modern

bureaucratic

national
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development, seemed, by comparison, to suggest a certain
tentativeness,

vagueness,

and ephemeral quality to the

other theoretical speculations I had come across.

When

initially exploring Korean commentators in the area of
u.s.-with-Korean

experience,

I

encountered

not

only

critical reference to Riggs and Incorporation of his
thought into Korean texts, but, possibly more telling,
interpretations and insights made by these Korean scholars
which were clearly marked by an indebtedness,

whether

acknowledged or not (though in nearly all they were), to
Riggs' prismatic theory.
study which follows:

And thus, the apologia for the

which is an attempt to understand the

importance of the 1945-1953 u.s.-with-Korea bureaucratic
interaction, in terms of its shaping and determining impact
on Korean modernization, and as understood through the
prism of Riggs' theory of world development in the 20th
Century, the Prismatic Model.

CHAPTER II
RIGGS' THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY
Introduction
What follows is primarily presentation of Riggs'
theory,

although not, because of paper limitations, in

exhaustive detail.

As pointed out in the introduction,

Chapter IV will apply the theory of Riggs, developed here,
to the important factors relating to Korean-with-U.S.
bureaucratic involvement presented in Chapter III.
Finkle and Gable (1971) characterize Riggs' theory as
focusing on how, primarily in developing countries, the
growing power and complexity of national bureaucracies are
likely to obstruct actual political development.

To

establish

in

his

thesis,

Riggs considers bureaucracy

comparison to party systems,
groups,

the electorate,

and the legislature.

bureaucratic

efficiency

is

interest

While recognizing that

necessary

for

social

and

economic development, the dilemma is that the bureaucracy's
power acts to block the evolution or flowering of a
functioning party system and democratic pluralism (1971).
The above concerns are important to Riggs, and in his essay
appearing in Finkle and Gable's (1971) book (excerpted from
15
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Riggs, 1963, as originally published in Lapalombara, 1963)
the above fairly well describes his direction of thought.
However, the later Prismatic Model, as developed more fully
by Riggs
theory.

(1964),

is a more exhaustively encompassing

The theory purports to address the phenomenon of

political

development

as

it

manifests

itself

between

traditional social functioning and modern, more or less
fully developed society, which in Riggs' perspective of
1964

could

have

been

totalitarian in form.

either

pluralist-democratic

or

Contrary to the social and cultural

relativist positions contemporary with Riggs, which will be
touched upon later in this chapter, primarily as they
clarify Riggs' own point of view, Riggs' perception is that
universal, generalizable characteristics are apparent among
20th Century developing nations.

And though his perspec

tive, based in empirically rigorous data collection and
analysis, tended to place him outside the growing main
stream of cultural relativism, inclusive of more subjective
assessment and even definition of the concept of develop
ment itself,

Riggs'

compendiousness
convincing.

and

analysis,
exhaustive,

by its very painstaking
rigorous

analysis,

is

Moreover, at least within the criticism and

commentary of Riggs addressed in this study, the richness
and completeness of theory, which seem to go beyond simply
depiction of universal development principle, and instead
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suggest social, political, cultural design virtually as a
paradigm of world society, cannot be understood, I do not
believe, without concentrating on the theory's expression
in its major text (Riggs, 1964) which Heady (1991), for
one, has simply referred to as the single most important
work in the field of public administration.
Presented below, then, is first of all a discussion of
the concept of Prismatic Society (1964), and then commen
taries and related insights, by both Riggs and others,
writing mostly of the same subject matter.
Underlying Concepts and Terminology
A key opening observation for Riggs (1964) concerns
the extent to which external models or standards affect
transitional countries within their transitional phase.
Social behavior is not so much institutionalized as it is
adopted by fiat or law of "formal organizational structure
with a manifest administrative function" (p. 34).

Formal

administrative structures in developing countries are in
many cases mere facades.

Older, more diffuse institutions

tend to carry out most of the effective administration work
as a latent function.

Riggs importantly contrasts this

developmental phenomenon with the experience of developed,
Western democracies, wherein new, specialized administra
tive functions emerged as latent consequences of changes in
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the operation of older institutions, whose charters still
retained traditional formulas of a fused type.

Fused in

Riggs' conceptual universe refers to traditional society,
within which power and control, of virtually any form or
manifestation, are merged or fused into one aspect or
ruling function.

Diffraction, the polar extreme, would be

the state of development within which power is divided and
dispersed.

This process of development, for Riggs, is not

without its deterministic propensities, as administrative
and

society

characteristics

stages or sequence:
would

the

must follow

developmental

"only at a later stage of diffraction

increasingly

specialized

character

of

new

institutions be recognized and legitimated by the adoption
of new formulas" (p. 34).
The term, "prismatic," itself ascribes a particular
kind of structural configuration to the area or society.
Prismatic is not an ascription of income per capita level,
nor does it specify degree of utilization of resources.
The term does not indicate the natural endowment of the
national entity.

Prismatic carries some connotation of

transitional and developmental, but, on the other hand, it
does not at all carry the sense of direction or movement
contained in these terms.

Transitional, underdeveloped,

and developing countries may or may not be prismatic.
Riggs states, however, that the concept of prismatic
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society is intended to identify a specific manifestation of
social order which is both wide-spread and important,
globally.

Of more importance, the term is intended to

unlock much of the meaning and significance of a given
identified social order, and to analyze its importance for
understanding political, social, cultural, administrative,
economic, and even psychological change in human society
(1964).

The conceptual framework associated with the prismatic
society is non-teleological, which is to say, prismatic
focuses upon observation, description, and analysis of the
prismatic society, in and of itself, not as an indication
of change, direction of change, or final result.

Changes

in degree of diffraction over time for a particular society
can only be determined through relevant factors open to
examination.

Changes or change itself cannot be determined

in the sense of degree of diffraction through examination
of relevant factors.
ly.

Thus,

Change cannot be assumed conceptual

the utility of the term, "prismatic," is

established, in Riggs' conceptualization, as carrying no
teleological import or connotation.

The prismatic exists

as an adjustment to circumstances.

As such, in theory,

prismatic society is neither conceptualized nor, in fact,
institutionalized as a stepping stone to modern format.
theory, such adjustment may be permanent.

In

The prevalent
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terminology of transitional and modern, or modernizing, on
the other hand, does at least connote teleological assump
tions and meanings.

Transitional and modern carry also

qualitative implications of keeping pace with reality, with
current needs, or of striving for these things, and of
maintaining or pursuing developmerital norms.

In the

general sense of these terms, it is desirable to be modern
and up-to-date.

In the teleological determination of these

concepts, transition, modernization, and so forth express
process, not state of existence, toward some conceptualized
goal or end state.

All in all, modernization conveys a

notion of moving, with "moving" the emphasis, toward a
preferred condition (Riggs, 1964).
Riggs (1964) further differentiates his term, "pris
matic," in perceiving that modernizing, developing, and
transitional, but especially the root concept of all of the
above, "modern," suggest inevitability of progress, more or
less in a preconceived direction.

The goal and the process

of modernization, as distinguished from the state of pris
matic, are viewed as inexorable, with time.

Didactically,

Riggs informs us that in terms of chronology we are all
modern, in the sense of contemporary.

It is, however, in

terms of substance that we should importantly understand
and investigate modernization.

The modern society, then,

is socially mobilized, relatively industrialized, produc-
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tive, and capable of maintaining both effective government
and public administration systems.

The form of modernity

for Riggs, as earlier suggested, manifests in both totali
tarian and pluralist democratic forms, in both representa
In moderni

tive government and in communist dictatorship.
ty,

given

its

qualitative

connotation,

functionally

specific structures achieve differentiation or diffraction.
In transitional society,

leadership attempts to invoke

change and progress, to one degree or another according to
a fixed vision or agenda.

The agenda, as transmitted

through leadership and elites, evokes positive connotations
and images of the leadership as virtually the fathers or
prime movers of a new destiny for the masses.
are the elect who promote modernization,
industrialization.

The elite

and initiate

Through the modernizing elite,

the

machinery of government assumes effectiveness and builds
toward national power.

The elite view and display them

selves as the creators of progress, although the overall
image projected may be also the inevitability of progress,
and that change is in fact internally propelled (1964).
Within traditional societies,
drawn toward progress.
retrospective.

elites are not thus

They instead are transfixed within

Progress in the modern and modernizing

sense is hardly conceived.

Preservation and restoration of

social norms, ancestral lifeways, and what is customary and
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familiar, and all the while diverging consciously from the
new and novel, all characterize the traditional format.
Seeking to restore what has formerly been may well become
the characteristic focus.

Yet Riggs (1964) postulates that

attaining to modernity is only in fact a quest.

Tradition

al societies may pursue the quest, but neither modernity
nor traditional realization or reversion is guaranteed.
The terms fused, prismatic, and diffracted are used by
Riggs to assist in clarifying societal and administrative
states commonly associated with the terms traditional,
developing

or

respectively.

transitional,

and

developed

or

modern,

The defining characteristics of Riggs'

replacement terminology are quite different, however, from
the usual nomenclature.

The defining characteristics

hypothesize proposed empirical investigative support, in
that modern societies, upon examination, will be found to
possess not only industrial development and comparatively
effective administration, but also relatively diffracted,
differentiated,

and institutionally specific functional

dynamics, both bureaucratically and throughout the society.
Societies of a more traditional character, conversely, will
be fused or undifferentiated to a far greater degree than
their either developed or transitional counterparts.

Those

viewed as transitional will be prismatic, or very likely
prismatic in structural composition (1964).
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To clarify,

the terms traditional,

developing or

transitional, and modern or developed all point to teleo
logical

assumptions:

that

developed

and

modern

are

realized, or desired, or evolved social states.

Tradition

al,

constitute

followed by transitional or developing,

indications of movement from the folk� or the primitive, in
some cases,
developed

toward the ideal vision of the modern or

state,

as

pluralist democracy.

manifested

primarily

in

Western

Riggs' theory, while not contradict

ing the viability and truthfulness of assumptions made by
such identification of development process, suggests also
a need to establish the structural realities of tradition
al,

transitional,

and modern,

and to focus upon these

individually, and if not in isolation, at least in the
sense of identifying structural components of each develop
mental state, the interrelationships among such components,
without necessarily considering either post or prior events
or

circumstances,

and

identified components.

the

functions

associated

with

For such focusing of overall social

structure, Riggs finds it most salubrious and conducive to
hypothesis formation to isolate bureaucratic structuring.
Thus, in Riggs' analysis, traditional equates with fused,
wherein

all

functions,

virtually,

and

all

power

are

manifest in one central structure, the ruling individual,
with likely attached and serving elite.

Transitional
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equates with prismatic, wherein the fused power-hold begins
to separate.
itself

The central power structure pulls apart from

into separating

elements,

but

not

completely.

Instead, the elements lock into a partially separated or
diffused state.
separated

Developed or modern indicates widely

elements

of

power,

specified

by

the

term,

diffracted, which in the ultimate sense would signify that
Thus,

each structure relates to but a single function.

traditional is fusing of all functions, all power; modern
is an equalization of distribution or atomization of power
throughout the society.

Prismatic is a state wherein the

diffraction or diffusion process begins but locks into
place,

often in a quite permanent sense.

This state

assumes its prismatic state, its ossified, inert manifesta
tion, as a direct function of bureaucratic power initia
tive, realization, and control, as will be returned to
later in this study.
Heady (1991) considers that Riggs' Prismatic Model is
a statement made in direct response and negative criticism
to Almond's Input-output Model.

The term, prismatic, can

be thought of as closely approximating what is in fact
considered

either

transitional

in

character,

transitional society itself, in Heady's view.
understanding,
with

the

or

the

In Heady's

the Prismatic Model attempts isomorphism

transitional

society

or

political

system.
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Ironically, Almond believed his own Input-output Model was
itself

ideally

suited

political systems.

for transitional

societies

and

The key factor of differentiation in

Heady's view, however, is that Riggs specified the Prismat
ic Society has inputs that do not lead to rule making and
rules which are not often implemented.

The society which

realizes its prismatic state, moreover, is based on a two
tiered model,

of what is prescribed ideally and what

actually happens.

Riggs' emphasis on the construction of

typologies or models for comparative purposes, with concern
to keep them value free or value neutral uses the concept
of model to specify "'the conscious attempt to develop and
define concepts or clusters of related concepts, useful in
classifying data, describing reality and/or hypothesizing
about it'" (Waldo, 1964, as cited in Heady, 1991, p. 15).
Heady (1991) further notes that Presthus (1959) distin
guished between theorists attempting broad, cross cultural,
all encompassing formulations and those advancing more
modest

and

restricted

mentions that Diamant

middle-range

theories.

Heady

(1960) discerned general system

models and political culture models.

Riggs' model was by

design and intention a general system model.

Waldo (1964)

observed:
The central problem of model construction in the study
of comparative public administration is to select a
model that is large enough to embrace all the phenome
na that should be embraced without being, by virtue of
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its large dimensions, too coarse-textured and clumsy
to grasp and manipulate administration. (p. 22, cited
in Heady, 1991, p. 16)
Riggs'

model of public administration,

using the

"general system approach" (Heady, 1991, p. 15), as differ
entiated from "political culture" or "middle-range" (p. 15)
models, established dominance in its field, using structur
al-functional analysis adapted from sociologists Talcott
Parsons, Marion Levy, and F. X. Sutton.

Heady interprets

Riggs as formulating ideal types of societies in order to
advance

social understanding,

societies

undergoing

especially

accelerating

in

social,

terms

of

economic,

political, and administrative change, which models led to
Riggs' (1964) formulation of the subject of central focus
here, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of
Prismatic Society.

Riggs (1962) earlier commented on his

own work as representative of trends in public administra
tion analysis which moved from the prescriptive or norma
tive toward the descriptive,

empirical,

and analytic.

Riggs, as interpreted by Heady (1991), called for studies
that were truly comparative, by which he meant empirical,
nomothetic, and ecological.

Riggs and others determined

that an ecological approach emphasizing human environment
adaptation was needed.

Human environment factors would

include "formally non-administrative" (Riggs, 1964, p. 426)
institutions.

The crux of the issue was that, especially
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in prismatic societies, the formal, administrative institu
tion would "adapt" to the non-administrative and informal:
Even if some sense could be made of administrative
institutions as autonomous structures in a relatively
diffracted society like that of the United States� we
cannot hope to understand administration in situation
al societies, where the interdependence of structures
is prismatic in character, without taking into account
the impact of formally non-administrative upon admin
istrative institutions. . . .
What must be demon
strated are the connections or interdependencies
between particular environmental variables and admin
istrative behavior. To do this a nomothetic approach
is essential. Without identifying relevant variables
and showing how they are linked, it is impossible to
demonstrate the ecological relationships. (p. 427)
Riggs cautions that the ecological approach comprising the
intention of his Prismatic Model, suggests the advisability
of accepting cultural relativist limitation.

Cultural

relativists, in contradistinction to Riggs' ecology, may
tend to establish culturally-specific data as constituting
the ecological approach itself.

Instead of such enumera

tion of environmental and cultural conditions,

a truly

ecological approach must be able to identify "sensitive
variables in the environment--whether they form a part of
the culture or not--and the demonstration of at least
plausible patterns of correlation between these variables
and the

administrative items which are the focus of

analysis" (p. 428).

Riggs hypothesized that many environ

mental factors which might be enumerated through cultural
relativist input are "relatively insensitive to development
and to the explanation of administrative behavior" (p.
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428).

The analysis of politics, change, and administration

are not dependent on knowledge of such factors.

Instead,

analysis of administrative behavior in developing societies
depends on access to and ability to differentiate highly
selective

environmental

data,

along

with

capability for establishing correlations.

organization
Correlations,

which are the crux of empirical analysis, can only be seen
through extension of focus to nomothetic analysis.

Such

empirical analysis can lay the groundwork for ensuing
normative,

prescriptive

analysis.

Ecological

forces

analyzable into correlations among factors do not, however,
suggest a deterministic approach.

They instead work to

establish boundaries and ranges of choice.

They open' up

avenues of awareness, and to the extent that nomothetic
correlations create constraints,

they also create new

dimensions of understanding which are liberating.

Accept

ing the impingement of compiled cultural data as necessari
ly determining administrative formation and developmental
choice creates an unnecessary confinement of perspective
and limitation of insight.

Ecological administrative

theory based on empirically valid data will define the
framework of reality and likely consequences of various
courses of action:

"Thus it will reveal unsuspected di

mensions of choice, of autonomy, by illuminating new alter
natives that have not hitherto been considered" (p. 429).
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The ecological would derive administrative and development
theory from this kind of scientific evolutionary approach.
Riggs pioneered in applying ecological analysis to compara
tive

bureaucratic

Interaction

and

between

public

administration

bureaucratic

system

systems.
externa,l

and

environment and also the dynamics of socio-administrative
change would be examined in a balanced manner emphasizing
mutual influence (1991).
Riggs' 1962 analysis, "An Ecological Approach: The
'Sala' Model" (in Heady & Stokes, 1962) suggests that new
ecological models are needed in public administration study
to fill the gap left by normative doctrine guiding adminis
trative reform and development.
relevant

information

about

In addition to "clear and
administrative

practices,

organization, and history in particular countries," also
needed will be "more testable and tested hypotheses about
causal relationships among administrative variables" (p.
49).

Riggs understands his two-fold demand for investiga

tion as contributing in practical ways to public adminis
tration, but also in terms of theory formation in the
social sciences (1962).
public

administration

political

science

in

models

Riggs perceived that study of
developing countries
constructed

in

through

reference

to

understandings from Western countries, primarily the U.S.,
was of limited relevance.

These Western models examine,
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overall, uniformity of environmental factors in the Western
contexts, as if institutions, practices, and structures
could be thus studied, in this somewhat abstract manner,
outside the context of environment or setting.

Western

implicit assumptions of institutional autonomy and applied
generalizations fall apart when applied to contexts of
underdevelopment (Riggs, 1962).
Heady's (1991) interpretation of Riggs' analysis of
development contrasts the original Prismatic Society (1964)
with Riggs' later Prismatic Society Revisited
Recognizing

(1973).

(as has also been stated here) that only

examination of Riggs' complete and complex text can do
justice to his findings, Heady begins with Riggs' sugges
tion that the Prismatic Model also applies, to some extent,
to present day societies, by which Heady doubtless intends
diffracted societies, since there can be no doubt, as least
in Riggs'

1964 analysis,

explication

of

that what was intended was

present-day

developing

primary emphasis on bureaucracies.
revision

of

his

theory,

societies,

with

Heady notes Riggs' 1973

Prismatic Society Revisited,

attempted greater application of Riggs' prismatic vision to
highly diffracted societies undergoing various structural
stress and strain, as for instance was notable in the U.S.
in terms of the Vietnamese war and the counter-culture
movement.

Riggs develops in the 1973 revision a two-part
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manifestation of the developed or fully diffracted model,
including integration of differentiated functions.

In the

1973 version, integration was viewed as equally important
to the developed condition as the aspect of diffraction or
power dissemination and diffusion (the bases of diffrac
tion) itself.

In the 1973 version, prismatic does not mean

merely transitional, that is, manifesting change between
recognized and understood stages.

It is instead a form of

social integration and stability in its own right and may
be as permanent a state as the developed or diffracted
condition.

Prismatic may reflect equilibrium and exist as

adaptation between democratic and authoritarian extremes.
As

such,

prismatic

represents

successful

influence or impact from the West.

response

to

Additionally,

an

inertia is established to maintain the prismatic state, in
that the elite, through its positioning as the official
class, maintains, as Riggs reiterates many times, and as
Heady underscores, a level and solidarity of rule through
its dominance of both military and bureaucracy.

The

prismatic, though perhaps initially manifested and per
ceived as transitional in format, acquires its own elite
dominated

vitality

and

solidifies the

various

social

stratifications and elite power structures (Heady, 1991).
Riggs of

the 1964

compendium had already

focused on

malintegration as well as stagnated diffraction as indica-
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tive of the undeveloped state.

Thus, it seems clear that

Riggs' 1973 revision addresses primarily theory application
to developed countries.

In other words, in reapplication,

the theory suggests how development and diffraction might,
in some instances of environment influence, revert to more
prismatic forms.

In seeking to develop this concept of

what might be termed prismatic reversion, in embryonic form
in

1964,

discover

Riggs utilized highly predictive insight to
indications

of

such

prismatic

tendency,

in

developed societies, such as the U.S., even at the begin
ning of the 1960s, leading to the telling consequences of
the later 1960s and beyond, in U.S. society (Riggs, 1973).
A society which is prismatic and experiencing diffrac
tion through endogenous forces Riggs speaks of as endo
prismatic,

having an endo-prismatic system.

One which

changes or experiences diffraction through response to
external pressures,

Riggs designates as exo-prismatic.

Transitional societies tend to be for the most part exo
prismatic systems.

They can be identified with contempo

rary non-Western societies which respond to the impact of
the industrialized West.

Endo-prismatic systems in which

innovations leading to diffraction have taken place are
found only in the pre-modern societies of Europe, according
to Riggs, in which the scientiflc and industrial revolu
tions took place.

In these societies, the dynamic element
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was provided by the middle class, not by the elite.
power of the older elite was challenged.
restraints were placed on them.
them.

The

Constitutional

Changes were imposed on

Most processes of change probably result from

mixtures of innovation and adaptation.

Influence of either

predominantly endogenous or predominantly exogenous forces
can lead to the emanation of the prismatic society.

The

former would be endo-prismatic-pre-modern; the latter would
be exo-prismatic and contemporary or transitional.

In

Riggs' terms, prismatic is taken to mean or specify exoprismatic.

The exo-prismatic model provides analysis of

public administration in transitional societies.

Change in

the model is viewed as response to stimulus, threat, or
challenge from the external world, primarily in the form of
diffracted societies.

When the exo-prismatic society

possesses sufficiently strong endogenous forces, the threat
imposed externally is responded to through transformation
(diffraction) of internal structure sufficient for enabling
its maintenance of political independence.

Thus,

the

internal elite remains in command of the processes of
change.

On the other hand, should the endogenous forces be

weak, the society becomes subject to foreign elite rule, or
colonialism.

The external elite imposes structural change.

The pattern and sequence of change varies widely,
economic development always results.

but

Government costs rise
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far out of proportion with national income.

Transforma-

tions in addition create major political, social, cultural,
intellectual, and technical consequences.

Development can

be defined as increasing interdependence, marketization,
and extension of the money and price system.

Economic

development may not be considered desirable from all points
of view.

The society may develop even while per capita

wealth declines simultaneously.

Inequity and insecurity

may accompany economic development also.
societal variables may also be affected:

Non-economic
social welfare,

morality, and the sense of purpose and meaning in life may
be either enhanced or undermined.
correlative

changes

results

in

Occurrence of desired
positive

development;

undesired, in negative development (Riggs, 1964).
As the traditional society confronts the threat of
industrial

powers,

in

military

terms,

the

militarily

threatened country may feel compelled to adopt modern
weapons

and

modern

modes

Economic costs are great.
would be required.
little to export,

of

military

organization.

New forms of social organization

Normally, the traditional economy has
hence to develop from.

Response to

external threat, such as in the military scenario, general
ly would demand immediate and severe internal adjustment.
If some aspect of internal production, on the other hand,
can be readily increased beyond immediate consumption
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needs, then it is likely or at least possible that minimal
internal social change will be demanded.

This minimal

adjustment case, however, seems unlikely, since economical
ly demanded organization for exports requires establishment
of credit and transportation facilities, opening of new
land, procedures for grading and standardization, and so
on.

In time,

basic family and social change demanded

becomes much more far-reaching when transformation to
initiate industrialization for weapons production must be
started.

The export base must increase.

To accommodate

defense and military posture change, the public bureaucracy
must be profoundly altered.

In time,

the externally

initiated change process imposes bureaucratic transforma
tion of the following order:

a patrimonial or prebendary

basis moves toward salaried personnel and professionaliza
tion.

The patrimonial basis comprised elements of feudal

order, independent-small-scale rule, clans, and so forth,
permitting

the

hegemony of

hereditary

succession and

predominant local power through officials or chiefs.

The

prebendary basis of traditional bureaucracies permitted
much greater central control but required officials to
procure a substantial portion of their incomes in the form
of tributes, fees, gifts, rents, or similar payments not
directly allocated and distributed from central sources
(treasury) (Riggs, 1964).
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consolidation

of

bureaucratic

power

requires

two

simultaneous yet interdependent transformations. The first
is replacement of the patrimonial or prebendary bureaucrat
ic remuneration with salary,

set sufficiently high to

discourage bureaucratic need for solicitation from external
sources.

The central treasury must·be large to overcome

the prebendary or patrimonial habit.

The public habit of

directly compensating officials for services is not readily
Opportunities and temptations for bureaucrats

overcome.
abound.

New political and judicial control systems are

required for sharp curtailment.

The second transformation

involves differentiation of specialized departments and
bureaus staffed with specialists having limited scope of
activities.

Efficiency of tax collection and expenditures

of funds for control consolidation over the bureaucracy is
demanded.

In traditional systems, a trickle up method of

fund collection and distribution prevailed.

Every bureau

cratic level collected, retained, and redistributed upward,
with a small fraction eventually reaching the central
treasury.

Expenditures in turn depended on "trickle down, 11

as heads of agencies and departments are paid and in turn
pay subordinates, after deducting for themselves.

Only a

minute proportion reaches the bottom bureaucratic level.
Specialization overcomes the above practice and helps to
assure remuneration according to standard procedures, and
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to specified persons {Riggs, 1964).
Developing national entities in the modern era tend to
face common sets of problems in relation to their course of
development.

In some cases these problems emanate from

circumstances surrounding the throwing off of colonial
rule, such as the need for building or rebuilding adequate
systems of defense.

Societies which have never been

substantially impinged upon by alien conquest, when setting
upon the course of modernization, must still address the
same needs of financing and structuring adequate defensive
components.

In order to carry out such complex commit-

ments, in either of the above instances, strong bureaucra
cies are the initial requisites.

Their creation will

necessarily be, in the post colonial case, extension of
basic bureaucratic structures as they 'had been created by
the retreating imperialist regime.

Even though replacement

of the retreating regime's administrators may occur in
wholesale,

across the board fashion, the post colonial

tendency is to retain the official formats, or recognizable
semblances of the alien administrative rule.

The moderniz

ing nation which carries little in the way of any acquired
baggage of prior Western or European or other hegemony,
must seek to emulate some known or predetermined model,
generally derived from those implanted in Europe and the
U.S. during the 18th or 19th Centuries {Riggs, 1964).

In
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noting commonalities between post colonial and non-colonial
politically

and

socially

developing

entities,

Riggs

discovers powerful confirmation of the generalizability of
his Prismatic Model. Riggs' analysis of extant bureaucrat
ic data, as well as his own more directly derived observa
tional material, suggest that particularities of tradition
al societies and the idiosyncratic patterns of colonial
rule left behind are all, to varying degrees transcended by
uniformities
process.
economic,

seemingly

universal

to

the

transitional

Much beyond this central contention about social,
and

political

development,

Riggs'

further

contention is that the prismatic form is fully capable of
emerging in recognizable distinctness either directly from
traditional contexts or through the after effects of
colonial rule, but it also may manifest itself as part of
highly developed or diffracted societies as well (Riggs,
1964).

Despite

strong

adherence

to

universalizing

and

generalizing principles regarding the Prismatic Model,
Riggs also constructs points of differentiation based on
cultural difference leading to adaptation variance in
approaching the modern.

Even so, when stipulating that

particular culture traits lead variously to distinct levels
of facilitation or hampering in terms of adaptation to
evolutionary social development,

either exogenously or
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endogenously stimulated and carried out, or both, Riggs
with greater emphasis states that the society's ability to
adapt itself to the vicissitudes of survival as demanded in
the contemporary world's definitions of political and
administrative modernization does not result from charac
teristics inherent in the culture, · but rather from the
society's

given

integration.

level

of

Interestingly,

overall,

multi-dimensional

this emphasis on social,

political, economic, cultural, and bureaucratic integration
of elements and variance is returned to in Riggs' 1973
analysis, The Prismatic Society Revisited, but, as men
tioned above here,

in that analysis,

in terms of how

prismatic characteristics, due to a deficiency of integra
tion, might reassert themselves, disrupting social cohesion
and undermining the beneficial foundations of diffracted
development.
oped

his

In the 1964 study, Riggs had already devel

perception

of

socio-cultural

integration

as

perhaps the key factor in both moving on to successful
developmental stages, and then, later, maintaining success
fully diffracted balances of power.

Conversely, however,

just as diffraction is supported within a context of social
integration,

so too is social integration enhanced, as

least in Riggs' 1964 view of the relationship, to the
degree that diffraction has been realized (1964).

Riggs

extended this argument to maintain that the success of
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social and political innovation and reform,

from post

colonial or neotraditional toward development, may likely
rest on the evolutionary elites' understanding of actual
levels of their society's socio-cultural integration.
in this way,

Only

or through such an analytical process of

attuned awareness, can successful upward transformations to
development be made possible.

Such awareness and knowledge

must guide the successful pioneer, whether indigenous or
foreign,

toward

realization

of

development

potential.

These agents of change, through awareness and analysis of
how socially differentiated factors adjust to one another
within the context of relatively unchanging culture, can
achieve

desired

transitional

momentum

and

development

impact.

Through expert analysis of data and the generaliz

able processes of developmental change, the transitional
process leader can recognize predictable development levels
and characteristics throughout the stages of transition
(Riggs, 1964).
As transitional stages are completed and the diffract
ed or developed state is reached, Riggs maintains, the
power of the bureaucracy is increasingly given over to the
political

domain.

The

bureaucracy

increasingly

acts

passively in response to political initiatives and in
support of the primary political agenda.

As social

development, however, is caught up in the prismatic case or
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realm, the bureaucratic power agenda, rather than experi
encing descent in relation to political power structures,
instead rises to new levels of power and dominance. In the
prismatic society, formally initiated and structured laws,
constitutions,

and both legislative and judicial power

bases generally do not take the intended effect.
power is essentially chimerical.

Their

Social control passes,

rather, to those encompassing and directing technological
and

industrial

power

structures.

These

power

bases

engender new elite formations, which in turn readily employ
the bureaucracy as power and politics control and policy
implementation tool and stratagem of choice (1964).
Legislators and executives chosen to assume leading
and shaping roles in the society discover that their
political functions are under bureaucratic domination.

In

the overall context and history of developing societies,
aid programs of the U.S., with single-minded determination
to push development to its utmost limits in transitional
societies, have served to bolster prismatic bureaucracy
power. As the bureaucratic machinery, which may ostensibly
serve developmental interests with efficiency, expands,
growth of any effective political institutions is stulti
fied.

Thus effective public administrative context too is

eroded at its foundations.

Political institutions capable

of directing and controlling public bureaucracies, accord-
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ing to necessity, never materialize. The close association
throughout the developing world between the prismatic
society and direct U.S. aid and involvement has served to
undermine rather than to strengthen public administration,
according to Riggs (1964).
Riggs' Theory of Social Change
Survival

needs

of

societies

suggests, be mutually contradictory.

may

in

fact,

Riggs

Societal structures

may simultaneously perform many functions, both beneficial
and dysfunctional. Reconciliation of typical functions may
not be desirable since such accommodation could result in
destruction of functions both beneficial and necessary for
survival.

Institutional change could result if contradic

tions among functions are great enough in number and
consequent

tension produced

is

sufficient.

Societal

experimentation with new social, political, and economic
structures is an attempt to reduce dysfunction within the
society.

Functional requirements which contradict one

another are especially important in reaching understanding
of transitional societies.

Riggs maintained that "the

extent of contradictory functional requirements in transi
tional

societies

is

extremely

great"

(1964,

p.

76).

Contradictory requirements are further suggested through
structures which overlap and establish contrast · between
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manifest and latent functions of particular institutions in
the prismatic model (1964).
Transitional societies'

prismatic institutions are

notably different from the formal models from which they
are derived.

"Latent consequences clash with manifest

roles" (Riggs, 1964, p. 81).

Non-economic factors of the

transitional society tend to have more powerful effects on
prices, supply, and demand than do their counterparts in
modern developed countries.

The prismatic market is not a

true market but rather a quasi-market, described in Fred
Riggs' terms as a "bazaar-canteen" (p. 81), a descriptive
concept originated by Riggs in order to characterize and to
differentiate the economic institutions of the prismatic
society.

In introducing the concept, Riggs maintained

that:
The substantive economic behavior of a prismatic
system can be understood only in politico-economic
terms, not just in terms of formal economic models • .
• . [T)he political and administrative behavior of a
prismatic system can also be understood only in
politico-economic terms, since the bazaar canteen has
crucial political and administrative consequences, as
well as economic. (p. 81)
The economic terms, "reciprocity" and "redistribu
tion," are important to understanding the functioning of
the prismatic society.
of

value

without

Reciprocity concerns the exchange

price.

This

process

characterizes

traditional society and is its primary mode of economic
exchange.

However, the administration of the traditional
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society depends on economic redistribution of a tributary
system.

Contributions or tribute payments are made by the

society's membership to a central office, from which, in
turn, allocations are provided outward, so to speak. In
terms

of

prismatic

society

nomenclature,

reciprocity

relates to what Riggs designates as· 11 bazaar" (p. 82) and
redistribution relates to "canteen" (p. 82).

Riggs views

both manifestations as emanating from the impact of Western
market

institutions

specifies

that

"a

on

traditional

prismatic

system

societies.

Riggs

emerges from

the

superimposition of differentiated, specific structures upon
relatively undifferentiated structures" (p. 82).
In the fused or traditional society, the institution
of reciprocity is the parallel of the market in the
diffracted society.
of

reciprocity,

The market is a rationalized version

with non-economic factors

subtracted.

Through market rationalization, "religious and sentimental
values are put aside as purely economic considerations
prevail" (Riggs, 1964, p. 103).

Redistribution in the

fused according to tribute and reallocation becomes tax and
something like public works in the diffracted (1964).
The prismatic model looks like a market, in the sense
that the economic is formally designated for the sale of
goods and services in terms of money.

Other factors

influence the effective economic results.

These include

45

the arena, the stage, and the office.

The determinants of

price in relation to goods and services are designated as
market factors.

Factors which determine power, prestige,

and solidarity are called arena factors.

In fused society,

concern over price hardly arises, since arena factors are
almost totally dominant.

In prismatic society, both arena

and market factors are combined.
model of prismatic society,

Within the bazaar canteen

price indeterminacy is the

pervasive economic characteristic.

Relationships between

buyers and sellers are the basis of pricing and of market
fluctuations.

Wages

prismatic indeterminacy.

also

fluctuate

through

similar

In diffracted society, market

rationality works to level and standardize remuneration.
The key point is,
aspects

maintained

in terms of economics, as with all
as

necessary

social,

bureaucratic

functions, in fused society all valuation is subjective and
there thus exists no pricing system, either as standardized
guideline to regulate rationally or, as in the prismatic,
to be used primarily for manipulation and maximizing price
variation according to political and bureaucratic power
leverage.

As with any formal aspect, whether legal code or

price, because of bureaucratic strength and elite manipula
tion of both traditional values and formal,

codified

declaration, the rationality of the aspect is lost and
instead serves only to intensify prospects for elite
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bureaucratic manipulation (Riggs, 1964).
Riggs carries his analysis of prismatic manipulation
for elite economic dominance into considerable detail and
to virtually all aspects of existence in the Prismatic
Model.

Riggs' demonstration is in an important sense

Marxist, in that the pervasiveness of economic influence
and motivation underlie virtually every social, cultural,
and

political

circumstance

and

position.

Political

influence maintained through bureaucratic dominance in turn
prescribes access to economic wherewithal, in ways which
work to undermine not only egalitarian redistribution, but
access to formal learning and full development of techni
cal,

educational,

accomplishments.

scientific,

and cultural values and

It is bureaucratic power and influence

which determine the economic sphere, and much less so the
other way round.

Riggs is painstaking in demonstration of

how economic acquisition is utterly precarious and at the
mercy of bureaucratic hegemony.

Minorities or others who

might possess virtues not only of intelligence and indus
try,

but also some positional power due to a certain

distancing from the majority culture and its attendant
mores and circumspection, are able to accumulate wealth.
But their retention and use of economic power is precari
ously subject to the design or caprice of powerholders, and
can be rather unceremoniously, through various quasi-formal
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manipulations, stripped from them.

In the nomenclature of

Riggs, they are "pariah" (p. 116) entrepreneurs.

They

thrive virtually at the discretion of elite powerbrokers,
who may, without material effort allow enrichment of a
pariah class, in effect for elite economic gain.
elites

with

political,

economic

power

may

eventually

Non

accede

to

bureaucratic ascendance through a series of

economic agreements, bargains, or tradeoffs, over time,
wherein the elite power strategy is gradually compromised
as economic advantage begins to find bureaucratic and
political power access.

From Riggs' economic calculation

it is through this process that power and control escape
elite dominance and pass eventually to other, long sup
pressed classes (Riggs, 1964).
Riggs' (1964) overall critical insight into the nature
of prismatic society perceives it as intrinsically paradox
ical.

The extent of the society's prismatic nature exposes

the society increasingly to intermixing of administrative
structures with social, economic, political, and cultural
aspects.

The subsystem of administration becomes under

standable

primarily

in

terms

of

the

society's

other

subsystems or non-administrative components. The intermix
ing and intertwining of subsystems are the form of prismat
ic

reality.

Isolating

these

structural

components,

administrative-bureaucratic or otherwise, from one another
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becomes virtually a hopeless task.

The reality becomes

only the single, larger, more comprehensive composite.
is in fact a syndrome or complex.
various requisite functions,
survival, must be performed.

Nevertheless,

It
the

directed toward tasks for
All societies, from simplest

to most complex, including the prismatic,

must perform

them, according to one pattern or another.

This kind of

commonality of course is the order of perception which
allows Riggs to form the universalizing principles of his
study based on prismatic society.

These basic functions

then are grouped according to survival needs which are
thereby addressed.

The survival needs are:

economic,

social, communication, symbolizing, and political (Riggs,
1964) .
Riggs' theory attends to the psychological factors
contributing to social reality with special care.
follows Kardiner's studies

(1939,

1945)

Riggs

which examine

interactions between social institutions and personality.
The basic hypothesis to the above is that if the congruence
between personality and institutions is strong and the
motivational patterns within a society are consistent,
behavior tends to be more the function of environmental
pressures rather than motivation differences.
In a prismatic society the probable, or at least
possible, existence of strongly divergent personality
types in key roles means that some may react quite
differently from others to the same situational
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pressures....
Prismatic politics might exhibit a
degree of randomness that could be best explained by
psychological variables. (p. 84)
Within transitional societies, inner-directed motiva
tional patterns may be very strong. Rural and lower-class
social groups would likely tend to be tradition-directed,
predominantly.

The upper-class would tend to be more

inner-directed. This would be especially true of urban and
larger organizations, government administration, and among
professionals and politicians.

In modern societies great

differences

permitted,

of

behavior

are

according

variation in roles and associational contexts.

to

In modern

social systems, the tendency is for individuals to move
freely from particular role or context to some other.
Within transitional society, on the other hand, variety is
induced through competing, overlapping, and often incompat
ible social system types. Thus, the prismatic is uprooted
from traditional social and value foundations, to some
extent, yet cannot be fully adapted to the modern instance
of psychic flexibility allowing social members to shift
values from one situation to another.

Individuals may,

therefore, when sensing and caught up within this kaleido
scope of flux, resort to contrivance of their own highly
personal set of values.

This value system may become

sensed as well as expressed as a system of "inner direc
tion" (Riggs, 1964, p. 89). Interestingly, Riggs perceives
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that variety in disposition, action, and experience in the
society

occurs

between

primary

groups

or

individuals

associations.

rather
Within

than

among

transitional

societies, among those who have difficulty in making facile
value shifts related to changing roles and associational
contexts,

anxiety will likely be commonly experienced.

Trauma experienced may be greatest amongst individuals who
are inner directed.

They would tend to experience consid

erably greater difficulty in trying to adjust to cultural
settings reflective of "contradictory and often clashing
value patterns" (Riggs, 1964, p. 90).

Within the changing

social order and cultural context, it is as if the world
were disallowing these individuals to fulfill their own
sets of self-imposed inner norms.
creation of guilt.

One result is the

This sense of culturally imposed

individual guilt is generally more difficult to deal with
than are other similar problems of adjusting to transition.
In general, within transitional societies various levels
and forms of guilt are quite prevalent.

The "kaleidoscopi

cally changing social order" (p. 90), of transition, which
manifests

itself finally in some frozen form

as the

prismatic society, becomes for a time the only certain
outward reality.

Reality in flux exists as an impossible

state for reconciliation with oneself, inner directions,
inner drives,

and individualized self-imposed demands.
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Elites of transitional societies may thus well maintain
personal and social patterns of inner-directed motivation.
Within

the

diffracted

system,

specific roles are maintained.

multiple,

functionally

In general, for individual

survival, identification with many groups or subgroups is
necessary.

Multiple adaptations in behavior, outlook, and

symbols of identification must be made.

In diffracted

society,

self-conduct,

adjustment means adaptation

in

utilizing minimum effort, to continually changing group
contexts.

Riggs cites Daniel Lerner's (1958, in Riggs,

1964) typology to the effect that the social member must be
in adjustment through continuous adaptation to the expecta
tions and attitudes of others within the several groups
variously confronted.
on self-accommodation.

Successful adjustment is contingent
Ability to maintain group member

ship, ideally, in diffracted society, with minimal diffi
culty in access and egress, depends with a high level of
certainty on accommodational success.

The norm becomes

simply continual change in group expectations as associati
onal settings are interchanged, or what Becker (1957; cited
in Riggs, 1964, p. 68) refers to as the "secular" norm.
The traditional society had manipulated far fewer
social roles, though these few roles covered the spectrum
of life relationships.

Change of roles was the expectation

only after prolonged periods of readjustment, often only
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after ceremonial rites of passage, and without ease of
movement or shifting among roles.

Within the traditional,

all life situations were reinforcing to institutionalized
norms according to community folkways and mores.

Social

roles were required to be sanctioned by the society and
carefully worked out.

Individuals following these formats

encountered few inconsistencies or contradictions.
were generally held sacred
Riggs,

1964).

(Becker,

1957,

Norms

as cited in

The pervasive and readily identifiable

aspect of the prismatic is that it contains both sets of
socio-cultural expectations.

Thus, in substantial propor

tions, one discovers both tradition-directed and other
directed individuals.

Prismatic individuals, those who

themselves are in transition within the transitional mode,
find themselves constantly, critically, and perhaps even
devastatingly

challenged

by

new

values

and

attitudes

confronted, while still investing some part of themselves
in the sense of an unchanging rightness to traditionally
held norms.

Facile rotation of roles as elicited in

diffracted or modern society is never fully possible in the
transitional.
Traditional

Conflict of values creates genuine trauma.
formats

and

roles,

while

not

altogether

acceptable any longer, still bind individuals in the sense
of powerfully suggesting to them that an ideal form yet
exists and can in some way be made compatible with present
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change.

Traditionalism as a lifeway, while not acceptable

in itself, arouses, nevertheless, a need for binding sets
of rules, which are actively though perhaps not in all
Inherent past values suffer from

cases directly sought.

discrediting as diffracted institutions emerge to challenge
or corrupt them.

Moreover, much of the specific content of

uprooted tradition-directed values is given up.

Equivalent

new norms are sought and are expected to provide similar or
equal levels of security.

New systems are encountered with

the expectation they will remain unchanging.

Personalities

engaged within the prismatic society perpetuate a psychi
cally costly struggle.

Simultaneous impacts of contradic

tory values can be shattering.

Inner-direction can take on

a new and highly negatively charged energy.

The inner

directed individualism of the prismatic model of society
provides a key point of differentiation from the inner
directedness of the merely transitional concept; that is,
as the inner directed individual relates to the transform
ing social and governing systems.

In Riggs' concept of the

prismatic, the inner-directed individual creates critically
important consequences for administrative behavior in the
society.

Riggs suggests that:

In the prismatic model, administration typically
involves frequent clashes between individuals having
incompatible or conflicting inner-directed value
systems and goals. Leaders in politics and adminis
tration, having a highly personal set of values, seek
to impose them on others. Alternatively, some persons
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prove apathetic; resist coordination, and seek to
satisfy only their private interest, resisting all
attempts to mold or "socialize" them in response to
the interests of others.
Hence intra-bureaucratic
conflict reflects private struggles between clashing
personalities as much as conflicts of economic and
social interest groups. (1964, p. 94)
From the above it can be interpreted that transition
al, prismatic societies are likely to-experience difficulty
in terms of absorbing individuals smoothly within operating
agencies

and

internalize

efficiently
organization

inducing
goals

and

them

to

methods.

adequately
Highly

diffracted societies contrast with prismatic, generally, in
this respect, in not experiencing such an order of diffi
culty.

Within the prismatic structure, intra-bureaucratic

difficulties and struggles do not necessarily occur with
greater frequency than in the highly diffracted context,
but they tend to be of a different character.

Prismatic

bureaucratic conflict tends to reflect, most importantly,
interpersonal rivalry, with less overt concern for dis
agreement over organizational goals and principled interests.

In diffracted systems the struggle may well tran-

spire in earnest concerning unit program goals and poli
cies.

The confrontation, however, is very likely to remain

confined to the organizational setting.

Outside of that

bureaucratic setting, the conflict likely terminates, and
the disputants remain on friendly or at least cordial and
sympathetic terms, much as do contesting attorneys when
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outside of the courtroom. Antagonists within the diffract
ed context regard conflict as issue-and policy oriented and
not as a matter involving basic personality struggle.
contrast

here

is

that

The

in prismatic society conflict

involving persons at a formal level results commonly in
defining the other, the rival, as the -enemy.
enemy,

thus defined,

Against that

active ongoing struggle in every

aspect, within and also beyond the organizational conflict
ensues.

Quite without consideration as to actual organiza

tion interest or difference, that individual personified as

enemy is struggled against and opposed, v irtually without
exception and without relenting.

The increased importance

usually credited to factors of charismatic leadership and
to factionalism in governmental processes of developing
areas can be in part explained by consideration of inter

personal conflict and relatedness difference from the
diffracted situation.

In the developing area prismatic

situation,

inner-directness,

prevalent.

Thus, as Riggs points out, the influence of

as

emphasized

here,

is

distinctively personal values and motivations increases in

prismatic as opposed to diffracted contexts.

In diffracted

contexts or societies, the greater prevalence of outer

directedness among persons causes them to respond to
organizational pressures and social interests with rela
tively greater uniformity as part of the group (1964).
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Riggs Reconsidered
Finkle and Gable (1971), as previously alluded to,
interpret Riggs as stating that:
Bureaucratic interests can actually obstruct political
development. The dilemma established by Riggs is that
an efficient bureaucracy is necessary for development
of the society and the economy.· However, political
development may come to be retarded through the
initial power, structure, and then evolutionary growth
of the merit bureaucracy, which stands to impede the
evolution of a functioning party system. (p. 239)
Heady (1991) comments on Riggs' analysis of realism
and formalism, as actually manifested in all society but
most noticeably within the prismatic, as revealing of a
kind of unmasking of deliberate manipulation of refracted
sanction, institutions, laws, positions, and in conjunction
with these, the expectations and beliefs of the electorate,
which is led to perceive higher congruence between reality
and form than actually exists.

Heady emphasizes Riggs'

suggestion that legal enactments in prismatic society can
create little benefit.

In the prismatic case, laws are

virtually enacted for the purpose of masking the reality
and the intention to manipulate.

Riggs' position seemed to

be that prismatic bureaucrats, and the powerbrokers who
establish and support them, learn to adapt legislation to
their own designs.

Heady's projection of Riggs is more to

the effect that law enactment may be initiated by these
same figures of manipulation in order to extend their
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advantage and venue of manipulation.

For example, one

might imagine such manipulation for control extending to a
situation wherein a program or task force, with accompany
ing legal codes of regulation, is put into place with the
formal purpose of monitoring bureaucratic decision making,
especially concerning manipulation ·instances.

Yet the

intention of creating such an institution of extension of
the central bureau, was merely, from the idea's inception,
to first, create distraction from the true center of power;
second, channel criticism or critical evaluation away from
the actual source of corruption; and third,

create an

internally controlled mechanism (the supposed oversight
bureau,

with

its

complex

assortment

of

regulations,

functions, and designations of authority) to intensify and
deepen opportunities for control, manipulation, and corrupt
gain.

It is little wonder that, as Riggs himself suggested

would prove fruitful, we are led to apply the prismatic
model

to

our

own

various

contemporary

political

and

bureaucratic situations, especially when corruption might
be legitimately expected and enactment of new law and new
agencies are established, supposedly for monitoring and
control purposes (1991).
Riggs' generalizations concerning the above situation
suggest that it is within the prismatic arena, initiated
through transformation intentions, but then establishing
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contexts quite beyond control of transformational ideals,
that the "bureaucratic polity"

(Riggs,

cited in Heady,

1991, p. 429) begins to raise its own interests beyond the
purposes of organized government, in any representative or
pluralist sense, and to manipulate all aspects of that
supposedly representative or communal form to advance its
own design and to cater substantially to its official
beneficiaries.

No outside interest, force, or institution,

except in the sense of the overall public will, which of
course may be very intractable, or otherwise constantly
pulled and manipulated in many directions, can be mustered
to counteract the bureaucratic predominance and tendency to
act for itself only or its elite supporters, and to thereby
corrupt the intentions and purpose of the communal will.
Clearly, Riggs' argument favors those experts, including,
in Heady's (1991) view:

Lapalombara, Goodnow, Pye, and

Eisenstadt, though with important differentiations among
them and various attitude shifts over the years,

who

contend that in modern development strong bureaucratic
tendency portends weakening, restraint, and stultification
of political institutions, and thereby acts most character
istically as an obstacle to overall political development.
As bureaucracies appropriate political functions, "politi
cal direction tends to become more and more a bureaucratic
monopoly, and as this occurs, the bureaucrats themselves
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are increasingly tempted to give preference to their own
group interests" (Heady, 1991, p. 429).
This kind of bureaucratic ascendance goes beyond
transitional stages.

Its propensity is the opposite.

The

imbalance grows and the dominant bureaucratic position
increases.

Heady interprets Riggs as· suggesting that when

"the imbalance continues and increases, the prospect for
attainment of a desirable mutual interdependence among
competing power centers becomes more remote" (Heady, 1991,
p. 429).

Recognizing that holistic or ecological approach

es had been and were continuing to be used in application
to developing societies, primarily through anthropological
and sociological analyses, Riggs asserted, nevertheless,
that alternative analysis of developing administration
should

explore

governmental

concepts

and

typologies

developed through Western political analysis, but adapted
to

developing

countries'

problematical

combination

of

traditional forms and values with modernizing industrial
ization.

Such a model would go beyond social anthropology

and comparative sociology, with their focus upon tradition
al or "folk" aspects and societies.

Riggs' call for an

ecological model stipulated, thus, the generalizing models'
requirements of Western administrative study, but adjusted
to fit developing societies' transitional characteristics,
as in part delineated through "folk" anthropology and
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sociology analysis. Not content with more purely cultural
ly relative analysis, as had been assuming social science
dominance even in administrative investigations, Riggs'
assessment of developing country analysis produced the
following conclusion:

"Hence I suggest our chief need is

for an explicit model of transitional societies and their
administrative sub-systems" {Riggs, 1962, p. 20).

This

model and Riggs' absolute certainty of the great void it
could fill in political analysis became encapsulated in his
interlocking concepts of "Prismatic Society" and the "Sala
Model" (p. 20).
Riggs explains his coinage of "prismatic" as based on
a need to create terminology that is specific and not
encumbered by associated meanings as with terms like
"underdeveloped" and "transitional." Prismatic represents
the mid ground between "fused," which is the traditional,
the folk society basically before development, and "re
fracted"

{a term in Riggs' analysis that later became

"diffracted"), which means developed with wide distribution
of power throughout the society.
Riggs notes that the process of differentiation within
society, which moves it from the fused state toward the
modern condition does not transpire according to principles
of uniform development throughout the society. Understand
ing of the process of differentiation, or diffraction
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(which is the modernization process) will be in effect
coterminous with comprehension of the concept of prismatic.
Riggs thus initiates his conceptualization of modernization
and the transpositional state which reconciles and contains
the

generative

societies

movement

in the

between

following

fused

question

and

and

diffracted

metaphorical

response:
How, indeed, does diffraction take place? What are
the intermediate stages between the extremes? Using
the original context from which our metaphor comes,
let us imagine a prism through which fused white light
passes to emerge diffracted upon a screen, as a
rainbow spectrum. Can we imagine a situation within
the prism where the diffraction process starts but
remains incomplete?
The separate colors, though
differentiated, are captive, "imprismed . • . • "
The "prismatic" concept helps us see why the models
devised to study both ends of this continuum are
inadequate for intermediate situations. (Riggs, 1964,
p. 27)
In further developing his formulation of the prismatic
concept,

Riggs hypothesizes that developing structures

within society toward the modern cannot be comprehended
through individual social science disciplines because of
the impingement of interrelating structures within the
social structural relationship:
The social sciences that study specialized structures
are inadequate because, although differentiated
structures arise in embryonic or prismatic form, they
scarcely function autonomously.
Hence any
approach which tries to comprehend one of these
sectors autonomously is doomed to failure. (p. 28)
Riggs concludes his initial exposition concerning the
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prismatic concept by contrasting it with the disciplinary
vision of anthropology, which characteristically attempts
to incorporate an emphasis on "diffuse structures" (1964,
p. 28), and in so doing makes it explicit that prismatic is
best thought of as an approach or theory or model for
studying how societies develop toward the modern in our
present, closing century:
The holistic concept [ of anthropology] is not too
difficult to apply so long as social structures remain
largely undifferentiated. Indeed, any other approach
would prove meaningless for a largely fused society.
But in the prismatic situation the subsystems, in all
their complexity, are already emergent, especially in
the most industrialized parts of the society, the
urban centers. This explains the tendency of anthro
pologists to restrict themselves to the village, whose
structures remain nearest the fused end of the contin
uum, while eschewing consideration of the urban end,
with its diffracted institutions.
But in so doing
their results remain as fragmentary and partial as
those of their colleagues from the other disciplines,
who concentrate on the cities where counterparts to
familiar specialized structures can be found.
The
result, of course, is a curiously dissociated or
schizoid image of the transitional society.
(Riggs,
1964 p. 28)
Thus Riggs' concept of the prismatic acts to overcome
the void or separation the divided focus on primitive on
the one hand or industrial on the other provides.

Prismat

ic reconciles and refocuses the image, recognizing the new
social situation created, with forms and behaviors charac
teristic to itself, but not necessarily to be discovered in
either fused or diffracted.
Within the prismatic society exists a bureaucracy
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which not only adheres to more traditional forms but shows
development toward the diffracted model.
(Riggs, 1962, p.

This "sub-model"

20) of prismatic is the Sala, which

throughout Asia designates "office," but also "pavilion,
drawing room, or place of religious meetings" (p. 20).

The

uses of Sala are more diffuse and undifferentiated than the
bureau of idealized administrative locus in "refracted"
society, though Sala demonstrates similarities and shared
characteristics (p. 21).
Riggs' employment of the term "Sala" is virtually the
fulcrum upon which his analysis of developing bureaucracy
rests.

Technically speaking, within Riggs' special lexicon

and nomothetic hypothesis, there exists acknowledgment of
the "tendency in the Weberian literature'' (Riggs, 1964, p.
267), to restrict the concept of "bureaucracy" to modern,
developed organizational applications, which is to say, to
"diffracted

governments"

(p.

267).

Riggs,

however,

maintaining that "institutions of hierarchic officials" (p.
267) were indicated in both Confucian and other non-Western
circumstances, suggests that bureaucracies may be said to
characterize all models of his theory:
and diffracted.

fused, prismatic,

For the prismatic instance of the govern

ment bureau, or office (diffracted, in Riggs' terminology),
or chamber (fused, similarly), the designation of "'Sala'
applies to personal rooms in a home, to religious and
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public halls, but also and particularly, to government
offices" (p.

268).

Thus the designation of Sala also

points to manifestation of "that interlocking mixture of
the diffracted office and the fused chamber which we can
identify as the prismatic bureau" (p. 268).
Primarily because of the factor of price indeterminacy
characteristic of prismatic society as delineated by Riggs'
economic analysis of development according to the Prismatic
Model, "corruption becomes institutionalized in the Sala"
(Riggs,

1964, p. 270).

Price indeterminacy allows for

distribution of government outputs according to determina
tions of recipients' social status:

the higher the rank

within the elite, the more output provided, at negatively
direct correlated costs,

or,

again depending upon an

integration of circumstances and elite power-status, at no
cost whatsoever.
astute

Calculation of such differentials and

maintenance of

significantly

such variable payoff schedules

interfere,

of

course,

efficiency and cost effectiveness.

with

government

By way of contrast, in

the diffracted state, as diffraction is generated toward
the ideal, "it is assumed that governmental outputs which
are for sale

(public transportation,

postal services,

foreign exchange, import quotas, the use of communication
facilities) are available to the public at uniform rates"
(p. 269).

Moreover, these uniform rates are adhered to
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"without distinction of person.

Every citizen regardless

of class, caste, or community is entitled to such services
at uniform rates" (p. 269).
Within the institutionalized corruption made possible
and, more to the point, probable within the structure of
the Sala, officials extort bribes and special favors from
interest groups.

Income which can be readily added to

official salaries is acknowledged and served through the
hierarchical system of the prismatic society as a whole.
Officials

in

superior

positions

within

the

hierarchy

receive payoffs, as do power wielders not directly posi
tioned within the

Sala itself.

Lower officials are

expected, rather, are demanded to actively extort added
income and to initiate the process of filtering rewards up
the hierarchy.

Cultivation of extra-legal reward systems

are necessary for job retention and pave the way to greater
promotion and bureaucratic power and success.

Beyond the

moral and ethical questions of abridgment of rights and
duties, and even beyond the corrosive effect such wide and
penetrating government corruption will have at the root
fiber of the society so governed, collapsing especially
both the ethical and productive vitality of those strata of
the society with only very limited power access,

the

directly pragmatic concern of inefficiency seems particu
larly disturbing:
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Thus Sala sanctions reward inefficiency, for what
could be more inefficient as a means of rule applica
tion than the practice of accepting money to suspend
application of a rule? How can one expect efficient
administration if appointments are based on favoritism
more than on competence? (p. 270)
By contrast, in terms of the model of diffraction
juxtaposed to the prismatic Sala, in the bureau or office
of modern, developed bureaucracy rational budgeting of
funds

prevails.

Allocation is made "to provide the

necessary resources for rule application at minimal cost to
the taxpayer" (Riggs, 1964, p. 270).

Activities receive

the support necessary for survival and maintenance of
function, but that is all.

Returning to the polar opposite

of the fully diffracted and integrated bureau, within the
corruption inherently manifest within the Sala:
Price indeterminacy means that some bureaus receive
much more than they need, and others much less,
depending on the skill and influence exercised by the
chief of each bureau in the budget lottery.
Some
laws, consequently, cannot be applied for lack of
funds, while money is wasted in administration of
others.
Prismatic "budgeting," in other words,
reflects officials' as well as program needs.
It
institutionalizes inefficiency in the allocation of
resources as a means for the implementation of pre
scribed policy goals.
Prismatic finance, in short,
protects prodigality and assures wealth for the
bureaucratic elite. (pp. 270-271)
In "The Sala Model" essay, Riggs ( 1962) emphasizes
heterogeneity in prismatic society.

However, the pris-

matic's unique structures are developed only within terms
of prismatic and Sala.

These features or aspects charac

teristic uniquely of the prismatic, are found in their more
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But throughout the

fully realized state within the Sala.

prismatic society, instances of both the modern bureau and
In analysis of a

the traditional court are also present.

particular society, specification of proportions of these
elements is important.

Heterogeneity is clearly evident

and in high degree in prismatic society.
highly characteristic of prismatic,

Formalism is also

meaning,

in Riggs'

sense, a discrepancy between norms and realities.

The

tension within the society is to a great extent a reflec
tion of congruence or incongruence between the prescribed
reality of development and the heterogeneous reality of
fused, prismatic, and somewhat advanced development, or
refraction all being contained in one format.
industrial

societies

and

fused

But modern

traditional

societies

demonstrate a fairly high level of realism.

Complete

realism, however does not exist in any developed country,
and in fact, Riggs feels, the U.S. administrative system is
in many areas and in many respects, quite prismatic in
nature.

Interestingly, this suggestion is made in his

study of 1962, yet it is a conclusion he examines later, in
1973, as a revision of his theory {Riggs, 1962, 1973}.
The central difficulty,

disparity,

or uncertainty

indicated by evidence of the prismatic, for Riggs, is the
degree of presence of formalism, as this term is defined in
his work.

Importantly, laws are given lip service, but
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primarily that is all.

The law is important, however, as

it is used for manipulation, demanding official obedience,
or demonstrating the same,

on the one hand,

for some

strategic purpose, while excusing oneself or one's subordi
nates from obedience, on the other, when expediency so
demands.

The bureaucrat or chief bureaucrat, thus manipu

lates according to inclination and advantage.

Also at his

disposal is the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the
more complexly instituted prismatic state.

The power of

bureaucracy is enhanced, and open to elite manipulation, as
Riggs discusses later to more telling effect, far beyond
what can be realized in either primitively governed or
advanced bureaucratic formats.

Opportunities for corrup

tion become a keynote insight into the prismatic (1962).
Basic to the motivation of Riggs in constructing
prismatic analysis is to suggest how those wishing to
adjust or expedite development processes often go wrong,
hence,

the critical nature of understanding prismatic

formalism.

For example, adding a law or new code of legal

procedure, while likely to effect change in the desired
direction in developed society, is more likely in the
prismatic to create only further underwritings and opportu
nities for corruption and illicit financial manipulation
and gain.

Instead of such manipulations of norms and

prescriptions for adherence and adjustment, which under-
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standing of the Sala should inform us only result,
likely do,

in deeper,

more articulate corruption,

or
one

should instead, if reform and progress minded, focus on
bringing

reality

and

prescription,

structural sense, closer together.

in

general,

in

a

Beyond simply heteroge

neous structuring, overlapping is important as a character
istic of prismatic structuring.

In the prismatic, refract

ed co-exist with undifferentiated structures of the fused
type.

Old undifferentiated structures carry out functions

alongside the differentiated institutions intended and
designed specifically for particular functions.

Thus, in

prismatic society, the family, the church, and communal and
hierarchical groupings continue carrying out undifferenti
ated groupings of functions in addition to, or without
resorting at all to, the refracted structure:

the refract

ed being parliament, official elections, public schools,
and so forth.

Perhaps functions spread across all of the

above in the more developed state will simultaneously be
performed within a church, or by the family.

The hold of

the traditional, fused condition is powerful.

On the other

hand, such overlapping can scarcely be determined to be
characteristic of either fused or refracted society.

In

refracted, manifest functions are performed within desig
nated structures.

To the extent that realism prevails,

overlapping does not occur.

In the fused model,

the
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occasion for overlapping does not arise, since only a
solitary, "major set of structures" (Riggs, 1962, p. 23)
exists for all functions (1962).
Before moving on to the specifically Korean instance
of 20th Century political and social development, as traced
in Chapter Three, it is important for understanding Riggs'
overall conceptualization of modernization to close with
his understanding, more specifically, of the concept of
diffraction, or more essentially, the diffracted or fully
diffracted society.

In what sense can the process of

diffraction and the fully diffracted state of society be
taken as normative.

Prior to assessing the developmental

course of any society, these are critical evaluations,
which must be made in terms of Riggs' understanding.
In addressing the issue of whether diffracted society
can be thought of as representing the norm for human
society or, in a slightly different sense, the norm for
human social, political, and administrative development,
and thus, realization of individual potential, Riggs first
notes the importance of facing the issue that diffracted
society today is essentially industrial and urban society.
Is that desirable, much less the ideal measure of develop
ment success?

Or, if we cannot readily affirm that it is

the ideal, to what extent is "Industria," as conceptualized
in an earlier study by Riggs and as cited by him (1964, p.
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24) to clarify the valuation that might be made concerning
contemporary instances of diffraction, or reflections of
that concept,

not in fact fully diffracted, but rather

instead something more like a further prismatic phase in
the development continuum.

Especially in light of Riggs'

own Prismatic Society Revisited

( 1973) and likely our

individual observations and interpretations over the past
20 years of social development, one might opt for the
latterday prismatic option,

or reversion to prismatic

through malintegration of social components,
hypothesized

(1973).

Riggs in

as Riggs

1964 strongly implied

something of this undercutting of how we value the social,
political, and human structures of our present age (some
what

prophetically)

when

he

suggested

that

"one

can

postulate that industria resembles the diffracted model,
leaving open the question of whether or not 'post modern'
society will be more or less diffracted than Industria" (p.
24)

It seems clear that at least a suggestion exists in
the above that development may in some postmodern sense and
time, or stage, move beyond or move in some way back from
diffraction, which would tend to suggest that while for
Riggs the process of diffraction may in a sense be norma
tive, that is, in a sense may be carrying humankind to
higher-, more complete realizations of potential, it is
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possibly not normative in the sense that the fuller the
diffraction the more desirable, the better, the state of
human development.

This may be true, even in Riggs' own

theory, even though he appears to suggest that diffraction
and development are virtually synonymous concepts.

It is

perhaps at present more accurate to ·suggest that diffrac
tion is a facet of development, indicating its present
manifestation and degree of completeness.

Diffraction

appears more nearly to characterize description

of a

process which carries human society to forms which appear
to more fully,

completely,

and equitably satisfy human

needs, while perhaps offering also structural conditions
tending more toward maintenance of just and fair social and
political outcomes.

It might be hypothesized because of

empirically observed process and example of diffraction
that it in itself is the norm, but Riggs pulls back a bit
from doing so.

The normative factor in human development,

social or individual, might be taken to be fullest realiza
tion

of

integrated

group

and

individual

potential.

Diffraction for the present indicates the move in this
direction, but may not be structurally the synonym of the
ideal social state.
Examination will

be made

in Chapter III of the

situation of modernization for Korea, primarily as it has
occurred in the 20th Century, but in terms of critical
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background and contextual factors, and with primary focus
on the importance of the U.S. with Korean bureaucratic
interaction, 1945-1953. Attention will be given to factors
in the above historical process pointing to the phenomenon
of diffraction. To some extent indications of how diffrac
tion and development might normatively diverge will be
suggested, and the whole, intricate concept of how Riggs'
theory in general applies to the Korean situation will be
addressed in Chapter IV.

CHAPTER III
THE KOREAN BUREAUCRACY:

1945-1953

Immediate Postwar Situation
Korea's experience of long term arrested moderniza
tion, finally reached resolution with the 1945 Liberation.
Koreans sensed this liberation as more than freedom from a
cruel and protracted suppression.

They were being given a

second chance to resume the process of modernization from
the

wellspring

of

indigenous

forces,

to "finish

the

unfinished business" (Lee, H. B., 1968}:
A real modernization of the Korean society is possible
only in the Korean interest, through Korean hands, and
through self-conscious digestion of Western civiliza
tion with a thoroughly modernized mind. It is the
Liberation that provided for an opportunity for such
possibility. (No, as cited in Lee, H. B., 1968, p.
4 6}

The Liberation itself and the ensuing time period for
Korea were explosive.

"Discontinuity from the past was so

sudden and the expectation of the future was so unlimited.
An air of effervescence swept throughout the society" (Lee,
H. B. 1968, p. 46}. The long latent desire for modernizing
was intensified also through the external circumstances
within which the Liberation was created. Split between two
superpowers, the Soviets and the U.S., with each espousing
74
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egalitarian principles, Korea manifested two various forms.
The Southern part, under U.S. influence, expressed demo
cratic ideas and practices.

Individual expression and

initiative soared to unlimited heights in the quest for
equal opportunity. Ideologically, South Korea was swept up
in a transforming pattern of social change.

The institu

tional spheres of sociocultural, economic, and political
realities were transported and intensified.

For instance,

in education, a witness to the South Korean transformation,
Ch'on Sok O suggested that the zeal for progress through
learning became almost unbounded:
Thus parents poured their enthusiasm into education of
their sons and daughters braving all kinds of economic
difficulties, and consequently the young literally
streamed into the schools. The old generation tried
to open the road to achievement for their children by
giving them the benefit of education which they
themselves had not enjoyed while the new generation
attempted to realize their dreams through the channel
of education. This phenomenon was like a flood, a
flood of zeal for education which had been suppressed
under Japanese rules now bursting out like a torrent
over a broken dike. (As cited in Lee, H. B., 1968,
pp. 47-48)
Initiated by Korean educators, the Compulsory Public
Education System began during the three year U.S. military
government in Korea, and was later adopted by the Govern
ment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 (Lee, H. B., 1968).
Immediately
intensified.

upon

Liberation

political

activities

The underlying quest driving the mushrooming

political assertion was equality of opportunity.

Still
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under U.S. military government administration, 1947 saw the
advent of 344 political parties in South Korea.

Politics

and society became virtually the same phenomenon.
Korea was liberated from Japanese rule on August 15,
1945.

A U.S. military government was established, and at

the same time the soviet Union stationed troops above the
38th Parallel, partitioning the country into North and
South, Soviet dominated and U.S. dominated, respectively.
Extreme economic confusion and disorganization throughout
Korea

resulted.

Partitioning

left

South

Korea

with

slightly less than 50% of the Peninsula's land area but
with 66% of the total population.

The South possessed a

more productive agriculture, but primarily only light
industry.

The partitioning had not been expected.

The

division between the two contrasting structures of produc
tion, which in fact had worked together in a complimentary
fashion, resulted in disorientation.

The separation added

to the entrepreneurial void of management and technicians
resulting from the abrupt Japanese departure.

Huge food

shortages developed and grain production went into relative
decline with the population increasing.

Refugees from

North Korea and repatriating Koreans from Japan poured into
the u.s.-occupied South, adding 2.3 million persons to the
population between 1946 and 1948.

Between May, 1946 and

January, 1948, the U.S. military imported 670,000 metric
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A large percent

tons of food for the population of Korea.

age of manufacturing plants in South Korea suspended pro
duction immediately after the war.

Employment in manu

facturing and construction declined by 41 percent between
1943 and 1947.

Hyper-inflation, expanding the currency by

a multiple of 6.7 over the pre-liberation period,
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percent during the first three months after liberation, and
by a multiple of 15 from 1943 to 1949, added to the South
Koreans' economic woes.

The u. s. military government

attempted to gain control over the spiral through rationing
and fixing price ceilings. These measures only intensified
black market activities.

Price control measures were

subsequently dropped (Kirn & Roemer, 1979).
Despite

the

continued

disorganization,

by

1947

industrial production had started to recover and moved
ahead rapidly until outbreak of the Korean War in June,
1950. Through 1949, exports and imports remained relative
ly small, and substantial amounts of goods flowed into
South Korea through two U.S. agencies:

GARIOA, the U.S.

Government Appropriations for Relief in Occupied Areas, and
the ECA,

or U.S.

Economic Cooperation Administration.

South Korea's independent government was established August
15,

1948.

Less than two years later, extreme economic

disorganization and social chaos returned when, on June 25,
1950,

North Korea invaded.

Fighting continued over a
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period of three years,

until July 27,

1953,

when the

armistice was signed. The war resulted in over one million
civilian casualties and a $3.1 billion loss in non-military
property.

Almost one-half of the manufacturing plants in

production in 1949 were destroyed.

The invasion from the

North created a double disaster for·the South, returning
the country to economic and social disintegration, just at
a time when a real bridge in progress and independence had
been crossed. By the war's end, South Korea was in extreme
economic and social disarray, and was heavily dependent on
massive amounts of foreign relief (Kim & Roemer, 1979).
Historical Background
South Korea is unique in many cultural and historical
respects.

External influences, especially over the present

century, have shaped Korea's development and its political
ideology.

Cole and Lyman

(1971) view South Korea as

virtually a laboratory for the study of postwar develop
ment.

The significance of this developmental period gains

from the fact that, despite many economic changes during
the Japanese occupation of some 35 years,

the "long

established, distinctive, and homogeneous culture (of South
Korea) had not been significantly transformed" (1971, p.
13).

In contrast with Korea's Japanese-invoked colonial

development, the period beginning after 1945 was filled

79
with dramatic change in all areas.

It is important to

understand the phenomenon of this postwar continuing change
in terms of Korea's traditional background and long
standing insecurity, primarily, for the present analysis,
in relation to how these traditional factors affected
Korean with U.S. interaction, in the sense of bureaucratic
exchange.

The outcomes for Korea in relation to its U.S.

influence have been of a different character than were
outcomes for Korea's close cultural neighbors, China and
Japan, over comparable periods of modernization.

Korea's

long-standing cultural difference from its neighbors helps
to account for this outcome variation.
its

borders

to

outsiders

for

Korea had closed

centuries.

activity and ports had also been closed.

Commercial
The society

remained homogeneous into the 20th Century without signifi
cant minority or alien groups.

The central ruling regime

existed without regional competition.

No warlord or

military class of great strength existed to influence the
civil process.

Strong religious groups were not apparent.

Class system rigidity, moreover, had been declining for 200
years.

Japanese occupation, through disenfranchisement of

a Korean aristocratic class and seizure of its lands,
accentuated class leveling (1971).
The present administrative and political structure of
South Korea, as well as whatever promise of future develop-
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ment remains in store, despite 20th Century influence and
dynamic change processes, are derived very essentially from
an ongoing and ancient Korean process and patterning.
Since the time of its earliest development, for Korea, the
predominant influence has been China, just as China has
tended to dominate the continent of· Asia, of which Korea
forms a relatively small peninsular extension.

From this

influence emanated political and administrative systemizat
ion in the form of Confucianism, accepted and promulgated
as the official state ideology of the Yi Dynasty (13921910).

The political philosophy of Confucianism readily

suited the new Yi ruling elite, replacing the Buddhism of
the preceding Koryo Dynasty.

The impetus of that time,

bureaucratically, was political and administrative reform,
along with consolidation of newly achieved power.

Confu

cianism helped to create a government structure which was
both

highly

centralized

and

authoritarian

and

which,

therefore, could be readily mobilized to realign the social
mores and underlying social structure to suit the emergent
ruling class (Ro, 1993).
The Yi transformation envisioned government adminis
tration based on moral teachings rather than rigid law.
Moral teachings and standards from Confucianism would
provide administrators with guidelines as to right conduct
and

effective decision making and courses of action.
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Confucian classical education became mandated for Korean
officialdom.

The central ruler and the Confucian elite

retained all decision-making powers mandating direct action
through the lower echelons.

The centralized system of

autocratic control and merging of political process with
public administration engendered in turn a complex, highly
organized, and massive--both in size and power--bureaucra
cy, with which the ruling elite struggled for control and
political dominance.

Preservation of law and order was an

abiding concern, as was education.

Libraries and study

centers were created, as was a national system of examina
tion for educational accomplishment and placement within
the bureaucracy.

Poverty among the agricultural and

laboring classes was widespread and intense.

Local village

democracy, of a limited order and efficacy prevailed, with
an informally elected leadership,

usually honored and

respected village elders, acting as buffers between the
people and the official central government.

Government

impositions on the population were heavy; services and
benefits were few.

Party factions and feuds among elite

groups became customary throughout the Yi Dynasty, serving
to weaken and delimit ruling effectiveness.

Up to the

modern era, the last Yi Dynasty phase, these struggles
weakened Korean political coordination and ascendance.

The

primary issue of concern between conservative and progres-
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sive forces as the 20th Century drew near was Westerniza
Should the country remain closed or open itself to

tion.

outside influence? The Confucian order had collapsed.
government was inefficient and corrupt,
inflexible.

The

yet outwardly

Bureaucracy as a mechanism for administration

and accomplishment had diluted to a mere channel for status
and rewards.
power.

The progressives managed, however, to seize

They instigated international diplomacy and trade.

The Independence Club and the School of Shil-Hak provided
progressive scholars and bureaucratic leaders.

Unfortu

nately for Korea, simultaneous to all of this development
that appeared so promising, Japan, intent on invasion of
the Chinese mainland, focused on Korea as the stepping
stone for its expansionary designs (Ro, 1993).
Ostensibly, Japanese influence stimulated moderniza
tion in Korea and established legal administrative patterns
which would permanently alter ancient Confucian methods and
institutions carried over from the time of Chinese influ
ence.

However,

some question of modernization's true

course for Korea, and also its actual sources of influence,
must

resonate

throughout

meaningful

consideration

of

Korea's 20th Century experience and bureaucratic develop
ment.

When

historic

factors

are

carefully

weighed,

configuration of Japanese impact on Korean modernization
becomes especially problematic.

Working from a complex
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view of modernization as developed by contemporary politi
cal and public administration theorists, the character and
results of the Japanese interlude of intervention seem of
more complex significance than the usual declaration--in
both Japanese and Western views--that Japan more or less
brought a backward and disparate country into the 20th
Century, albeit, even according to such views, with some
ruthlessness,

flouting of international law,

and with

designs that were almost entirely based on Japan's then
modern-day sense of self-aggrandizement.
insight

The initial

important to interpreting the full nature of

Japanese with Korean interplay is simply to realize that an
emergent

progressive

and democratizing development

in

Korean society was abruptly cut off as Japan sought control
of Korea.

Japan's paralyzing effect on Korea's moderniza

tion struggle was accomplished, in part, through perpetua
tion or reassertion of Korea's traditional autocratic
character.

Using similar hierarchical structures to those

Korea had of late struggled to partially free herself of,
the Japanese exploited the politics and administration of
Yi Dynasty remnants toward purely Japanese ends.
far from moving toward democratic modernization,

Korea,
found

itself taken down a path resembling feudal vasselhood.
Korea's human and material resources were vastly exploited
and expropriated.

A culture and tradition stretching back
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some five millennia, instead of embarking on exploration,
through

essential

modernization,

of

egalitarian

and

democratizing aspects essential to its inherent nature, was
instead forced to adopt Japanese political, economic, and
cultural

norms,

as

reinterpreted

in

recent

times

to

correspond with the Japanese empire's expansionary tenden
cies.

Several phases over the 35-year period indicate the
From 1910 to 1920 the pattern

progress of this oppression.

of colonial rule was delineated.
necessary was set in place.

The political machinery
From 1920 to 1930,

the

Japanese created alliances between themselves and elements
of the aristocratic and middle classes of Korea.

From

1930-1940, the rates of exploitation and domination were
greatly intensified as Japan built up its war making
capacity.

Officially, from the Japanese perspective, Korea

existed as a colonial possession under the supervision of
the home ministry, exercised in Korea through the person of
a governor-general,
emperor.

in turn appointed by the Japanese

A few Koreans held minor government posts in an

otherwise Japanese saturated government.

The Korean people

by and large took no part in government affairs, even
though since 1919,

through a system of councils with

membership, both elected and semi-elected, they had been
granted some participatory rights, as part of the Japanese
reaction

to

the

outbreak

of

the

Korean

Independence
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Movement of that year (Ro, 1993).
On the other hand, up until the 1930s, at least, when
Japanese repression greatly intensified, Japanese occupa
tion had the unforeseen effect of turning Koreans toward
decidedly Western

influence in the form of Christian

missionary establishments, which had been allowed to remain
functioning under the Japanese.

The Japanese system of

pervasive and insistent cultural imperialism drove Koreans,
depending on their degree of anti-Japanese and strong
nationalist feeling, to these Western points of relief.
Christian Koreans themselves, primarily due to the connec
tions

made

with

strong

nationalism,

transcended

any

remaining prejudice of their own countrymen toward Chris
tianity.

Christians rose in popular estimation, creating

a channel for connections with the West, Western thinking,
and

later

pervasive

Western

influence.

Even

though

constituting at the time only 8% of Korean population,
Christians played a pivotal role in forming post-liberation
Korean government.

It could well be asserted that this

combination of Korean individuality, Japanese hegemony and
culturally imperialistic repression, and these conditioned
through the succor offered by missionaries from Western
countries provided the impetus for Korea's later special
association with the U.S. and its acceptance of U.S.
influence (Cole & Lyman, 1971).
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The Japanese domination of 35 years, nevertheless, did
create many changes in Korea. The Korea of 1945 understood
that it had irrevocably moved, albeit through a highly
negatively charged imposition, into the modern era and that
the Korea of previous generations had been in some sense
lost.

The emergent Korea of the latter half of the 20th

Century would initially have to be structured on what the
Japanese had

at first imposed and then

Koreans themselves,

however,

left behind.

overwhelmingly viewed the

Japanese administrative overlay, assisted by efforts of the
U.S. military bureaucracy, as something to be stripped away
from Korean identity, so that genuinely Korean political
responsibility and administrative structure and control
could be resumed,

after the 35-year interregnum.

The

Japanese period of long intermission, delay, and disruption
seemed especially frustrating, almost as much in retrospect
as it had in its experience, since it had come just as
Korea's elite had begun to be moved toward the complex
introduction

of

techniques

democratic government.

and

philosophy

of

modern

That time of democratic awakening

and modernizing self-realization had been cut off just as
it had begun to blossom.

It could never be recaptured

entirely. The need for practical experience, training, and
education necessary particularly for democratic form to
merge with an incumbent society so stolid in its tradition-
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al ways, had waited, entirely unsatisfied, except for the
Western Christian exposure, which had remained intact, for
the forced removal of Japanese totalitarian hegemony.
Korea's urgent, primary desire became, thus, in 1945, to
catch up as rapidly as possible and become the equal of
Western standards in democratic self-government (Cole &
Lyman, 1971; Ro, 1993).
Ro

(1993)

finds

special

significance

protracted modernization process,

in

Korea's

in terms of Japan's

intervention joined with Korea's more long lasting rela
tionship

with

Western

influence,

shaped

through

association with Christian religious institutions.
study of Korean modernization,

on the other hand,

her
Most
has

assumed that Japanese intervention internally in Korea
after 1910 acted as a kind of "experiment in modernization"
(p. 41), attempting through outside manipulation of Korean
social, political, and economic structures to create rapid
development.

From this viewpoint,

largely imposed on

Western understanding through the efforts of Japanese
historians, Korea had had no inclination, no propensity
whatsoever,

toward self-instigated modernization.

From

this perspective, Korea was viewed as internally debilitat
ed and, therefore, in need of external structuring and rule
in order to assume a productive role in the modern era.
Japanese invasion and consequent dominance, as interpreted
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still by both many Westerners and Japanese alike, thus
could be viewed as benign in intent and even somewhat
salubrious in result (1993).
The Japanese accomplished a virtually total restruc
turing of the Korean economy.

The Korean government

administrative bureaucracy was totally rebuilt according to
Japanese formulations.

Industrialization on a somewhat

limited scale was introduced, in conjunction with modern
methods for resource exploitation.
communication were modernized.

Transportation and

Urbanization expanded.

The

changes, however, the actual processes of modernization,
were only surface alterations, yet "the uninformed observ
er, looking at the external changes taking place during the
period might even believe that Korea made significant
progress" (Ro, 1993, p. 44}.
The

superficial

nature

of

Korean

with

Japanese

interaction, in terms of not deeply altering the context of
Korea, was in part due to the reality that all aspects of
the process were Japanese managed and controlled.

Distanc

ing of significant change in terms of Korea and Koreans had
been effectuated through Japanese manipulation for Japanese
national interest.

A continuing historical view,

as

alluded to above, may insist that at least part of Japanese
intervention intention lay in imposing sure benefit for the
Korean people themselves.

The entire process, however,

89

with its character of structural alienation and external
imposition was not likely to take in Koreans' individual
interests.

Fulfilling these interests and needs was never

understood as a possibility, much less as an intention.
The true Korean leadership was of course also not brought
into the Japanese impositional pro6ess.

Ro (1993), in

connecting Japanese imposition with Korea's modernization,
summarizes that:
In the true sense of the word, the structural trans
formations that took place were not modernization.
(In what sense could the Korean bureaucracy be called
"modern" if over 90 percent of the important upper
level administrative and managerial positions were
held by Japanese?). (p. 41)
Ro goes on to connect this externality and void in
true modernization processing with the oft-cited reality
that the departure after 1945 of the Japanese colonial
administration resulted in total collapse of the Japanese
engineered economic infrastructure.

Institutional change

imposed from without, and that through implanted military
regime and colonial suppression, can hardly be thought
favorable for modernization of a people and their society.
Korea's true progress of modernization lay outside this
Japanese institutional design, and in fact had its begin
nings well before Japan's colonial experimentation.

The

value change necessary to actual modernization began in
Korea in the mid 19th Century.

Ro (1993) sees, as has been

suggested above in this study, that the most significant
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factor to this modernization was Western introduction of
Christianity.

With Christian missionaries and religious

establishments came ideals of education, democracy, and
modern thinking.

These ideals supported development of

Korea's initial and indigenous progressive developments,
the Shil-Hak School and Independence Movements.
intervention,

counteracting

the

positive

Japanese

interplay

of

Korean progressive thought with Christianity, destroyed the
indigenous progressive leadership which had been engen
dered.

This death blow and stultification administered by

Japanese invasion, permanently prohibited the indigenous
model

of

flowering.

progressive

and

democratic

development

from

Later post-1945 efforts, which would be taken

up with direct interaction with the U.S., could only follow
the

"inverse"

model of development,

which is to say,

catching up in an emergency fashion with modern forms
through direct implantation and imitation, with very little
indigenous processing or evolution of form, because of the
35-year loss of time and 35-year suppression of pro
gressive, modernizing development (1993).
Events prior to the Korean War, after 1945 and the
division of Korea, created the extraordinarily difficult
times and ideological split between Communist-socialist and
both conservative and more liberal forms of democracy.
Reflecting not only the North-South division, but also
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creating dissension within South Korea along lines similar
to the opposition of the two Super Powers, the political
and economic struggle in the South, under the aegis of a
U.S. military government, led to a military uprising in
1948.

The uprising was Communist instigated.

The resul

tant purge of leftist and liberal elements by the rightist
bureaucracy was devastating. Dependency on U.S. supplies,
both

economically

and

politically,

increased

in

part

because Korea had to be viewed as a prize contended for in
the struggle between Communist and Western democratic
ideologies, which the 1948 uprising served to underline.
The U.S. supportive response toward Korea was intensified.
Aid from the U.S. was at $6 million in 1946, 93 million in
1947, and 113 million by 1948 (Cole & Lyman, 1971).
The Japanese period of imperialist rule in Korea had
not left Korea with bureaucratic know-how.
military

occupation

authorities

And American

themselves

prepared for civil administration.

were

ill

They were further

severely handicapped by possessing no knowledge whatsoever
concerning

the

Korean

milieu.

The

overall

American

presence during the postwar time was one of uncertainty and
clear absence of preparation.

This ambiguous phase of

transition contributed largely to the Korean generally
chaotic state of affairs.

Koreans themselves seemed

uncertain as to the sources of conflict and difficulty, but
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one factor remained clear:

the split politically between

left and right was intensifying.

Koreans had expected

rapid moves toward reunification,

and had not in fact

expected the immediate split, based on the reality of their
own preparations in China for reclaiming independence and
their resistance actions in Manchuria ·during war time. The
U.S. response of vacillation generally, but especially in
terms of reunification, in conjunction with elements of
strong anti-Communism,

which in turn created negative

dispositions toward political leftists and liberals in
Korea, worked to solidify conservative forces in South
Korea.

Ironically, these conservative forces were support

ed by the remnants of bureaucracy,
collaborated with the Japanese,

who had in effect

and by a police force

establishment which had also been part of the same collabo
rationist structure.

Too late, American efforts attempted

to establish a moderate political solidarity.
year of Korean independence,
dominance,

1948, the

saw a rightist political

replete with ruthlessly repressive elements

emerging (Cole & Lyman, 1971).
U.S. influence in South Korea pushed for two posi
tions:

first,

possibility

of

temporary

resignation

reunification

and

concerning

establishment

of

the
a

separate independence for the South, and second, strong
anti-Communist positions internally and in relation to the
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North.

In this milieu, Syngman Rhee, highly conservative

but unquestioned in nationalist credentials, emerged. Rhee
supported

U.S.

dispositions toward

anti-communism and

separate independence. With the support of bureaucrats,
police,

rightist nationalists strong in anti-Communist

sentiment, land holders, and businessmen, Rhee would head
the Democrats, the first Korean post-liberation party, and
Rhee and the Americans

become Korea's first president.

disagreed on many points, but solidarity of views increased
as rightist opposition to the Communist presence grew.
With U.S. support, Rhee opted for recruitment of Korean
bureaucrats

trained

by

and

previously

supporting

the

Japanese. Korean feeling generally was very strong against
these collaborationist bureaucrats.
grew over this matter.

Political criticism

The prevailing bureaucratic core

institutionalized itself as a closed and conservative
force.

Within its ranks, however, conflict did exist.

Nationalistic bureaucrats strove to block Japanese-trained
senior level incumbents from achieving higher advancement
to politically important areas of the bureaucracy.
Japanese-inspired

incumbents,

in

turn,

exerted

The
much

administrative influence, primarily to control personnel
policies.

Highly legalistic and formal standards were set

for admission to the bureaucracy.

The new personality of

Korea, then shaping itself, could not yet penetrate the
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bureaucracy for another decade (Cole & Lyman, 1971).
American presence and influence in Korea, as well as
input from Washington, could be thus tentatively summarized
as increasing economic support and political concern, as
the Communist split with Western democracy intensified, and
as Korea's own geopolitical division exacerbated internal
postwar dissension and disturbance.

American presence

served to underwrite an intensified conservative Korean
agenda, and discouraged reorganization for incorporating a
more inclusive and reconciliatory democratic tendency.
With support of the U. s. contingent and under the
aegis of the Korean Democratic Party, a very "conservative,
defensive,

and

closed"

bureaucracy

was

implanted

in

conjunction with independence (Cole and Lyman, 1971, p.
20).

Added to this coalition, the force of the Korean

police establishment was brought to bear.

Supported by and

integral to the coalition, the police,

still primarily

intact from the period of Japanese occupation, and remem
bered and hated as the most apparent Korean intermediary of
Japanese rule, worked to expand their postwar power.

As

with the Japanese inspired bureaucrats, the police contin
gency immersed itself politically as a form of protection
against powerful anti-collaborationist sentiment.

Rhee's

1948 purge of leftist and liberal political factors fit
perfectly with the police agenda.

They sensed security in
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carrying out ruthless actions against the coalition's
political opponents (1971).
Still,

a positive side did come into being.

The

spirit of independence among the Korean people, the at
least temporary calming of widely divergent political views
through division of the country into North and South, the
reconciliation of several partisan perspectives in the
administration of Rhee, and the bureaucratic know-how of
the carry-over administrative framework, provided stabili
ty, efficiency, and considerable progress. The infrastruc
ture of South Korea showed indications of strengthening,
and South Korean agriculture produced exceptionally well.
Land redistribution measures were carried out.

Tenant

farming was virtually eliminated in Korea during this
period.

Land acquisition seemed to resolve most political

unrest in the rural regions, and stripped the left wing of
any hope for rural political support. Political dissension
now became the sole province of urban South Korea (Cole &
Lyman, 1971).
With some consolidation of political, social, econom
ic, and even technological gains in the South, whatever
direct U.S. influence remained, on a bureaucratic process
operating smoothly, appeared to be diminishing.

Despite

associated drawbacks of a conservative and repressive
agenda, not enhancing to the elements of representative
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government which evidenced themselves from time to time, if
only as solitary legislative voices, the Rhee regime, with
the efficiency of its bureaucratic machinery and technical
ly able police and security, seemed well able to secure
heavy economic sustenance from the U.S.,

while lending

itself a growing character of independence.

Though the

primary impetus may have been driving at best to the
autocratic, style already too compatible with longstanding
Korean attitudes, and at worst to dictatorship, neverthe
less, a conservative but perhaps still democratic, politi
cal philosophy, replete with U.S. approval and support, was
unfolding (Cole & Lyman, 1971).
The invasion by the North would, however, irrevocably
change all of this, and drive Korea's relationship with the
U.S.,

and with the rest of the world,

unforeseen direction and dimension.

into a totally

The Land of the

Morning Calm became virtually overnight, the front-line
bastion of the Western Allied defense in the Far East, and
by the time of the war's conclusion, Korea's armed forces
of nearly one million would testify to the changed nature
of almost every aspect of her identity, changes which
continued to transpire through close association with the
u.s.
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The Immediate Bureaucratic Impact
H. B. Lee (1968) suggests that Korea's Liberation in
August of 1945 was her second opening to the modern world,
identifying the forced commercial treaty with Japan of 1876
as the first, after which Korea had signed similar treaties
with the U.S. and with European powers.

But in fact Lee's

own historical notations amplify the suggestion of indige
nous modernization agenda as early as 1864 with the
Taewongun reform of 1864, predating Japan's forced exploi
tation by a dozen years.

The famed Independence Club

Reformist Movement of 1896-1898 had thus been preceded by
Taewongun by more than 30 years.

Other indigenous modern

ization attempts had been Kaehwadang Erneute of 1884 and the
Tonghak Rebellion of 1894.

Taewongun's forceful and

ambitious attempt to restructure Korea through a multi
faceted modernization, as father-regent to the young king,
incorporated what were then drastic measures, including
elimination of factional discrimination in bureaucratic
recruitment, and an end to bribery within the kingdom, and
establishment of a more vigorous tax collection system.
Additionally, the defense units were to be revamped; the
dominating influence of Confucian mores on the ruling class
was to be ended, inclusive of the elite's "servile adora
tion" (Lee, H. B.,

1968, p. 44) of Ming China and resul

tant policy identification with them.

As promising as
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Taewongun's policy appeared for establishing modernization
from the top down, it was undermined by its own ultra
isolationist policy and the internal power struggle between
the regent-father and the in-laws of the young king.

The

in-laws conspired to block the country's entrance to the
modern world (1968).
The Kaehwadang Emeute, some 20 years after Taewongun,
was a modernization attempt of a different character, and
was more generally in response to the Japanese presence and
forced opening initiatives concerning Korea.

Kim Okkyun

and an elite group of upper class officials had observed
modernization in practice in Japan.

They wanted to

eliminate the traditionally-oriented Korean royal in-laws
from access to royal power.

The Japanese expeditionary

garrison unit supported their attempt.
was

Failure, however,

predictable due to the elite's lack of sound national

identity and their "lack of an organizational base among
the mass" (Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 44).
As a massive peasant rebellion originating in Cholla
Province under Chon Pongjun, in 1894, the Tonghak Rebellion
began as an endogenously syncretized religion in 1860 under
Choe Che-u, combining the four extant religions of the time
in Korea.

These included Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism,

and Catholicism. The movement generated was both national
istic and social development in nature.

Protests against
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ruling corruption, both governmental and elite class, were
instigated, as well as against all outsiders, especially
the Japanese. After 40 days of upheaval spreading through
out the Southern half of the country, the rebellion was
subdued by the government acting with assistance from
China.

Japan acted in turn to intervene.

the Sino-Japanese War on Korean soil.

This initiated
The 1896-1898

Independence Club Reformist Movement provided the climax to
the overall Enlightenment Movement of the decade immediate
ly after the Tonghak Movement. Evidence of this new spirit
was in the establishment of private high schools founded by
both Christian missions and nationalist leaders. The first
Korean newspapers were published. The intellectuals of the
Independence
oriented.
reformers.

Club

were

Western-educated

and

Western

Syngman Rhee was included among these youthful
The ruling elites were able to suppress the

movement. Indigenous modernization thus could not entirely
succeed.

Successive intrusions by Chinese, Japanese, and

Russians around the turn of the century resulted in the
capitulation of the country and takeover by the Japanese.
Indigenous initiatives, especially after the March 1, 1919
uprising demanding restoration of Korean independence, were
quickly suppressed.

Indigenous modernization process was

prevented by the "exceptionally narrow-gauged and brutal"
(Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 45) colonial rule of the Japanese.
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Lee thus emphasizes the importance of viewing the Korean
Liberation of 1945 in the light of this long period of
suppressed independence (1968).
The actual impact of U.S. military operations on
bureaucratic development in the immediate postwar period
has

been

characterized

as

uncertain,

"fumbling" (Mason, et al., 1980, p. 40).

unfocused,

and

From the immedi-

ate postwar perspective of U.S. military rule, and through
the

initial two years of independent government,

the

economic explosion of Korea, initiated in 1960, would have
seemed unlikely.

The U.S. postwar perspective was appar

ently that Korea's state of economic weakness and dependen
cy would be virtually permanent. This presumption of long
term Korean economic dependence would be important to U.S.
Korean bureaucratic relationship during the postwar period.
And in fact it was only with the Korean war itself, 19501953, which had both a salubrious and solidifying affect on
South Korean national identity and confidence, that Korea
would initiate efforts which would eventually lead to the
phasing out completely of U.S. economic assistance, but not
in fact until well after the war, in 1975. Immediate post
World-War-Two administrative or bureaucratic democratiza
tion, in the face of ongoing influence from the U.S., was
quite another matter. Modernization and Westernization of
political development in Korea in terms of its institu-
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tions, structures, and values did not progress according to
the rapid agenda of the economy.

Probably the early

postwar reinstitution of Japanese-inspired bureaucracy for
management and u. s. support of a repressive regime and
related

Japanese-organized

institutions

combined to create a bureaucratic ·whole,

of

repression,

which, though

partly inspired through U.S. associations, could not move
institutionally entirely toward the West, and would not
rectify much of this administrative, bureaucratic deficien
cy until after the recent (1992) presidential election.
Prior to this very recent change in direction,

most

momentum may have been generated toward authoritative
administrative structures increasingly at odds with the
democratizing inclinations of the society, in its fullest
sense, outside the machinery of bureaucracy.
progress had been ineluctably,

Democratic

at the behest of U. s.

interaction with Korea, forced into a relative state of
submission, seemingly for the purposes of administrative
strengthening and delineation of more precise lines of
political and bureaucratic authority and regime stability,
but without nation building, in the sense of fully relating
administrative and authoritative structures of government
to political forces within the society (1980).
This stunted bureaucratic process clearly finds part
of its root source in the immediate postwar, 1945, period,
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as has been suggested above, and more specifically, finds
its decisive point in the response to the administrative
vacuum left by the rapid exit of Japanese administrators.
The U.S. interaction with Korean administration and bureau
cracy might well have not taken so decisively limiting of
an approach--supporting against popular Korean public will
a collaborationist bureaucracy, a similarly-founded police
institution,

and conservative political leaders--if the

Soviet and Communist presence and assertiveness in the
North had been absent. The Soviets, however, had scrambled
avidly into Northern Korea, just three days before full
Japanese formal surrender.

They had immediately busied

themselves in organizing their own hand-picked government.
General Hodge, U.S. military forces in Korea commander,
arrived nearly a full month later, on September 7.

He

lacked substantial briefing concerning Korean affairs and
possessed no specific direction from either McArthur in
Tokyo or the State Department in Washington. The Tri-Power
Conference in Cairo had taken up the issue of Korea in what
had seemed to many almost an afterthought.

The decision

had been to establish Korea as a trusteeship, under the
U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The duration of this admini

stration was to be for an indeterminate length of time.
General Hodge, without chosen South Korean representatives,
had to prepare for negotiations with the Soviets and their
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already established North Korean counterparts {1980).
At this indeterminate juncture,

with the Soviets

holding the upperhand, Syngman Rhee, considered a pioneer
of Korean independence, returned to Seoul on Oct 19, 1945.
The Truman State Department had objected to Rhee because of
his adamant anti-Soviet posture.

Speaking in Seoul on the

day after his arrival, Rhee attacked the Soviets, with
strong words against the status of trusteeship, against the
division of Korea--considering these shortcomings to be
entirely due to Soviet machinations--and all the while
raising American fears and the concern of General Hodge
that such remarks would disturb the already delicate bal
ance of power.

Rhee and the U.S. contingent had to coop

erate on negotiations with the North Koreans and their
Soviet patrons.
ry,

Though Rhee was of course not conciliato

and though a less than ideally compatible working

relationship among the four counterparts emerged,

what

became increasingly clear during this phase, supposedly
intended for Korean unification, was the more probable
nature of Soviet intentions.

Their hasty rush through

Manchuria and into Korea, to begin political organizing at
the moment when Japanese capitulation seemed inevitable,
would have been conclusive evidence enough for anyone of
Soviet malfeasance, except for the ingenuous Americans, who
had taken the Soviets to heart as "peace-loving" allies.
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Protraction of unification negotiations for the Soviets was
likely a stratagem intended to persuade the U.S. to grow
weary and contemplate withdrawal, leaving all opposition to
Soviet hegemony to Rhee alone

(Mason,

et al.,

1980).

Abandonment became the predominant mood for the U.S. State
Department, which turned as a final resort then to the U.N.
General Assembly, still in its infancy, and requested they
initiate and supervise the election of a Korean National
Assembly, that is, national in the sense of being for the
whole country.

The idea would be to simply presume

unification, since no cooperation appeared forthcoming from
the Soviets. Elections in the South only, of the Assembly,
which in turn would select Rhee, sealed one chapter for
Korea, one of great hope for both rapid unification and
democratic freedom,

and opened another.

The ensuing

reactions of the u. s. (pulling back support from Korea
between 1948-1950) may be somewhat problematical in terms
of interpretation, except for the understandability of war
weariness, but far less understandably given the clarifica
tion of Soviet intentions, not to say, grand design, in the
Far East.

South Korea, dislodged from U.S. support, with

a populace resenting imposition of and support for a
collaborative
sometimes

bureaucracy

violently,

with

and
its

police,
own

and

struggling,

internal

political

divisions, was hardly in a position for a creditable self-
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defense.

With apparent inevitability, as discussed above,

the ensuing horrendous and bloody war which then seemed to
some clearly developing would bring the U.S. and Korea
irrevocably

together,

and

would

totally

redefine

all

aspects of their relationship (Mason, et al., 1980).
During the Korean War, the U.S. relationship developed
in unforeseen directions with South Korea, not in military
conflict only, but within the context of administrative
bureaucratic relationship.

Rhee's ascendancy to full

autocracy, precipitated as early as 1948, with his harsh,
Japanese-collaborationist-supported crackdown on a leftist
uprising, had created opposition of considerable energy in
its own right, from which his rural popularity could not
entirely insulate him.

The Assembly, particularly, became

galvanized in opposition.

And waiting in the wings so to

speak or at least developing, a military presence, the most
immediate and indulged recipient of U.S. support,

was

solidifying as the primary organizational potency.

In

1952, however, Rhee discovered merely that his popularity
had waned enough of his left-of-center, or perhaps actually
only center, opposition had strengthened enough in the
Assembly to oust him, given their constitutional right of
appointment or authority to elect the president.

Seizing

the initiative, and allied with the Korean Martial Law
Commander, Rhee forced through a constitutional amendment,
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transferring presidential election to popular vote of the
electorate.

Among the people, Rhee was the only recogniz

able candidate. He won the election with two-thirds of the
popular vote.

Rebukes expressed from Korea's strongest

military allies, including President Truman, had no effect
{Mason, et al., 1980).
The full-fledged autocratic projection of Syngmon Rhee
placed a kind of signature on the U.S. establishment of and
involvement with Korean bureaucracy.

His 1952 assumption

of the presidency would prepare Korea for a trend of
autocratic rule and military dominance over state legisla
tive and bureaucratic processes.
The Underlying Effects of U.S./Korean
Bureaucratic Engagement
Initiation of u. s. involvement with Korea had had
three specified objectives:

to establish a free and

independent Korea according to promises made at the Cairo
and Potsdam Conferences; to strengthen Korea, politically,
economically, and militarily, so as to establish her as a
factor of stability in the Far East; and to project the new
Republic of Korea as an example of democracy in Asia, for
other Asian peoples to see and to emulate.

The continued

obstacle (entirely, it must be so stated, at the instiga
tion of the Soviets) of forestalling unification, created
a blurring of the U.S. vision for Korea. With the Soviet's
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true intention displayed, the question arose as to the
focus of U.S. development ploys.
reality going to be?

What was the Korean

Unification of division?

The

possibility of unification remained until 1947, and late
into that year.

All U.S. action and directive for the

first two years of interaction were toward this goal. When
the reality of Soviet purpose crystallized, it can be seen
how the result would undermine U.S. resolution and commit
ment.

The new vision, as suggested above, became simply

that South Korea would have to stand on its own (Mason, et
al., 1980).
Accompanying U.S. occupation forces was the GARICA, or
Government Appropriations for Relief in occupied Areas.
The program had three purposes:

to prevent starvation and

disease; to increase agricultural output; and to provide
imported commodities for the massive shortages in almost
a11 consumer goods.

Korea,

under the program, was to

become a net exporter of foodstuffs, as predicted, at some
point during the 1950s. Concerning American intentions and
interplay

with

establishing

a

Korean

administration,

however, the division of Korea, other than simply finding
reflection in a U.S. vision for Korea which became increas
ingly disunited and at odds with itself, resulted in a new
logic, which determined U.S. involvement between the time
of South Korea's 1948 Independence and its 1950 military
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engagement with the North.

The logic of overall U.S.

policy asserted that if unification were still possible,
even though the process was delayed, it made little sense
to bolster South Korea to the extent envisioned for the
whole of Korea at Potsdam and Cairo.

Congress became very

hesitant to allocate more funds; rehabilitation on the
scale actually needed was not considered feasible; the U.N.
also vacillated and continued to debate the Korean issue;
the American military advisor, assessing Korea in 194 7,
reported

reunification

was

imminent,

which

scenario

evidently convinced President Truman; and therefore the
effort for a democratic South Korea became half-hearted.
It faded from a picture of Korea as a democratic showplace
to a very limited vision wherein it was considered ill
advised to make South Korea self-sustaining.

A self

sustaining and separate South Korea had come to be inter
preted as establishing an experiment in industrialization
without resources (Mason, et al., 1980).
The U.S. Military Government in Korea

(USAMGIK),

assuming the failure in unification, dedicated itself to an
agenda of short-term objectives.

Certain actions taken,

nevertheless, developed longer-term consequences.

Land

redistribution of Japanese-held Korean properties was
delayed

until

Company, Ltd.

the USAMGIK established the new

Korea

This agency gathered necessary information
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of redistribution, and in March, 1948 established the
National Land Administration.

By September, 487,621 acres

had been sold to 502,072 tenants.

Ninety-six percent of

Japanese landholdings were liquidated, and provisions were
written into the new Korean Constitution for redistribution
of larger Korean land-holdings.

Some delay resulted, but

by 1948 all redistribution had been put into effect.

This

represented the major accomplishment and most successful
bureaucratic interaction of the U.S. with Korea during the
1945-53 era (Mason, et al., 1980}.
Divestment of non-land Japanese properties was not so
successful.
properties

The
in

new

1948,

Korean

and

Republic

largely

through the end of the Korean War.

acquired

maintained

these

ownership

Large landholders who

had been dispossessed of lands were not readily persuaded
to purchase and take over Japanese enterprises.

The U.S.

military pursued educational expansion and reform, wishing
to change the character of Korean education, which had
developed under Japanese colonial rule as a mechanism for
regimentation of Korean youth.

The U. s. intervention

doubled primary school attendance and tripled secondary.
American-style, locally-elected school boards were encour
aged, as was the placement of women into teaching ranks and
establishment of more vigorous teacher training programs.
Many U.S. interventions and innovations, however, did not
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survive.

Coeducation was not extended beyond the primary

school.

Universal education at the primary level did not

become a reality until the late 1950s.

A strong central

ministry replaced local school board control. Little doubt
remains, however, that the strong impetus provided through
U.S. military government innovation .to Korean education
contributed

significantly

to

the

Korean

development

potential (Mason, et al., 1980).
Within the ostensibly short-range assistance program
promulgated by U.S. authorities, other programs evidenced
the longer-term U.S. concern.

The Truman State Department

had to withdraw its $500 million economic rehabilitation
program from Korea in 1947 because Congressional support
was absent. With Korean independence, the State Department
planned for an aid program under the Economic Cooperation
Administration
Marshal Plan.

(ECA),

which was already conducting the

Emphasis would turn to capital development

rather than short-term assistance.

The ECA administrator

in 1949 got assurance from Congress that a comprehensive
recovery package was forthcoming.

Before installation of

the ECA program, the ROK-US agreement of aid was jointly
signed. While similar to U. s.-European agreements, several
added requirements of specific U.S. expectations for the
Korean government to improve financial responsibility were
included also.

From one perspective, these requirements
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were safeguards in face of apparent Korean recalcitrance,
in such areas as disposal of Japanese properties.
larger sense,

however,

In a

the U.S. stipulations suggested

doubt that the Koreans were able to handle their own
internal processes.

These resentments and disagreements

would produce long-lasting friction·over the years.
ECA,

The

in 1949, continued to argue for a three-part aid

package, stressing to Congress that continuation of mere
relief would result in permanent impoverishment of Korea.
U.S. capital investment was privately needed in development
of coal, expansion of thermal power generating facilities,
and construction of fertilizer plants.

The U.S. still

expected South Korea would be a net exporter by 1953 and
that

total

however,

U.S. aid could be eliminated.

Congress,

refused to pass the aid package.

The world

observed, as it followed U.S. Congressional expression, as
well as when a few days later, it heard a major policy
speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, that the U.S.
appeared to be in the process of pulling out of South
Korea, or at minimum doing an about face in terms of its
support commitment.

North Korea certainly interpreted all

the messages in this way (Mason, et al., 1980).
South

Korea

was

understandably

disturbed.

The

messages were confused and confusing coming from the U.S.
The U.S. criticized Korea's efforts at checking inflation.

�
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Acheson threatened cutoff of aid.

In fact, South Korean

measures were already proving effective, and had been doing
so over a period of about six months.

The strain in

relations, marked by considerable distrust on both sides,
would characterize much of the Korean-U. s. relationship
through 1953, the end of the war a_nd end of the period
examined here.

However this all may be, still, the U.S.

undertook financing of most of the war effort and associat
ed relief provisions.
ment program.

The ECA switched to a war procure

The U.N. developed a relief program in

Korea, with $429 of the $457 million coming from the U.S.
Distribution eventually came entirely under the U.S. Army
Command (Korean Civil Assistance).

The U.N. also estab

lished the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency
{UNKRA),

which aimed at reunification after the war.

Multi-nation funding, with the U.S. restricting itself to
66 percent of UNKRA's budget, however, didn't work out.
Aid reverted to a bilateral U.S. to Korea situation.
Disagreements concerning repayment of funds Korea had
deposited with the U.N. emerged at the war's end.

Issues

of inflation, foreign exchange, and the extent to which the
U.S. was willing to assist Korea in reconstruction all
marked the end of the war and the 1945-53 period (Mason, et
al., 1980).
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Analysis of the Problem
The

essential,

outward

dynamics

of

U.S.

Korean

governmental, administrative, and bureaucratic interplay,
especially over the postwar through Korean War period, can
be understood in the above terms of continuing turbulence,
misunderstandings as to objectives, procedures, and the
true ,agendas of agreements, and also the degree of gen
uiness in U.S. goodwill in pers_isting in the establishment
of Korean democracy. As the above scenario suggests, given
an equal measure of Soviet goodwill in bringing about an
early unified and democratic Korea, many of the horrors of
the time would never have been conceivable, much less have
actually taken place. Nevertheless, and perhaps even more
tragically, if that is possible, one may interpret that
after 1945 and up to the time of the Korean war, and even
with Soviet-inspired hostility, deception, mischief, and
malfeasance, still, given an ideal admixture of cooperation
and understanding, and the social, political, and economic
dynamics that would have thus been generated, the U.S. and
South Korea might have created together the showplace for
democracy as originally intended, and have drawn in other
Asian peoples into emulating that model.

The course of

almost 50 years of history, in China, perhaps, and in Viet
Nam, possibly, might have been far different, had they been
able to do so.
But deep U.S. and Korean misunderstandings,

at a
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cultural level, were present.

Most of the difficulties

that became virtually unbridgeable were likely manifested
Misunderstandings, many of which

at this deeper level.

were due largely to simply bureaucratic differences, would
in turn produce bureaucratic incompatibilities,
this,

an

impossibility

for

working

together

and in
and

for

envisioning how commonly held goals could be achieved.
Hence, analysis of U.S. Korean bureaucratic relationship
becomes, first of all, a necessary probing of these many
initial, basic incompatibilities.
The first issue supportive of the idea that bureau
cratic misunderstanding was critical in postwar dynamics is
simply

the

relationship

of

Korean

bureaucracy

as

an

institution to the process of modernization envisioned for
Korea, importantly at the behest of the U.S.

In Korea's

history, no governmental organ other than the bureaucracy
existed to carry out critical official functions and
The postwar visions of modernization and

formations.

No alternative to

democratization were no exception.

bureaucratic initiatives at that time existed, nor was any
contemplated. In other words, a true state of bureaucratic
dependency was the norm.
modernization

process

Caiden (1991) suggests that the

for

Korea

(and

this

should

be

understood in terms of 1945 and beyond, and not essentially
according

to

whatever

modernization

transpired

under

115

Japanese oppression) had positive results outwardly, but
structurally, or institutionally, bureaucratic imbalances
First, the positive results

were internally solidified.
were:

(a) Koreans became impressed with pragmatic results

as practical, concrete development became a reality; (b)
technocratic values and realistic conceptions of power in
part displaced spiritual values;

(c) distribution became

secondary to production; and (d) passivity was replaced by
aggressive,

positive,

and

fatalism became submerged.

progressive

attitudes,

as

Production and rationality were

substantiated through technological propagation.
second, the negative side emerged as:

However,

(a) subordination of

all other institutions to the public bureaucracy, with
consequent modification of political power and decision
making,

as well as stagnation· of democratization;

(b)

development of societal imbalance, complacency, apathy, and
inefficiency, as institutions increased in dependency and
were prohibited from actions which would be self-strength
ening and develop them as autonomous;

(c) emergence of

Jaebols, or family business-holding conglomerates, through
cozy patron-client relations, along with institutionalized
corruption and economic speculation, among those closed out
of the bureaucratic inner circle; (d) spiraling inflation
of social costs, made unnecessarily high due to bureaucrat
ic favoring of the privileged classes or groups, resulting
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in gross social inequalities and regional disparities; and
(e) bureaucratic implementation of modernization character
ized by waste, pollution, low-quality products, and a rush
to meet objectives, regardless of costs and illegalities
(1991).
From the Korean contemporary perspective, the bureau
cracy, because of its strength, in part based on tradition
and support of the people and the institutions of the
society, has been able to accomplish what it has set out to
do, even given the difficulties enumerated above.

Thinking

positively, we see that the groundwork for growth has been
firmly established, so that Korean society can now encour
age public initiatives and development.
perspective,

From this positive

all of the shortcomings which have become

bureaucratically entrenched, can now be corrected, as power
is passed into the hands of private ownership and elected
public representatives.

This is the theory, at least, and

its positive perspective of bureaucracy is based on very
old, traditional views of bureaucratic function, going back
to Confucian standards.

It becomes important at this

juncture to attempt some identification of these standards.
M.

K.

Kim,

(1983) cites Wright

(1962) concerning

Confucian attitudes in relation to bureaucracy.

Confucian

expectations associated with bureaucracy included:
1) Submissiveness to authority:
superiors.

parents, elders, and
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2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)

Submissiveness to mores and norms.
Reverence for the past and respect for history.
Love of traditional learning.
Esteem for the force of example.
Primacy of broad moral cultivation over specialized
competence.
Preference for nonviolent moral reform in state and
society.
Prudence, caution, and preference for a middle
course.
Non-competitiveness.
Courage and a sense of responsibility for a great
tradition.
Self-respect (with some permissible self-pity) in
adversity.
Exclusiveness and fastidiousness on moral and
cultural grounds.
Punctiliousness in the treatment of others.
(Wright, 1962; cited in Kim, M. K., 1983, p. 28)

The

persistence,

influence,

and

daily

adherence

demanded of these precepts should not be readily dismissed
or

over-looked

general.

when

interpreting

Korean

For Korean bureaucracy,

reality,

in

an elite function,

replete with many honors, they are taken ideally as an
unbridgeable code.

Exceptions of course exist, in real

world

such

application,

corruption.

as

in

forms

of

bureaucratic

But in terms of addressing modern Korean

bureaucratic development, with Japanese influence and with
the more important American interactions, it is critical to
see Confucianism's dominance in Korea:
To the Chinese people, Confucianism became something
like a skin that can never be rubbed off. It has been
generally recognized that though Korea introduced
Confucianism from China, Korea became an honor student
of Confucianism, in some aspects more faithful to the
tenets of Confucianism than the Chinese people were.
(Kim, M. K., 1983, p. 27).
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It can be reasonably asserted that Korea's success,
with serious drawbacks along its path of bureaucratically
dominated ascendance, was largely due to the unrelenting
application of ancient principles. Though Korea's pattern
of achievement, derived from Confucianism,

caused some

disturbance in its interaction with U.S. interventions,
this pattern also helped Korea to receive input with a
character that allowed full utilization of U.S. collabora
tive efforts.

In some ways, Korea's interactions with the

U.S. have transpired with a mutual closeness possibly found
in no other international context.

The Confucian pattern

of acceptance and utilization, while defining a distinct
and separate character for Korea,
difficult

to integrate

which is sometimes

with non-Korean

culture,

also

maintained the perseverance, to which the U.S. supportively
responded, which finally won out. The U.S. role was truly
indispensable, but Koreans accomplished the matter accord
ing to their own individual system (Kim, M. K., 1983).
For Korea, the dominant institutions are bureaucratic.
To some extent, a tendency still exists to see a bureau
cratic office position as a piece of property.

Thus,

exploitation, through the position for gain, is common.
Generally, Korean institutions are more client-oriented in
their functions than ordinarily would be expected for
comparable bureaucratic institutions in Western, developed
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societies.

Korea remains far more ascriptive and clientel

istic in distribution of its rewards, than do the advanced,
industrialized countries with which it is associated.
Through a complexity of bureaucratic organizations, both
Korean society and polity are hierarchically organized.
The bureaucracy simultaneously becomes a patron-client
network.

Ideological and cultural themes alone cannot

account for the importance of face to face contacts.

For

most of those politically involved, political power is
simply rewarding of friends and punishment of enemies.
Interest group activities fall short of what is expected in
a pluralistic society.
Western influence,

not only in terms of Japanese

organization from 1910 to 1945, itself a hybrid product
modeled on Prussian bureaucratic form, but also through the
presence of postwar American military, has been substantial
in shaping Korean bureaucracy, but it is not, as this paper
has attempted to suggest in several ways, the whole story.
Korean scholars are likely more attuned to matters of
difference in this area than are Westerners.

The "Theory

P or Possibility Model" (Guerreiro-Ramos, 1970, cited in
Kim, B. W. & Bell, 1985, p. 19) emphasizes that non-Western
cultures are not bound by Western determinism in shaping
even those institutions powerfully influenced by the West,
as for example bureaucracies.

Contemporary bureaucratic
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practice in Korea blends Korean culture with foreign
practice.

Korean political culture remains pervasively

authoritarian,

in

participatory
convincingly

face

solutions
and

of

pluralist,

offered

from

transformationally

democratically
the

West,

most

the

U.S.

during

military presence and period of influence. Some practitio
ners within the realm of public administration, however,
see this nexus of Western with Korean, even in the U.S.
case, as primarily functioning at the formal level, with
bureaucratic elitism persisting at the policy-making level.
Korean

authoritarian

political

tradition

has

remained

resistant to change even in the face of powerful receptivi
ty to so many other u. s. influences evident in Korean
culture.

B.

w.

Kim and Bell (1985) mention the following

prerequisites for pluralism (first impressed upon Korea by
U.S. example and presence, but with for many years no
lasting, functional result):
(1) Viable competition among individuals, elite's, or
groups; (2) opportunities for individuals and organi
zations to gain input access to the decision-making
process; (3) organizational mediation between elites
and masses; (4) viable instruments of mass participa
tion in political decisions such as elections and
other media of influence and access; and (5) democrat
ic consensus based on a "democratic creed." (p. 21)
This interpretation, shared by many Koreans at the
time of B. W. Kim and Bell's writing (1985), of a drift
toward authoritarianism, after initial formulation of an
American democratic model of bureaucratization on reconcil-
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iation

principle,

practice.

seemed

to

represent

actual

Korean

Only time will tell with certainty if more

recent events leading to greater Korean pluralist, demo
cratic, and reconciliation modes of administration will
last, in terms of continuing practice rather than merely
outward form. Western theorists have doubted the viability
of pluralist democratic practice joined with bureaucratic
processing largely dominated by uni-dimensional interest
These perceived difficulties of the pluralist

groups.
model,

in Western practice and transmitted in kind to

Korea,

exposed a theoretical empirical weakness,

which

Koreans themselves take to be the basis for the problemati
cal assimilation of pluralism into Korean bureaucratic
practice. Pluralist political assumptions, in fact, may be
viewed by Koreans as dysfunctional for national development
in its entirety.

Support for preconditions salient to

pluralist conceptions falls outside of Korean psychocul
ture.

U.S. democracy,

so preconditioned by its own

diversity and quest for reconciliation, transmits values of
pluralism as endemic to democratic functioning.

An unus

ually homogeneous, cohesive Korean society cannot properly
conceptualize, as would inherently, on the other hand, U.S.
society,

a power structure and bureaucratic initiative

fragmented and based on competitive power-group interac
tion.

The pluralist,

equilibrium ideal,

and in fact
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representative democracy in at least the modern Western
sense, thrive on cleavages of interest and on bringing into
balance components of diversity. Constitutionality itself,
in concept and in function, thrives on just such a various
ly defined and manifested public will; yet, not so Korea,
or so it seems; simply because, or primarily so, fragmenta
tion is not considered a virtue, but is instead held to be
totally alien.

All of this is not so much to suggest that

the present Korean situation of continuing domination of
elite over mass is consciously, rationally preferred, but
that it is more to the effect of what B. W. Kim and Bell
(1985) have referred to as the product of "psychocultural"
(p. 22).
fication,

Constraint, differentiation, regulation, strati
and

even

narrowing

of

individual

political

freedom become the inevitable process, given the propensity
of enormous social and cultural conditioning.

Postwar

constraints of a more ostensible nature have also viably
reduced any influence from U.S. bureaucratic modeling
toward pluralist acknowledgment of individual interests as
primary.

such constraints include:

(1) A narrow range of individual political freedom;
(2) executive dominance of the bureaucracy, legisla
ture, and judiciary; (3) limitation on the role and
function of political parties; (4) increased role of
the military in politics; (5) the security threat from
North Korea; and ( 6) national planning for rapid
economic growth. (Kim, B. w., & Bell, 1985, p. 22)

Additionally, it can be seen that Western influence is
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rejected, not in the sense of any specific part, but in
whole, as it conflicts with traditional forms:

family

ties, intergroup loyalty ties, and psychocultural roles.
B.

w.

Kim and Bell (1985) further cite both Lapalombara

(1963) and Riggs (1963), as substantiating the incompati
bility, quite often, of assumptions and practices relating
to bureaucratic functioning.

Lapalombara (1963) points out

bureaucratic assumptions associated with modernity are
apparently culture bound and find, in Western democratic
development thinking, important roots traceable to Darwin
ian senses of social development.
are

thus

deterministic

and

Such Western assumptions

unilinear

in

evolutionary

Developmental change, in pragmatic terms,

development.

however, toward fully democratic institutionalization, may
be

better

realized,

national forms.

sometimes,

through

non-democratic

Riggs (1963) defines process analysis of

administrative evolution to more democratic formats in
societies without Western traditions as a matter requiring
almost

infinite

sophistication

realities of the moment.

and

attentiveness

to

For Riggs, it is fallacious to

assume Western modes are always viable, even when it may be
reasonable and universally beneficial to pursue similar
democratic ends.
intact,

Developing democracies need not receive,

Western bureaucratic technique nor innovation,

anymore than it should be presupposed that all stages of
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Westernized development must be passed through (Kim, B. W.
& Bell, 1985).
Now, even more than when Caiden and B.

w.

Kim consid

ered Korean Bureaucracy and its intermeshing with democrat
ic ideals in terms of formulations similar to those of
Lapalombara and Riggs, it is reasonable to see that, first,
Korean autocracy, and then, reemerging elitism, along with
a continuing political centralist dominance, have apparent
ly moved Korea simultaneously toward material achievement
and democratizing goals, with some efficiency, and with
perhaps more resoluteness than could have been prefigured
had instead simply close emulation of Western bureaucratic
and political process evolved.

Still, without the American

postwar presence, interaction, and modeling, in conjunction
with the Korean strongly antithetical reaction to Japanese
dictatorship

and

purely

exploitive

governance,

such

positive results might not have been realizable.
Korean

modification

of

democratic

reconciliation

modeling, with elitist bureaucratic form, is seen by B.

w.

Kim and Bell as also effective due to certain "ecological
changes in the social-physical environment" (1985, p. 23).
Changes include:
1) Population increases and demographic mobility; 2)
the impact of the Korean War on political institutions
and political consciousness; 3) the effect of economic
inflation on political regimes; 4) the expansion of
education, urbanization, and the size and status of
the military; 5) institutional changes, that is, the
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growth of formal organizations, and the growth of
occupational specialization; and 6)
ideological
changes, bringing with them a positive new view of
democratic ideals. (p. 23)
Suzanne Keller's theory of strategic elites is cited
by B. W. Kim and Bell {1985) to illustrate how a new elite
structure, reflecting some social heterogeneity in develop
ment process, replaced ruling elites in Korea.
elites,

These new

self-defined as acting collectively for social

good, nevertheless based their elitist position of domi
nance on assumptions that Koreans, in the mass, were not
acculturated sufficiently toward democracy to pursue viable
policy decision making.

What seems fairly clear, since the

1985 writing of B. W. Kim and Bell, is that bureaucratic
elitism has opened a bit toward a democratic elitism, or
government, which, while not precisely characterized as by
the people,

is more fully operational when given the

approval of the people.

Nevertheless, passivity may still

be presumed something of a positive value in the elitist
prescription for democratic functioning.

Social stabiliza

tion as development proceeds is thought to depend on such
elitist/mass relationship.

On the other hand, bureaucratic

elitism, fostered through ancient cultural form, Confucian
hierarchy, Japanese intervention and postwar carryover, and
finally, American military bureaucratic influence, security
concerns, and the ensuing emergency realities of three
years of war, has likely understated potential contribu-
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tions of those outside the exclusivity of the governing
elite.

The classically defined pluralist model of demo

cratic participation now seems to possibly be becoming
something more of a reality for many Koreans. The plurali
st model seems not so much outside the ken of present
Korean reality,

and not so much ·in alienation to the

democratizing process initiated, within confines of Korean
bureaucratic elitist heritage, during the postwar, 1945-53
era, as such a fully realized model of democratic reconcil
iation might have at one time seemed.

s. J. Kim (1987)

views the bureaucratic relationship between the U.S. and
South Korea in the postwar period analyzed here as primari
ly "postwar identity crisis in the initial state-building
process" (p. 61).

Gradually, through changes initiated

according to regime changes, Korean relations with the U.S.
shifted from dominant security dependence in the 1940s and
1950s to an interdependence,
economic security relations
culture change in Korea,

by the 1980s,
(p. 65).

based on

Significant to

especially after 1960,

were

bureaucratic interactions with the U.S. during the earlier
postwar era.

Of special significance were the changes in

Korean education, which implemented greater freedom of
thought and individuality, not to mention a far broader,
more Westernized,

and more comprehensive,

comparative, view of the world.

as well as

This educational redirec-
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tion among Korean youth laid the groundwork for revolu
tionary consciousness and activism in 1960 and beyond.

In

terms of U. s. and Korean bureaucratic interaction, what
transpired in the postwar years would in the long term
become precisely challenging of what had been long dominant
before.
State structure,

carried out through bureaucratic

interaction, influenced by social class and world system
structural pressures, but primarily acting under its own
volition

(the U.S. and Korean interaction),

served to

rearrange society and the administrative bureaucracy's
relation to it.

Student strengthening through educational

reform, may have influenced initiation of cultural revolu
tion in the 1960s, but of equal importance, emanating from
U.S.-Korean bureaucratic interaction, was land reform and
virtual destruction of a powerful landlord class (Kim,
J., 1987) •

s.

It can readily be seen that the U.S.-Korean bureau
cratic interaction,
stage of

u.s.

especially during the incubational

Military Government presence, was not only

critical to Korea's developmental shaping but was multifaceted as well.

In part this multi-faceted process,

influence, and later result were due to the unfamiliarity
of the U.S. with the situation of their intervention.

But

they also were due to the rapidly changing nature of the
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world systems climate, including the shifting and contra
dictory Soviet and North Korean Communist posture above the
Contradictory influences and pressures

38th Parallel.

would result in the contradictory forces within Korean
bureaucracy and throughout the society as a whole (Kim,
J., 1987).

s.

The military as a major state institution

played a key role in both political and economic areas.
Political development remained at reduced levels, due to
U.S. military emphasis.

U.S. support for an autocratic

regime also inclined toward military emphasis, and mainte
nance of a hierarchical tradition of strong, central, non
participatory,

elitist rule.

Yet,

through education,

through democratic example, as well as through support of
Korea in face of military and subversion threat from a
truly totalitarian dictatorship to the North, and, struc
turally, through land reform, the U.S. interaction moved
South Korea toward what would ultimately become a thorough
going

democratic

liberalization,
contradictory

consciousness.

This

modernization,

and democratization would be part of a
legacy imparted to Korea from the U.S.

(1987).
Traditional power structure, anciently centralized,
became, overall, for the short term discussed here (19451953) powerfully reinforced, first by the U.S. military
regime, and then by the assumption of power, following
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close upon u.s.-established prerogatives, of Syngman Rhee.
Rhee, with U.S. support, set out to fully monopolize power.
An elitist system became reestablished under Rhee, at the
behest of U.S. established influence, yet all the while the
U.S.,

from a different tendency,

through liberalizing

education, prepared the coming generation to think in terms
of revolutionary consciousness (Paik, 1982).
Whang (1986) notes that an important characteristic of
U.S. with Korean bureaucratic interaction, despite obvious
ly acknowledged need for democratic development as espoused
by both parties, was a lack of understanding and attendance
to patient development in establishing democratic institu
tions.

Whang cominents that for the new Korea, born in the

wake of World War Two, "judicious restructuring of its
institutions as part of nation-building effort" (p. 85) was
needed.

Much of the resultant political confusion during

this time period Whang credits to the lack of clear
recognition of need for democratic development.

Instead,

attempts to realize democratic institutions were marked by
impatience,

in turn creating confusion,

economic disruption, and social disorder.

political and
Whang views the

political-bureaucratic interaction analyzed here as four
years of turmoil

(1945-49).

He depicts neither much

opportunity nor any clear action toward laying democratic
groundwork for change. The Korean War, which dramatically
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and horrendously concluded the era for Korea, is fundamen
tally viewed as further impeding political development and
nation building. Whang sees the period of initial bureau
cratic interaction as disruption, confusion, and delay,
with little clear political, economic, or social planning
insight until after the purging of consciousness which was
Nation building, thus, for Whang, had to

the Korean War.

emanate primarily through a self-reliant effort, when the
government of Korea would become committed to political as
well as economic development (1986).
This negative aspect and downplaying of the immediate
postwar period of U.S.-Korean bureaucratic interaction for
shaping

Korea's

democratic

political

destiny

should

probably be viewed, however, primarily as a corrective to
some thinking which might otherwise envision Korea as
overwhelmingly

the

product

military intervention.

of

U.S.

bureaucratic

and

While in fact it seems likely that

neither of these extreme views holds consistently true,
they do point to a third, somewhat composite view, very
much directing us to a vision of how Korean identity itself
has remained unitary, and has existed as predominate, even
through Japanese repression and the preponderance of U.S.
association and influence.

The immediate postwar era,

while compatible with and in most important ways supported
by U.S. intervention and presence, should still be viewed
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most essentially as Korean instigated and moving toward
Korean deeply held values and aims. Recovery of the Korean
identity as a people and national entity was first and
foremost in Korean consciousness and had been maintained as
such throughout all of Japanese occupation.

It had not

waited for U.S. presence and direction, though, of course
in face of Korea's persistent, much larger, and surrounding
enemy neighbors, such U.S. presence and intervention was
viewed as appropriate and necessary.

Even educational

reforms after 1945 represented developing Korean attitudes
and

were

overlays

truly
of

interactive

methodology,

with

American

curriculum,

and

values
so

and

forth.

Educational reform for Koreans was never the result of
their being the more or less passive receivers of U.S.
directives.

Throughout the domination of Japan, Korea had

been developing its own view of a modernizing world and
what the eventual Korean place in it would be, once the
occupational burden was lifted.

Part of full recovery of

Korean National and integral self would be education,
exemplified by the Korean phrase meaning "benefits for all
mankind"

(Whang,

1986,

p. 144).

This universalizing,

humanistic, and even democratic spirit had been anciently
part of Korea's identity and value system.

Revision of

educational goals and policies was derived from historical
ly Korean consciousness.

Values of equality, individual
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autonomy, and fair opportunity access were inherent to
Korean culture and history.

To all of these values, all

clearly compatible with U.S. democratic and constitutional
formulations, was added, by the close of the Korean war, a
redirection toward American pragmatism.

Industrial and

technical education became paramount,· and essential for the
Similarly, pragmatic American

postwar rebuilding effort.

values in education have been consistently emphasized since
1945,

with Korea maintaining an open door

educational opportunity.

policy of

Compulsory primary education for

all and government encouragement of private schools have
consistently supported the Korean effort in emulation of
U.S. educational forms.

As with the U.S., open access to

education in Korea has been the way to achievement in all
areas and aspects.
ences,

however,

activities

and

Indicative of its bureaucratic prefer

Korea chose to centralize educational
decision

processes

through

a

national

Ministry of Education, in contradiction to basic precepts
of the Korean Constitution, guaranteeing political neutral
ity in education, which had seemed so urgent after the
Japanese experience.

American decentralizing influence,

however, persisted through the 1950s, with over one half of
educational
groups.

funding

coming

from

school-organized

PTA

This kind of interaction with the bureaucracy,

however, eventually became more nominal, and educational
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control more centralized, in the 1960s and beyond {1986).
Jung {1983) views all Korean bureaucratic process as
primarily a result of stopgap, emergency conditions, 19451960.

Interaction with U.S. stipulations and influences,

as well as use of employees who had gotten jobs prior to
1945 under the Japanese due to support of the enemy, were
each stopgap in nature.

Only after 1960 could Korea

develop bureaucratic forms in keeping with its own identi
ty.

Accordingly, Korea has combined great effort and

application in the academic study of political science with
traditional structures and values discussed earlier.

Jung

acknowledges the impact of study in the social science of
public administration as pivotal for Korean bureaucratic
administrative practice.

However, more comprehensively,

Jung develops an analysis of three perspectives which he
designates

as

"intellectual

orientations"

{p.

213),

essential for understanding Korean development process.
These are the "Western," the "Ethnocentric," and the
"Reform"

{p.

213).

Jung's analysis is critical for

comprehending U.S.-Korean bureaucratic interaction, and for
synthesizing information concerning the interaction as
presented in this study thus far.

The Western orientation

of bureaucratic administration in Korea develops ideas of
British and U.S. Positivist thinking as dominant. Adoption
of Western systems thinking and management styles is
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thought to work for Korea.

Koreans with academic back-

grounds in policy science, management science, quantitative
decision making, and functional approaches to management
follow the U.S. and

British view.

The

approach is historical and subjective.
Korean

bureaucratic

experiences

are

Ethnocentric

Widely diverse

studied,

however,

including the Japanese occupation and the U.S. Military
Government intervention.
less,

The assumptions are, neverthe

that Korean society and culture are unique.

similarly

unique

bureaucracy

is

needed,

A

subjectively

understood, to manage the affairs of that society.

The

Ethnocentric orientation is weak because of its dependency
on historical contexts.

It lacks contemporary viability.

The third orientation, the Reform, attempts to integrate
the two other forms.
norm

stressed.

emphasized.

Development administration is the

Importation

of

viable

strategies

is

Such strategies, however, still must be made

to work in the unique Korean situation.
the Reform viewpoint,

Still, even given

with its indications of American

pragmatism, the final product must be based on an ethnocentric concept:

for the Korean bureaucratic reality, all

major bureaucratic forms have anciently been ingrained in
tradition and reality.

New input, from the West, can be

added to help in adaptation to contemporary problems
(1983).
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Several important issues remain unresolved in terms of
the foregoing presentation of what are generally considered
to be key factors in the analysis of bureaucratic relation
ship between Korea and the U.S.

Before moving to applica

tion of Riggs' prismatic concepts to the Korean situation,
it may be well to suggest at this point what these unre
solved key issues are.

The first concerns the overall

mindset or disposition of the Korean people with the advent
of the 1945 Liberation.

Clearly,

the populace,

long

suppressed, was eager for its freedom from foreign domina
tion and, there can be little doubt, equally disposed to
set out on a course of national self-determination.

It is

problematic, however, to adequately assess what the overall
sense was of how that self-determination should transpire.
For one matter, it is difficult to assess the importance or
relevance of separation of viewpoints between the elite and
the masses, not so much the elite who may have lost the
independent vision of Korean destiny through collaboration
with the Japanese, but rather the elite which carried that
vision forward, as it originated in both earlier stages of
Korean history and suppressed modernization movements
throughout the 19th and very early 20th Centuries.

For our

present understanding, even given internal elite conflict,
it may be necessary to dispense with too detailed an
analysis of Korean mass postwar disposition and simply
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accept the reality that, as in nearly all situations of
social development, the ideology or conflict of ideologies
of the elites would be what would determine the fate of the
society as a whole.

One further, more democratic and

somewhat populist supposition, however, can likely be made
at

this

mindset.

point

concerning

the

overall

Korean

postwar

That is, there is much to indicate, and common

sense would seem to support, that not simply the elite, but
the general mass, especially in the sense of its greater
urbanization under Japanese industrialization influence,
had become more egalitarian, independent, and also demo
cratic in spirit.

The people's sense of the possibilities

of the more open, individually rewarding experience of a
modern,

democratic,

developed world had been awakened

through contact with that world, both directly, through
urban industrialization processes, and indirectly through
elite anti-collaborationist interjection over a consider
ably extended period.

This changed consciousness of the

people was evident in the explosion of Liberation exhilara
tion and enthusiasm, with political activation, after 1945,
extending deeply into mass awareness, and not simply a
facet of elite political agenda.

Nevertheless, the full

ramifications of that overall, initial postwar mindset,
given the multitude of inputs from many sources, as well as
the complex variations among domestic political rivalries
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of the time, demand further research to delineate fully.
The second key issue would concern the motivations,
strategies,

and agendas of what would soon become the

world-recognized two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, at the outset of the postwar period, in relation to
Korea. Hart-Landsberg's {1993) study, taking the socialist
perspective, presents some difficulty in terms of incorpo
rating the rather conclusively anti-American view into the
scenario of u. s. with Korea bureaucratic interaction as
understood here. Some of these variant, socialist perspec
tives are taken up in Chapter IV and following.

The

standard interpretation concerning the U.S., as presented
from both u. s. and Korean viewpoints, is that the U. s.,
with all of the best intentions in the world, either failed
in approaching the Korean situation with enough information
or sophistication, or failed due to a combination of lack
of knowledge and naivete concerning Soviet and world
communist intentions and agenda, as well as due to inter
ventions of various geopolitical factors, such as changing
political contexts throughout both Asia and Europe, which
U.S.

policy

intentions

understandably

prepare for let alone predict.
finds

some

dispositions

support,
toward

not

well

The socialist view, which

especially
Korea

could

taken

in
by

terms

of

relative

the

two

emergent

superpowers at the Yalta Conference {Hart-Landsberg, 1993),
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suggests the U.S. policy had been from the start deliberate
and calculating in terms of incorporating Korea into its
Pacific dominance strategy for the postwar era after 1945,
and had then also become increasingly reactionary to
unfolding Korean propensities toward socialism after World
War Two, and had moved to support· decidedly right wing
leaders,

agendas,

and repressive policies to suppress

Korean democratic popular resolve

(1993).

This paper

attempts not to understand the Korean situation from this
anti-American,

anti-capitalist-free-market

perspective

(incorporating its own agenda, as it does, of justifying
socialist initiatives, past and present).

The alternate

socialist view must be recognized, at least in terms of the
present study, as viable and as important to the attempt to
account for all variables and all influences in the complex
situation under analysis. The issue, as suggested, can not
be fully resolved in this writing, and in terms of overall
scholarly political analysis, it has also remained somewhat
open to debate.
The final key problematic issue taken up here as
impinging on full understanding of the Korean-with-U.S.
bureaucratic interaction concerns the character and intent
of Korean leadership during the immediate postwar period
and up through the end of the Korean War.

This intent and

character are understood to have been to considerable
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extent influenced and marked by factors associated with the
above-mentioned other two problematic key issues, concern
ing first the will and disposition of the Korean people at
initiation of the postwar, and concerning, second, the will
and disposition of the U.S. bureaucratic intervention for
that period with Korea.

These first two issues are

critical to the overall debate this paper takes up in terms
of Riggs' prismatic analysis, primarily as they touch upon
and influence the third key identified problematic issue,
the character and intent, and, what might also be added,
outcome,

of Korean,

primarily bureaucratic,

during the period investigated.
last,

leadership

And it is of course this

bureaucratic leadership, which is the fulcrum of

prismatic analysis, and which must most directly be studied
now and reformulated in terms of Riggs' model,
chapters which follow.

in the

In taking up this analysis, in

terms especially of the above complexity of unresolved,
critical issues, some culturally-specific in nature, others
more indicative of the postwar time of shifting geo
political realities, it is well to remember Riggs' inten
tion, particularly as delineated in his work, Administra
tion in Developing countries (1964).

The purpose of that

study was to show how his data-referenced, comparative,
ecological,

and

nomothetic

approach is

essential

for

isolating variables which effectively impinge upon and
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construe the course of political, social, and administra
tive development, in all instances of 20th Century modern
ization,

while

allowing

clarification

of

perspective,

objectively speaking, above a quagmire of conflicting
subjective commentary and cultural-specific inquiry.

This

is the perspective Riggs attempts to demonstrate and to
offer for application.

It is one that, while the ensuing

chapters will hardly do it justice, is nevertheless taken
up as offering very much needed clarification, possibly not
to be found in any alternative source, to the highly
conflictual and labyrinthine Korean postwar development
scenario.
The first Korean principle of bureaucratic government
in Korean "traditional society" (Pak, T. s., 1986, p. 489),
understood as emanating from the Chosen or Yi Dynasty
(1392-1905), is referred to as "Minbon Chuui, or people
centered" (p. 490).

Maintenance of order, through "strati

fied relationships among the people," (p. 441) was the
second principle.

And third was classicism, which essen

tially refers to emulating "an exemplary society that has
maintained order in some special era in the past" (p. 491),
but which also places emphasis on "rulers themselves to be
ethical in their moral conduct in order to realize such an
ideal society" (p. 491).

Stratification of social classes

and reliance on ruler benevolence for exemplary government,
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may clash with democratic and modernization development.
The first and most basic element of Minbon Chuui, however,
government centered in the people, and only through the
bureaucracy, suggests a traditional and abiding philosophy
predisposed after Liberation in 1945 to true democratic
modernization, essentially, government fully centered in
the people in the sense of "by the people" (1986, p. 490).
Certain governing bureaucracy characteristics, such as the
dominant centralizing tendency after the joining of the
Three Kingdoms w�th the Shilla Dynasty in 918,

while

suggesting non-democratic tendency, which continues as a
primary focus of Korean bureaucracy with inherent propensi
ty for autocratic rule, also tended to establish structure
conducive to at least proto democratic form.

Korea's early

establishment of central national government also provided
for shared government power among the king,

a

State

Council,

Six Boards, and other policy making officials

(1986).

The process was participatory and driven to

consensus, but apparently still dependent upon the benevo
lence, and also intelligence of the king.

Nevertheless, an

important thread of Korean public administration scholar
ship views the central cabinet government,

with State

Council acting as a quasi-legislative body (the Ui Jong
Bu), even though confirmed in Confucian elite structure, as
"the budding of democratic politics in Korea, emphasizing
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participation, discussion, and consensus" (Pak, 1986, pp.
495-496). Pak's conclusion, however, suggests that despite
an ideological and, in terms of consensus governance,
pragmatic democratic tendency within both Confucianism and
Korea's central bureaucracy, enduring in the Chosun dynasty
up through the end of the 19th Century, Korea could not
evolve to modern democratic form but would have to set out
on independent modernization in rejection of Confucian
form:
While Confucianism advocated people-centered ideas and
the Confucian system was structured to promote the
welfare of the people and made decisions by consensus,
Confucian system failed to adjust itself to the
changing times and failed to consolidate its national
strength, eventually causing the loss of national
sovereignty. (Pak, T. T., 1986, p. 500)
In overall terms, the specifically Korean perspective
concerning development, and Korea's own position within
world development, are unique.

The concept of "national

ism," complex in meaning itself, is critical to Koreans'
understanding of their modernization process.

In comment

ing on Korea's sense of national identity development, Cha
(1987) initiates his discussion by addressing the issue of
externally instigated development:
Unlike the Afro-Asian nationalism that emerged before
the formation of nationhood by its people, Korean
nationalism had its people and nation before the
introduction of an idea of nationalism, similar to
nationalism in Western European countries. But unlike
Western European nationalism, which grew on its own
from within, Korean nationalism originated from
without through external stimuli. (p. 505)
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In his footnote, Cha {1987, p. 505) specifically aligns
himself with Riggs' notion of exo-prismatic predominance in
20th Century development by noting that "in Western Europe,
a nation was founded first and nationalism grew from it,
but in newly developing countries in Africa and Asia,
nationalism was introduced before the founding of a nation"
{p.

505) •

The unique character of Korean nationalism

emanates from several factors which impinge on the exo
prismatic form of her development.

This unique character

of Korean national development adds a further dimension, as
Cha elucidates, to understanding of how both internal and
external factors come together in Korea's modernization.
Cha {1987) emphasizes that development in response to
external stimuli indicates deficiency vis-a-vis internal
strength and cohesion.

Cha's contention is that 20th

Century development, as was Korea's case, could derive
almost entirely from "its effort to meet external challenges" (p. 506).
nationalism

In supposing that Korean initiation of

toward

development

and

modernization

was

essentially a reactive or even defensive measure,

Cha

suggests that the entire impetus became not so much
internal self-strengthening with effort toward necessary
reorganization of social structures and internal unity, but
something more like a resistance mode to external challeng
es.

Cha emphasizes that most scholarly research has in
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fact relegated itself to examination of the course of such
resistance.

Cha's perception is that the more important

factors underlying Korean development relate not to Korea's
"anti-imperialist struggles" (p. 506), primarily, during
the overall period of modernizing effort, that is, against
the Japanese, but instead are derived from efforts "to
overcome national division" (p. 506).

Cha introduces then

his own analysis as part of a more recent trend in Korean
scholarship "to examine the development of Korean national
ism as an internal developmental phase of Korean national
history on one hand, and to emphasize on the other the role
of the masses in Korean nationalism" (p. 506).
Korean nationalism has developed primarily in terms of
self-reliant consciousness among both Korean leadership and
the populace as a whole, initiating in the modern instance
with the forced opening of Korean ports through combined
Japanese and Western powers during the 19th Century.

Korea

was forced into a response mode of establishing a sovereign
state similar to the states of Western Europe.

Method of

resistance could not be agreed upon; the challenge could
not be met, but the maintenance of self-reliant conscious
ness continued,
depriving

Korea

both as opposition to outside forces
of

its

independence,

and

preventing

unification of nationalist movements for national survival.
National unity could not be consolidated toward a single
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purpose or goal, and according to Kim Yong-Jak, as cited by
Cha {1987) in his thesis of "'dual aspects of self-reliant
consciousness'" {p. 509), Korean self-reliance was simulta
neously subservient in weakness toward one imperialist
power, namely China, during the late Choson Dynasty, while
showing more strident resistance to the West and to Japan.
This dual aspect continues through the present as was
especially notable during the 1945 post-liberation period
when:
Among the Korean people there existed a benevolent
consciousness toward the Allied powers at the time of
Korean independence, particularly toward the United
States after World War II. However, excessive benevo
lent consciousness interferes with the growth of a
self-reliant consciousness and may fall into the
danger that the government may make more of an effort
to acquire the approval of the foreign powers than to
develop the people's support. {Cha, 1987, p. 512)
Cha {1987) discerns three ideologies characteristic of
Korean movements to affirm or regain sovereignty and to
move toward independence in relation to the challenge of
the international powers.

These were "the ideology of

enlightenment, the ideology of reject-evil and protect
orthodoxy, and the Tong Hak ideology" (p. 507).

In each

movement, preservation and modernization were joined, but
"the core of the national efforts at the time was the
struggle for national preservation" (p. 508).

Armed Sino

Japanese intervention was able to destroy or at least
subvert any success these independent movements might have
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carried forth, but in retrospect only because the three
were unable to recognize the value within one another and
join in unified opposition (1987).
Implementation in earnest of Japanese colonialization
with the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, solidified Korean
independence and modernization thinking.

The peasant

masses became joined with the "reject-evil and protect
orthodoxy" thinking, forming the "struggle of the righteous
army" {Cha, 1987, p. 510).

Enlightenment ideology and the

urban mass populace became united under the "patriotic
enlightenment movement" (p. 510).

Together a mass forma

tion toward independence and a grass-roots basis of unified
consciousness was established at the time of the March
First independence movement, which had been predated by
more limited and sporadic popular participation in the
Tonghak, Righteous Army, and Independence Club movements.
Korean nationalism truly became entrenched among the mass
of the people with the March First movement of 1919.

Prior

to this change in consciousness, even with modernization
efforts made in earnest, realization of the urgency of
reacting in a unified way to foreign aggression had not
established itself.

With March First, for the first time,

"were the Japanese imperialists defined as the enemy of a
free and modern Korean nation"

(p. 511).

Overall the

movement failed, nevertheless, in not going beyond certain
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limited objectives, and failed to clearly delineate the
Japanese

as

totally

depriving

Korea

of

its

economic

wherewithal, of its life blood for survival, through the
consequences of its economic aggression (1987).
Independence movement failure in conjunction with
failed appeals for independence made in both Washington and
Paris, caused Korean thinking to turn toward socialism as
a more viable and attractive option.

Korean nationalism

thus became further divided and suffered greater suppres
sion with the Japanese introduction of its "so-called
'cultural policy,' a pacification measure" (Cha, 1987, p.
512) •

Economic unity and the perception of unified economic
effort or destiny in the consciousness of the Korean people
prevented their full perception of the threat of Western
and Japanese expansion and exploitative approach to Korea.
Even up through the latter part of the Chosen Dynasty, with
ongoing national administration of the unified political
entity, no economic interaction among regions existed.

It

was in fact only with the attempts of the Sirhak scholars
prior to Western and Japanese intervention that national
economic reordering and unification was attempted, with
establishment of "a national market by maintaining high
ways, a standard of weights and measures, and a national
currency as well as by reforming the means of transporta-
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tion"

(Cha,

1987,

pp.

515-516).

Interestingly,

this

impetus toward economic unity and reformulation would
simultaneously engender the Sirhak scholars' attempt to
eliminate the status system and thereby unite the Korean
people into one.
Thus, their object was to establish a modern nation
from a pseudo nation by abolishing the barriers
between regions and social classes. However, Korea
became a market for modern European capitalism before
the forces that were to transform the ideas of the
Sirhak scholars into practice could be realized. (p.
516)
At the time of the opening of the ports and the
overwhelming of the Chosen Dynasty, and, therefore, in
consequence, but more indirectly, the overwhelming of the
agenda of the Sirhak Scholars, the ruling elite attempted
to imitate the expressions of power they were directly
confronted with through European nationalist imperialism,
also manifested through Japan and the U. s.

Their imitation

could be, however, only a surface reflection of ostenta
tious wealth and military prowess, with Eastern values
supposedly

maintained

within.

The

Chosun

leadership

proclaimed the concept of Tongdo Sogi, meaning Eastern ways
combined with Western technology.

The idea was emblematic,

clearly, of Western bourgeois thinking, of enrichment and
advancement of the whole society through the landlord and
merchant classes,

a concept somewhat in keeping with

Eastern ethical norms centering on the interests of 1fillfl
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Ban, or Aristocratic class, wherein landholdings would be
centrally honored and wherein, in contemporary terms, they
would be kept at equal levels with merchants and usurers'
capital and investments.
with

the

democratizing,

The idea came into clear conflict
egalitarian,

and

modernizing

thinking which had been growing prior to the abrupt
overwhelming of Korean ports by means of modern arms.

Of

major conflict were the demands of the Tong Hak peasant
army, consisting of peasants who made up the lower strata
of the nation.

The Chason leaders were attempting "to

persuade the Tong Hak peasant army by citing Eastern ways"
Maintenance of separation of classes, intensi

(p. 516).

fied through Yangban cooperation with imperialist exploita
tion, suppressed the development of a unified economic
entity which would incorporate all social strata into a
truly national economy and creation of a truly national
spirit.

The Japanese colonial system, in part by making a

Kor.ean national economic formation impossible, also acted
to

prevent

the

modernizing

nationalism from developing.

and

democratizing

Korean

Anti-Japanese struggle of the

nationalist movement, of course necessary, nevertheless,
had the counterproductive impact of pushing the deeper
nationalist struggles and realizations of economic and
social unity into the background.

Even with the 1945

Liberation, these deeper social struggles based in national
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economic unity working toward true modernization remained
suppressed.
The basic reason was, of course, the division of the
Korean nation, but in the case of South Korea alone
there seem to have been two reasons. The first was
the fact that the leaders who had political power
after liberation consisted mainly of a conservative
group of landlords and bureaucrats educated and
nurtured under the Japanese imperialists. Therefore,
it was difficult to expect the formation of a national
economy that could overcome the existing feudal
characteristics. (Cha, 1987, p. 518)
Japanese occupation had the effect of denying Koreans
"independent development in all walks of life" (Sohn, Kim,

c. c.

& Hong, 1982).

Ideological conflicts within Korean

culture and society were brought again to the surface with

Japan's announcement of formal surrender. In some ways the
experience initiated in 1945 would resemble those of
typical colonial countries and peoples of the postwar.

A

new dimension of externally generated conflict, originating
also in ideological difference would be imposed with
partitioning of the nation.

U.S. and Soviet Union differ

ence

internal

would

difference.
foreign

intensify

the

Korean

ideological

The Moscow meeting of the victorious allied

ministers,

notably

including only

the

United

States, Soviet Russia, and Britain, on December 15, 1945,
placed Korea under a trusteeship of the four great powers
of Britain, China, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R.

The purpose

was to take a provisional step toward a united Korea.

The

thinking of the Korean people was not incorporated into the
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decision.

Koreans protested at this new external imposi

tion, in place a mere four months after Liberation.

A

powerful will to defy domination of Korea had built up
during the Japanese suppression; this will was intensified
among Koreans with the postwar division.

This will of

opposition they of course commonly shared with colonial or
former colonial peoples worldwide (1982).
The communist faction of Koreans, which at first had
quickly and avidly organized for a rapid, unified, and
socialist assumption of power after the war,

with the

Moscow agreement, and apparently following direct Moscow
orders,

reversed its position toward support for the

trusteeship

and

division,

though

individually

Korean

communist membership was strongly opposed, as were nearly
all Koreans.

At least in the immediate postwar period the

quest for unified national independence was the supreme
national goal.

To Koreans,

even the small communist

contingent, the Allied Trusteeship meant only a repetition,
though of course abated in intensity and exploitative
design, of the Japanese experience.

In the Soviet-occupied

North, the people were uniformly directed to once again
follow the dictates of external imposition (1982).
Pak (1980) presents the standard view of the political
milieu facing Koreans and their U.S. military bureaucratic
counterparts south of the 38th Parallel. The U.S. military
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had three broadly defined goals as mentioned earlier in
Japanese surrender, maintaining order, and

this paper:

preparing Koreans to "govern themselves as a free and
independent nation" (p. 15).

The political context after

the war, as suggested in this writing, from many perspec
tives, was very complex.

It seems fairly certain that the

U.S. mission, other than general outlines of its mission
given above, had no precise agenda, no clear strategy from
either Washington or the U.S. Military Pacific command on
which to act.

Understanding the nature of the u. s.

position and intent is extremely critical for arriving at
a correct interpretation of the meaning and importance of
the 1945-53 bureaucratic process,

its relation to the

previous intervening events of Korean modernization process
begun at least as early as the 19th Century, the ongoing
situation of Korea (largely an outcome of structures put in
place

and

directives

carried out 1945-1953),

relevance of Riggs' model of Prismatic Soci-

and the
ety.

The

relevance and importance of these issues should come into
clearer focus later in this section of the writing as a
contemporary

Marxist

examined is presented.

interpretation

of

the

situation

The most widely accepted Korean

view of U.S. intervention is summarized by Pak (1980) as
follows:
In the prevailing political confusion, [Commanding
General of the United States Army XXIV Corps] Hodge
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had neither reliable administrative personnel avail
able nor policy direction coming from Washington.
Under these circumstances he had to make many politi
cal decisions on his own and to rely upon English
speaking Koreans in implementing them.
A lack of
coordination between the military government in Seoul
and the policy planners in Washington [was manifest].
Thus, the military rule was characterized by its
confusion and indecision in policy areas. {p.15)
Though the purposes and intentions of the U.S., as
largely impressed upon the thinking of Koreans, represented
"noble democratic ideals,

the U.S. military rule thus

failed in achieving its political goals, especially in
laying down the plans for future democratic process" {Pak,
1980,

p. 16).

At this early point in his analysis,

however, Pak goes on to assert that "because of its brevity
and inadequate policies, the military rule was unable to
make any significant contribution toward the development of
democratic politics in Korea" {p. 16).

This harsh assess

ment, it is made clear, is in terms of outcomes, from a
developing Korean pragmatic political outlook, and not in
terms of U.S. intention and strategy.
assessment,

also,

The finality of the

is not entirely supported by Korean

interpreters, and in fact .may not be entirely compatible
with Pak's overall view.
Hart-Landsberg (1993) suggests that "Japanese imperi
alism directed a brutal capitalist transformation of Korea"
{p. 117).

From this perspective,

possibly the most

important outcome was in turn an oppositional Korean
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formation of "a working-class-led socialist movement" (p.
117).

Viewing this socialist movement as not only the

correct direction for Korea, but also the position most
widely supported by the Korean people, as well as the
organic result of the independence,

modernization,

and

egalitarian positions and efforts initiated in the 19th
Century and the democratic tendency inherent within the
Korean spirit, the socialist perspective of Hart-Landsberg
examines "the role U.S. imperialism played in the defeat of
this socialist movement, the division of Korea, and the
rise to power of a capitalist-oriented, military dictator
ship in the South" (p. 117). Citing a study by Choy, Hart
Landsberg (1993, p. 117-118) draws our attention to the
relative positions of Roosevelt and Stalin vis-a-vis Korea
as recorded at the Yalta Conference, February, 1945, when
Roosevelt apparently had suggested that Korea should remain
under joint trusteeship of the United States, the USSR,
Great Britain, and China from "twenty to thirty years" (p.
117) before being granted full independence. Choy's study,
as cited, has Stalin responding with "'the shorter period
the better'"

(p. 118).

One aspect of this apparent

paternalistic frame of reference as indicative of U.s.
thinking toward Korea rings true in that the U.S., appar
ently

with

no

manipulative

or

strategic

intent,

had

believed it necessary after 1945 to educate and develop the
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Korean people so that they could then,

later,

assume

responsibility for themselves (apparently accepting the
Japanese interpretation of Korea, or the one the Japanese
devised for international consumption, to camouflage their
exploitation); that is, the U.S. military had come with
this unnecessary parental directive prepared ahead of time,
before

knowing

anything

concerning

Korea.

From

the

contemporary socialist perspective, in 1945 the U.S. was
looking for a way to solidify its recaptured hegemony in
the Pacific and in Asia. Roosevelt in actuality was trying
to circumscribe Soviet impact in the region while also
utilizing Soviet prowess for achieving u.s. objectives.
Thus the U.S. was at first enthusiastic about Soviet
agreement to

declare war

on Japan,

but later became

concerned as Japan's collapse, including Soviet overwhelm
ing of the enemy in Manchuria and then immediately into
Northern Korea and down the Peninsula, unfolded so rapidly.
The U.S., in this interpretation, had been counting on a
thoroughly protracted deliberation over Korea so that it
could implement with greater care its own East Asian grand
strategy, within which the Soviets had been prefigured more
as accomplices, albeit unwitting, rather than as rivals and
antagonists (1993).
Rather than not having duly considered Korea and its
fate, the U.S. is thus more properly viewed, from this
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perspective, as facing a disabling hitch in grand design,
and

finding

itself

within

a

"growing

disaster" (Hart-Landsberg, 1993, p. 118).

foreign

policy

Truman had in

the meanwhile assumed the presidency and was advised of the
urgency of moving U.S. troops into Korean and even Manchu
rian territory to offset Soviet presence.

This situation

was the immediate scenario of that urgent and decisive
moment, according to Hart-Landsberg:
Unable to mobilize U.S. troops quickly enough for such
an operation, yet determined to block the Soviet
advance, the U.S. War Department sent two colonels
into a room on August 11 and gave them Thirty minutes
to decide upon a dividing line in Korea, one which
would allow U.S. troops to accept Japan's surrender as
far north as was possible given U.S. logistical
limitations and the Russian troop advance.
The
recommendation of the colonels was the 38th parallel,
a division that placed approximately two-thirds of the
country's population and the capital city, Seoul, in
the United States Zone. (1993, p. 118)
The U.S. was surprised when the colonels' plan was accepted
by the Soviets, even without prior information concerning
U.S. intent, with soviet troops already below the 38th, and
without U.S. troops on Korean soil for nearly one more
month.

The result was the initiation of Korea's postwar

division (1993).
F�om the perspective of contemporary Korean scholar
ship, as presented in some small part in this paper, and
with at least partial agreement of contemporary socialist
view concerning Korean development, a long-term generation
of Korean democratizing, egalitarian, and then modernizing
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pursuit, traced from early Confucian political structures
of distributed and consultative bureaucratic initiative,
through important reform movements, as well as through
peasant revolts, in conjunction with weakening of Chosun
dynasty rule and enlightened elite intervention, appeared
to be establishing an endogenous progressive reform in
Korea by mid-to-late 19th Century.

Japanese hegemony and

colonialism, and in some views, later u.s.-soviet implanta
tion of respective dictatorial postwar regimes served to
eviscerate

Korea's

modern,

democratic

process,

which

otherwise would have succeeded in pragmatic terms rather
than remaining invested as a dominating, survival spirit
only, within the Korean people. As it occurred in pragmat
ic terms, the Chosun or Yi dynasty pattern of non-democrat
ic rule relented just enough to allow Japanese colonial
suppression to reestablish totalitarian dominance, but in
even more virulent form.

Western writers, however, other

than those taking the socialist tack, tend not to perceive
the democratizing, egalitarian trend so much in Korean
thought and history as do Korean native scholars, even
though Western non-socialist views may be just as likely to
perceive Japan's perpetuation of suppression rather than
maintenance of development tendency.

Typical Western

viewpoints are, perhaps understandably, much less likely to
perceive Allied postwar dominance and stratagems as not
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much different from those of the Japanese.
postwar

scholarship

tended

to

stress

Earlier Korean
continuance

of

authoritarian rule and absence of independent initiative in
Korean political experience.

Y. H. Lee (1975), emphasizing

the dominance of authoritarian systems of Korean society
and underlying social structure, states that even instances
of minor political participation carried out by the Korean
populace were "compliant instead of autonomous" (p. 17).
The

peasant

revolts

from

this

perspective

occurrences, or simply interruptions.

are

minor

Koreans, from this

widely accepted view were submissive and accepting of
paternalistic authoritarianism:
The ordinary people generally were politically unaware
and uninvolved.
Their role was that of passive
subjects. They did what authorities told them to do.
Governmental policy was something to accept and obey
rather than something they could question and attempt
to change. There was little opportunity for ordinary
citizens to participate in the decision-making pro
cess. Political infrastructures such as parties and
interest groups were absent and there were few chan
nels of demand making. (p. 17)
If the above represents the general view of the
political disposition of the Korean people, at least up
through the end of the Chosun or Yi dynasty, it is never
theless, at best, merely an overview of the mass popula
tion, and ignores the reforming and modernizing element
among Koreans, much as it, too, underplays the democratiz
ing and consensus building aspect of Koreans, at all social
levels,

especially

their

willingness

to

express

mass
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political will throughout the course of Korean history.
Korean endogenous democratizing and modernizing efforts,
especially those of the last century of Yi dynasty rule
indicate internal adjustment in response to political
suppression of developmental needs and the elite class's
remission in its obligation to provide harmonious leader
ship and coordination of effort throughout the society.
Korean mass submission to elite leadership indicates not
acceptance of authoritarian will, but rather acceptance
throughout the culture of the Confucian edict for harmoniz
ing the interplay of all effort of all social elements.
When this trust is abridged, as it had been by the ruling
elite in the latter days of Yi dynasty rule, and as it had
much more

markedly

been

with the advent

of Japanese

takeover, the direction of the people is clearly toward
ridding themselves of that rule.
arises,

again,

concerning

the

The critical question
aftermath

of

Japanese

frustration of Korean endogenous modernizing initiatives.
What was
Korean

the overall postwar political disposition of the

populace

and

leadership?

Even

though

Korean

interpretation may in general establish consensus as to the
nature of Japanese suppression leading up to the 1945
Liberation,
injurious

that
effects

its
in

totalitarian
relation

to

centralization
Korean

society

and
far

surpassed any ruling dispositions of the Yi period, the
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central questions of this writing cannot so readily be
addressed with uniformity, not in Korean critical interpre
tation, and much less so within critical understanding as
a whole.

Beyond mere recognition of the disruptive and

torturous

character

of

Japanese

imposition,

several

important pieces to the puzzle of visualizing as a whole
the long-term process of Korean modernization, however, can
be aligned somewhat at this point, if not exactly placed
into their precise settings and relationships.
widespread

democratizing

will

and

A powerful,

consciousness

among

Koreans, instilled through associated strains and tenden
cies of long development in their history was galvanized in
the

spirit

of the

Korean people through

reaction to

Japanese suppression, came to intense expression with the
postwar Liberation, was undercut in many ways by postwar
conditions, most of which were imposed from without, and
then was further undermined it seemed by internal Korean
structural political development, nearly all aspects of
which were defined in the postwar period and resultant
Korean War,

but continued in various manifestations up

through the present.

In the postwar period, it seemed as

though all the forces and vectors of Korean destiny were
crystallized.

The generation toward democratic moderniza

tion would be inevitable, but to comprehend the circum
stance and course of the process,

much retracing and
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reconsideration of Korean identity would be required.

This

identity would find itself manifested in new and perhaps
curious

ways

in

the

postwar

and

following

political

situation, aptly designated, vortex (Henderson, 1968).

CHAPTER IV
THE POSTWAR KOREAN EXPERIENCE IN LIGHT OF
RIGGS' THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY
The internal conflagration of- politics could not
subside during all of the eight-year period analyzed here,
even with the results of the first general election, May
10, 1948, and consequent establishment of the new Govern
ment of the

Republic,

through election of the first

constituent National Assembly which developed the Constitu
tion in July of the same year and elected Syngman Rhee as
the first president on August 15, 1948.
of war,

Even with outbreak

almost immediately after the May 1950 second

general election, and throughout the pressure of the war,
the intense, hothouse political competition continued.

If

anything, the ambition, egalitarian ideals, and independent
spirit of the Assembly constituents increased,

all in

opposition to the rather authoritarian president, who had
maintained that Korean people must be educated and encul
turated before they would be able to accept democracy.

His

Independence Day speech of August 15, 1951, during the
height of war, however, marked Rhee's new direction of
thought on this matter:
So far I have considered it premature to install a
party system until the people can fully understand the
162
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meaning of a political party...but the time has come
to organize a large party covering the whole country
on the bases of farmers and working people, in order
to promote national welfare and to protect the common
interest of the people. We shall have to make such a
political party a permanent base upon which the
government can firmly stand. (As cited in Lee, H. B.,
1968, p. 72)
The reversal of position on Rhee's part indicated
first of all the extremity of opposition he was experienc
ing from Assembly members.

Rhee was setting the stage to

move to direct popular election of the president, depending
on his image as the "Father of his country" to establish a
broad political base absorbing various competing forces.
Rhee's position, as it developed from the idealist leader
of independence in exile for virtually half of the present
century to elected official maintaining power and repre
senting particular constituencies in the face of competi
tive forces, reflects the transitions or transformations,
societal, political, and individual, which Riggs (1964)
elaborates in his Prismatic Society Model.

H.

B. Lee

(1968) concludes his initial analysis of Korea's first
post-independence administration as follows:

"There is no

doubt that President Rhee's immediate intention was, as a
student of Korean politics points out, 'to maneuver through
the use of extraparliamentary forces those parliamentary
forces in opposition which he could not control with his
own parliamentary forces alone'" (p. 73; Yun, 1963, as
cited in Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 73). Lee is directly stating
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here that the kinds of manipulations he perceives Syngman
Rhee engaging in are prismatic in nature.

They are made

possible and workable by the conflux of fused and somewhat
inauthentic progress toward developed or diffracted society
as contained in prismatic form.

They are indications of

Rhee's own perception of the prismatic nature of the
Power and authority were

postwar situation for Korea:

effectively separated from one another, as they had not
been in the traditional,

fused society.

And Rhee's

manipulations (of his office, the people, and the elected
political representatives) denote his willingness to bypass
democratic process to maintain bureaucratic, elite power
(the essence of prismatic).
tics,

In terms of pragmatic poli

the essence of Riggs' disposition concerning the
Neither aspect, it should be added,

prismatic is twofold.

is positive, though each clearly applies to the Korean
situation.
The first major underpinning of Riggs' argument is
that

intense

prismatic

bureaucratic

attempts

toward

development,
the

modern,

emphasized

as

while arguably

necessary for the state to achieve its overall developmen
tal goals,
development.

tends to be crippling to full

political

Further, conditions within the transition

phase are not merely conducive to prismatic bureaucratic
formation,

they

are

also,

and

even

more

critically,

165

supportive of maintaining that bureaucratic power,

to

political formation's detriment, and are virtually impervi
This first major

ous to outside claims or influences.

pragmatic issue in effect identifies or interprets also the
metaphor of the prism as Riggs has established it.

The

prism Riggs is contemplating, composed of crystals locked
in place, initiates in solid form, from the fused society.
The social structure begins to break up, to decrystalize,
but only

so much destructuring can occur,

until the

separating crystals lock once again in place, but in new
This frozen, merely

position and with greater separation.
initial manifestation of diffraction,
state.

is the prismatic

It is, moreover, and most essentially, the intense

ly organized and activated bureaucracy of development,
differentiated from other bureaucratic formats as the Sala.
The exercise of its great powers and its sense of previous
ly unknown control, establish an inertia to go no further
toward diffraction.

Prismatically its grip of power is

locked in place, frozen, in part intentionally for advan
tages realized in terms of elite power,
economic access.

This

control,

and

is the first major pragmatic

underpinning of Prismatic Society.

The second is more

graphic in its telling prismatic effects.
definitive in its application.

It is much more

It is the bureaucratic

power application which H. B. Lee (1968) has discussed
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above in terms of President Rhee.

The prismatic manifests

certain legalisms, formalities, and formal structures, not
generally to be found in the fused state,
formally, that is, in the prismatic.

but intact,

The formal structure,

however, lacks the kind of knowledge, support, and imposi
tion of legitimacy found in fully deveioped, fully diffracted social forms.

Moreover, within the prismatic, the

structures and patterns of the traditional, fused society
remain fairly well intact and remain in use.

The formal,

modern

carries

political

or

bureaucratic

function

on

separate functions which are also performed by, simulta
neously,

traditional fused structures.

primarily,

that

the

continuance

performing

social functions

of

The point is,
fused

structures

with legitimacy

tends

to

undermine the validity and the full legitimacy of the
formal,

modern structure.

legitimacy

allows

This separate,

undermining

or helps to establish the kind of

multiple focus and flexible application of standards which
characterize the prismatic.
power,

This enormous discretionary

especially as held by bureaucratic elites,

as

arguably Syngman Rhee himself was, means that the structure
of law and its codification in prismatic society become the
ultimate tool for manipulation and control.

The fused

society, on the other hand, while vesting near total power
in one person, nevertheless, had no formal system which,
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through selective application, could be used for browbeat
ing and disempowering the masses, while sustaining, through
elite noncompliance or discretionary compliance joined with
authority to impose one's will onto others, the dominance
of the elite, as well as the elite's handmaid, the bureau
cracy.

A similar scenario to the· above of balancing

noncompliance

with

authority

strategy of President Rhee.

became

the

position

and

Such openness to engage in

manipulation and rather obvious powerbrokering prevents
political movement beyond simply investing all power in the
bureaucracy and toward democratic form, while allowing near
total power to reside in the elite hands.

This power

brokering and manipulation are more or less precisely
descriptive of the position Rhee found himself in at the
center of Korean Bureaucracy.

Ultimately, in such a sys

tem, if you are advantaged and have privileged access to
the bureaucracy, you will likely be able to subvert, by
pass, or escape the edicts of the law.

If you are disad

vantaged, however, you are not so well off as you would be
if under the king's discretion in the fused society.

This

is true, simply because the law in the prismatic society
can be applied to you any way the power elite wishes, and
you will have no recourse.

You know only that the law will

be applied to enhance the power of elites in control, and
it will be applied to further deplete your own legitimacy,
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to squeeze added tribute from you, and to prevent your
aspiring to higher legitimacy and power authority.

In the

fused society, as a non-elite, you are better off because
you are not really in competition with anyone.

You are in

no position to contest or threaten even formally the power
positions of either central ruler or the formally subjugat
ed positions of elites.
at will.

The central ruler disposes power

Power is neither a contested nor a continuously

redefining sphere of control and influence.

In the elite

format of the prismatic society, the elite power base,
which is essentially the only power base, since the king's
power has thus been absorbed, is in a position constantly
of testing, adjusting, controlling, expanding, and redefin
ing its power, which derives from both fused context that
remains and the structures of law open to infinite varia
tion and manipulation, not to mention boundless interpreta
tion.

As an individual not under the elite power base

umbrella, you are in a precarious position indeed, since
you may be challenged and viewed as threatening to the
elite power structure, in a way you would unlikely be con
sidered by the king or central ruler.

You are in a double

bind, knowing that the will of the whole society can be
organized against you through the law and its manipulation
by the bureaucratically dominant elite.

Yet that same law

has no binding hold on the elite itself and is in fact the
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strategic tool the elite employs to carry out its designs
for solidifying and enhancing power.

Solidifying and

enhancing power through the above such manipulations is of
course what the elite adepts, such as Rhee, came to pride
themselves upon.

They learned this disposition of their

political skills from the prismatic bureaucratic structure
itself, which came into being though it could not likely
have been predicted,

through the imposed interface of

traditional with modern.

It is the structure of the pris

matic which creates the huge power of the bureaucracy and
the internal mechanisms for power aggrandizement in behalf
of the elites, which teaches them the means and processes
for power manipulation, and which provides the enthralling
absorption into power strategy, design, and interplay which
dominates the will and ideals of the elites, causing them
ultimately to be so captivated by the experience of power
and its demands for successful gamesmanship, that they
possess no desire to go beyond that game, except to further
solidify their advantage.

Rhee, the idealist who would

wait for 50 years for the opportunity which could allow
unfolding of Korean modern democratic egalitarian destiny,
would nevertheless respond with greater urgency and en
thrallment to the limitless power reaches of the Korean
prismatic bureaucracy.

Political reality would become not

achievement of ideals but instead "relentless struggle
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between the ruling party led by Syngman Rhee and the
opposition groups in the National Assembly" (Lee, H. B.,
1968, p.

73).

Paige (1971) depicts the presidential term of Rhee as
"emergent authoritarian dominant party rule tempered by the
rise of a vocal opposition coalition under quasi-competitive conditions"

(p. 147).

Paige views the long-term

Korean political and bureaucratic development as emerging
from a centralized bureaucratic state with a low
degree of political participation, through a period of
proscribed Korean political activity under direct
colonial rule, into a condition of marked divergence
between authoritarian single party and competitive
party rule, both characterized by high levels of
political involvement (p. 151).
Korean political development can be viewed as based on
social learning theory, from the above perspective, the
assumption being that South Korea's adaptation to democrat
ic processing proceeded rapidly and to good effect due to
"deliberate human manipulations rather than mechanistic
statements about the emergence, structure, and consequences
of various political systems" (p. 161).

These manipula

tions should not be thought of as impositions from the
outside upon Korean political and bureaucratic experience.
In terms of South Korean experience at least, after effect
ing the division of the country into two spheres, external
shaping influence is seen by Paige as "relatively limited"
(p.

163).

More to the point in terms of driving forces
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creating

democratic

development

are

Western

influence

factors based on shared antagonism to Soviet and communist
influence,

transpiring,

in

the

South

Korean

instance

through post-World-War-Two leadership groups whose politi
cal consciousness was fixed in mature form during the
"communist-nationalist controversies· of the 1920s"
Ultimately,

163) .

Paige

views

the

Korean

(p.

political

experience from 1945 and beyond as demonstrating that
"deliberate political action is potentially capable of
significantly

transforming

man's

political,

social,

economic, and cultural institutions" (p. 167):
The extent to which purposive political action will be
able to control or shape human society will not be
determined by any combination of impersonal systemic
or structural forces but rather by the effective
initiatives and counter measures that other men
organized for political action can bring to bear
against it. The Korean case thus helps to remind man
of the importance of his values and to liberate his
mind to envision the creative potentials in politics
for achieving them. (p. 167)
In
relation

developing
to

his

political

thesis

of

social

transformation,

learning

Paige

insights relevant to Riggs' Prismatic Theory.

in

suggests
Political

theory may emphasize too much the importance of precondi
tions within a given society for establishing a modern
system.

Paige believes this emphasis is misplaced, no

matter the system under investigation.

More critical to

political establishment and emergence,

for example,

democratic systems are "goal-means concepts,

of

leadership
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skills,

organizational effectiveness,

capabilities"

(p.

159).

These

take

and reinforcement
precedence

over

"macrosystemic variables commonly suggested (e.g., replica
tion of certain European historical processes, high level
of education, urbanization, mass media exposure, industrial
technology, per capita income, etc.)" (p. 159). The factor
of "dissociated learning" developed by Hartley and Hartley
and as cited by Paige (1971, p. 159) suggests support for
learning capacity and intention as primary for political
development, thus somewhat substantiating Riggs' suggestion
that the prismatic state is not only predictable for
political transformation, but, concomitantly, also, under
specified sets of circumstances, necessary, if not alto
gether desirable.

Dissociated learning suggests that the

individual embedded within a social context learns behav
iors which otherwise are thought to be alien:
Thus, administrators in developing countries can learn
to display relatively modern behavior in the office
while continuing relatively traditional behaviors at
home •..Research in developing countries suggests that
modern behaviors do not necessarily extinguish tradi
tional ones, or vice versa, except in mutually exclu
sive situations where the rewards to be gained from
the one outweigh those anticipated from the other. In
most cases there appear to be high tolerance for, and
perhaps even unawareness of, inconsistency.
For
politics this implies that it is possible to learn a
number of different patterns of political behavior in
a given social framework. (Paige, 1971, p. 160)
The suggestion is further that political, social, reli
gious, and economic behaviors need not "exhibit a high
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degree of similarity in certain respects for the political
pattern to be stable.

Both learning theory and the Korean

case suggest that relatively high degrees of discrepancy
are possible" (p. 160).
Paige's analysis, while supportive of Korea's rapid
advance into democratic political processes and administra
tion, and also insightful as commentary on Riggs' prismatic
analysis of how both traditional and modern can be simulta
neously contained within the developmental context or
prism, is not entirely cogent, in two respects, in terms of
the foregoing analyses of this paper.

First of all,

Paige's essential supposition is that Koreans, in terms of
cultural

and

historical

experience,

were

predisposed toward democratic development.

not

really

From Paige's

perspective, centralized authoritarianism and Confucianism,
essential to thousands of years of Korean social experi
ence, would have rendered democratic thinking as largely
incompatible with Korean psychohistory and predisposition.
Paige's view of Koreans appears to be primarily through a
Japanese perspective which largely interprets Japanese
interjection into Korean society as instigating Western
modernizing contexts, and as predisposing and introducing
Koreans to later democratic acceptance.

Thus, the emphasis

on learning theory suggests Koreans are a case in point of
a given society's ability to rapidly absorb new thinking

174

and imitate behavior when they are motivated to do so, as
the Koreans were thought to be, in the Paige interpreta
tion, just after World War Two. Following this interpreta
tion,

in the sense that renders it,

at least in some

psychological mode, compatible with the Prismatic Model,
Paige suggests that even though Koreans after 1945 were not
simply following a U.S. imposed model working toward
democratic development, they did experience such develop
ment, though primarily of their own making and instigation,
as an alien context, and one which they would follow only
through dissociative learning or consciousness.

Paige may

be critically unaware of the importance of early moderniz
ing and democratic expression and potential within the
Korean people and their cultural-historical experience.
His awareness of the relationship between Japan and Korea
does not incorporate the strategic factor of Japanese
suppression and attempt to eviscerate from Korean con
sciousness the flowering of egalitarian and democratic
expression, long a part of Korean psychohistorical aware
ness, and coming to a kind of fruition prior to Korea's
anguishing experience in the 20th Century with Japan.
Korean expression and realization of democratic form and
direction, as Paige would otherwise know, are not really
impositions at all, nor are they, except in a more limited
and surface manner, examples of dissociated learning.

With
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the emancipation or liberation of 1945, the Korean politi
cal spirit,

as expressed with great urgency,

and the

egalitarian spirit of democracy, virtually coalesced as
one.

Korea's administrative formation would also not be

prismatic in the way that Paige suggests, which is that the
Korean mindset would be traditional� authoritarian, and
Confucian, or centralized, while the outward administrative
adjustment would tend to be democratic, since that is what
the dissociated cultural imposition was demanding.

The

prismatic application would in fact be virtually the
opposite.

The prismatic manifestation would instead be

more nearly, for postwar Korea, what Riggs' (1964) depicts,
and what H. B. Lee (1968) clarifies in the example of Rhee
after 1948.

It is the structural juxtapositioning of

modernizing-democratic with traditional-fused or central
ized-authoritarian, which is prismatic, and which creates
the contexts which appear to be dissociative in terms of
democratic

formulation

and

expectation

disjoined

from

centralized bureaucratic authority and opportunity for
exploitation and manipulation on the parts of administra
tors.

In other words, in the Korean case, as the history

of its protracted and ofttimes circumvented modernization
would indicate, dissociation between democratizing theory
and the mindset of the people and culture cannot explain
the manifest circumvention and stultification of democratic
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modernization development which has more often than not
transpired.

That is, to suggest that democratic moderniz

ing formulation and activation somehow went against the
grain or the spirit of the Korean populace would be a
serious misreading of a people and their culture.

This

paper has attempted to demonstrate how, instead, the spirit
and aspiration of the Korean people toward modernization
and toward democratization, after long suppression, was
released with the 1945 liberation.
with

other

frustrations

After that point, even

emanating

primarily

from

the

political realities of the postwar situation, the pursuit
of democracy was avid and intense and continues as such,
instilled within the people as a whole.

Disruption in that

democratizing tendency and transformation, which itself has
manifested

as

virtually

unbridgeable

and

unrelenting

bureaucratic and elite dominance, even among those elites
who themselves had avidly pursued the spirit of modern
democracy, can never be construed as indicating that Korean
thinking in relation to democratic principle is dissociat
ed.

Nothing, possibly in all of world culture and politi

cal thought could be further from the truth of the matter.
Disruption in democratic modernization must find other
sources of explanation.

Riggs'

model of dissociation

between bureaucratic formulation and bureaucratic motivation and action seems much more satisfactory.

And, in
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fact,

his

structural-functionalist

position

not

only

appears to fit the facts of the Korean case, but also seems
to be the only approach which can offer rational explana
tion or reconciliation of the contradictory forces which
have emerged in Korean postwar bureaucratic development.

c. Y. Pak (1980) suggests that despite the openness to

and eager expectancy for a new democratic society and
political agenda after 1945, the leadership trends them
selves were more toward authoritarianism and personalism.
The political opposition,

while serving to inform the

public in terms of democratic and egalitarian principle,
was not successful in pragmatic terms of helping to foster
a democratic action agenda to counteract the prevailing
prismatic bureaucratic tendency. Despite holding democrat
ic values, the people could not be brought to the necessary
psychological level or orientation needed to compete with
and to challenge leadership power and strategic bureaucrat
ic manipulation (1980).
B.

w. Kim and Rho (1982) emphasize that even with

inherent tendency and yearning for democratic expression,
a Western rational legal system is nevertheless necessary
for exercising true democratic function.

Such a demand

entails an impersonal and impartial attitude on the parts
of administrative officials toward not only all persons,
but also toward all documents and legal concerns.

Strong
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familism and factionalism militate against the impartiality
which must govern democratic implementation,

and these

conservative and fused social characteristics still were
sustaining elements of Korean social make up, as they are
Transactions among

now, only possibly to a lesser degree.

officials are viewed in particularist terms.
reciprocal relationships prevail.

Personal,

Any administrative,

bureaucratic relationship is a personal relationship.

The

parameters

for

of

these

personal

dynamics

and

basis

exchange and reciprocation must be attended to, often in
protracted deliberation and occupying almost all of the
negotiation agenda.
agree with Paige

B. w. Kim and Rho (1982) somewhat

(1971)

that the essential basis of

prismatic dilemma is in the consciousness of the bureau
cratic official who, from a modern and also democratic
perspective must act impersonally and according to law,
regulation, and egalitarian principle.

From within the

context of tradition, however, such action would constitute
clear divorcement from cultural demands (Kim, B. W., & Rho,
1982)
The prismatic carry-over effect which did much to
shape Korea's post-1945 political destiny was that adminis
trative leaders tend not to be viewed in terms of how
functional they are in the sense of fulfilling democratic
goals

and

visions,

but

rather

according

to

personal
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characteristics which emblematically delineate the culture
of tradition and interpersonal value:
The specific attributes of the administrator are
regarded as more important than his actual performance
or achievements. This lingering influence of familism
and communalism has greatly retarded the development
of rationality and impartiality in Korean public
administration during the last two decades. {Kim, B.
W. & Rho, 1982, p. 71)
In the realm of administrative decision-making, the
tendency remained for the particularist criterion, such as
family membership, to rule over the normative order of the
society as a whole, in the sense of what the society in a
formal way has determined to be desirable for its fullest
expression and sense of self.

The deep cultural value

placed on primary group interests acts to distort the
mandated decision process necessary for pragmatic implemen
tation of socially desired political agendas.

The demo

cratic essential principle of subscribing to merit and
nurturing it through equal treatment of all citizens {the
end results of the fully diffracted society, in Riggs'
analysis) is sidetracked and subverted through particulari
st distortion of administrative process.
and private process become confused.

Public process

Government services

are valued according to what Riggs called price indetermi
nacy, with all of the attenuated ill effects, compounding
to corruption and further class separation, stratification,
and political factionalism, identified by B.

w.

Kim and Rho
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(1982) as serving to deplete Korean development and nation
building, subverting what otherwise could be strengths of
"racial, religious, cultural, and linguistic homogeneity"
(p. 72).
As Riggs has further argued concerning the formation
of the prismatic bureaucracy characteristic of 20th Century
developing countries

{1962),

the Korean administrative

authority and administrative control become separated:
"The authority may be legally located with an individual
occupying a higher position, but the actual exercise of the
authority may be entrusted to the man who has the special
confidence of a person in a higher echelon" (Kim, B. W., &
Rho,

1982,

p. 80).

Identification of

separation of

authority as constituted from actual power as pragmatically
applied is a further way of penetrating to the core issues
of the prismatic society, model, and bureaucracy.

The

actual configuration of power within the administration can
be

maintained,

understood,

personal agreement.

and

utilized

only

through

From this perspective, since what is

formally presented through bureaucratic arrangement cannot
provide power access, the net result is that decisions of
consequence are made behind the scene, generally through
covert process.

Paik {1982b) sees this disparity between

formal authority and the actual manifestation of power as
especially typifying the Korean bureaucratic situation:
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In this situation, for a citizen who has business with
the government, finding the right person who enjoys
the confidence of the right man is by far a more
effective course than following normal channels.
Especially in the case of the Korean public adminis
tration, ministers or higher officials who lack
practical experience in administrative affairs usually
rely heavily on their subordinates whom they trust.
These particularistic relations clearly create a sense
of insecurity among those without a proper link with
power figures, thereby severely undercutting their
morale. (Paik, 1982b, p. 80)
This undercutting of the public morale, as strange as
it may appear to those who support democratic egalitarian
principle, and who further might suppose that democratical
ly constituted public bureaucracy would attempt all in its
power to further democratic interests, in Riggs' Prismatic
Model occurs not without intention.

From this perspective,

as Riggs {1964) clearly presents, as the elite, through
bureaucratic access, gains unprecedented political, social,
and economic control, control which it may have wished for
under centralized, fused political dominance, but of course
could never quite attain to, the experience and advantages
and simply custom of power, both for one's own interests
and the interests of one's associates, familial members,
and extended class, become so attractive and all-encompass
ing of one's interests, that it becomes impossible to give
them up.

The elite bureaucratic administrator discovers

that his primary and virtually exclusive function is one
thing only:

to solidify and amplify the elite power domain

and to defend at all costs against any encroachment.
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Creating demoralization within those who lack power access,
or who lack the wherewithal to purchase such access, is the
surest method of defense against whatever encroachment they
might muster.

It is a process which strictly draws the

demarcation of political debate and power struggle along
class lines.

Further,

if undercutting of morale and

resultant class demoralization can be made to seem so
pervasive and endemic as to become virtually integral to
the class consciousness of itself, the struggle to preserve
elite special privilege and advantage is virtually assured
of success.

Those contemplating any challenge to the

system will revert to their negative and demoralized
construction of the power access situation, and will thus
defeat themselves.

And it is critical to bear in mind that

it is the structural formation of the prismatic bureaucrat
ic situation that creates the elite privileged situation
and establishes an experience of power and control other
wise not to have been contemplated, much less foreknown or
predicted.

In other words, the elite, as in the case of

Syngman Rhee, does not

set out to create a prismatic

bureaucracy so that it can manipulate and exploit and gain
ultimate control for the elite class at the expense of
society and democratic development.

On the contrary, the

original intent is not without idealism and democratic,
egalitarian vision.

The elite class possesses all of the
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knowledge, skill, experience, and its own share of talent
for initiating the enterprise of establishing the effi
cient,

modernized,

and,

as with the mandate for South

Korea, democratic society.

The intention within the class

generally is that it will assume the mandate, the burden,
and carry out the enterprise, which •is, after all, quite
noble, with pride and in equal measure, with good faith.
The rest of society, within the limits of its knowledge and
sophistication, has given the elite leadership this role.
Struggle ensues amongst elite members for the right of some
designated faction to fulfill the role, put on the mantle
of power, and carry out the will and destiny of the people,
of the culture, and even, as with the advent of South Korea
as an independent national state in 1948, the fulfillment
of expectations of the democratic world.

The subverting of

these noble designs is prefigured, however, in the prismat
ic components which result as the forces and structures
erected

toward

modern

development

are

enveloped

and

conditioned within the still largely fused and traditional
ly

based and derived administrative functions of the

society.
Paik (1982b) further relates prismatic development as
constituted in Korea to the intense ritualism which is
pervasive and often ostentatious. and exaggerated among
Koreans,

especially

concerning

obligations

of

group
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loyalty.

Following religiously strict, specified social

norms

essential

is

for

the

preservation

of

personal

dignity, which in itself is a powerful motivating factor
among Koreans.

Together, these factors act to provide

close coherence between the reality of Korean post-1945
political and social experience and-the model of modern
development Riggs has elaborated.

Access to traditional

and ritual-dominated behavior, and especially the ritualis
tically superlative dictates of "unfailing and ostentatious
loyalty to one's primary group associates" (p. 84) deter
mine that:
Therefore, when the interests of such a group are at
stake, the timid bureaucrat is suddenly prepared to
violate or ignore any regulation or law without
hesitation or restraint. It is a much less serious
social transgression to bend a few rules than to
disappoint a member of one's family, school, or
regional group whose life and strength derive from
mutual dependability. (Paik, 1982b, p. 84)
The point that Paik (1982b) is driving toward is that
the Korean situation in general, from 1945 and beyond, has
been so constituted as to have been elaborately, and even
on a grand scale, appropriate for prismatic development.
Just as several analyses have pointed to South Korea, or in
another sense the whole of post-World-War-Two Korea, as a
laboratory situation for political development analysis, so
might it be suggested that South Korea has developed in
many senses virtually as a model case in demonstration of
Riggs' Prismatic Theory.

The element of high respect for
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ritual and tradition beyond rule of law or formally
constituted political order Riggs interprets as follows, as
noted by B. W. Kim and Rho (1982):
The transitional lacks any strict sense of principle
and the implications of "rule of law." Rather, he
takes advantage of opportunities to "break the law"
when that serves his interest, but demands rigid "law
enforcement" when that happens to· fit his convenience.
(Riggs, 1962, p. 13)
On the other hand, the pursuit of administrative goals
and programs tends to be perfunctory and formalistic.
Administrative work tends to be formalistic in style and
legalistic in substance.

The formalistic aspects and

outward style dominate over substance and productivity.
The administrative goal pursued becomes a flexible arrange
ment in terms of meeting external expectation and following
externally imposed regulations.

The specified goal remains

overall, formally speaking limited in character (Kim, B.
W., & Rho, 1982).
The above aspect of disingenuousness, if it might be
so termed,

unless it is rather a kind of expediency,

realism, or adaptation, possibly, simply to expectations or
imposed delineations of Western democracy, as has been
suggested as a possibility elsewhere in this paper, was
incorporated, though not necessarily specifying the Korean
instance,

within Riggs' model of Prismatic Society, as

"formalism"

(as cited in Yoon,

1982,

p. 110).

Riggs

emphasized through this concept the reality that constitu-
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tions as written documents, various regulations, and civil
service codes are likely to not be truly reflective of
actual power relationships and the overall political and
bureaucratic substance of the society.

The substance of

proposed policies tends not to be so important as determi
nations and implementations made by the suggestion of those
with underlying power.

Emphasis is always given to the

personage truly possessive of power-relationship with the
important or top official.

Administrative programs are

instigated through suggestions made through and with the
support of such personal power arrangements.

Without such

backing, and without, in fact, the presumption that the
program was initiated or was somehow the emanation of such
a power arrangement, any plan, no matter how well con
ceived, will have virtually no hope for success.

Moreover,

the aspect of formalism, as Riggs describes and analyzes,
will produce by and large poor administrative coordination
and equally disjointed results from administrative individ
uals and agencies.

Laws and regulations will be frequently

revised, as anyone conversant with Korean bureaucracy, the
instance examined here, will attest to.
will lack consistency.
administrative programs.

Government policy

Discontinuity will characterize
Policy at all levels will be

determined by the personalization of public administration.
In-coming top administration figures will likely carry with
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them their own retinue of subordinates.

In part, this

transposition of one's own personnel to the new position
acts to substantiate the personalization of one's power
play in public administration.

The conditioned orientation

is to increase at every opportunity the sum total of
personal power,

which enlisting under control of the

incoming official as many of the bureaucratic subordinates
as possible is intended to accomplish.

The new executive,

because of putting personalization above law, code, and
regulation, will attempt to institute new programs and to
change other functions and programs when at all possible.
Personal interests will intentionally be incorporated into
the bureaucratic fabric so as to leave little doubt that
these assume precedence over supposed actual government
objectives:
Bureaucratic organizations may involve dysfunctional
characteristics of personalization because organiza
tion consists of human beings who are more or less
motivated by self-interest. However, in the Korean
bureaucracy, the diverting of an individual bureau
crat's activities from achieving the formal purpose of
the bureaucracy by manipulating conditions of his
personal power and prestige seems to be excessive in
that legitimacy tends to be largely compromised with
illegitimacy. (Yoon, 1982, p. 110)
Riggs' emphasis is on elaboration of an ecological
model for analysis of public administration, most specifi
cally in terms of comparative administration, and that as
applied

to

understanding

contemporary

circumstances in developing countries.

administrative
Riggs' analysis,
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according to H. B. Lee (1968) was evoked primarily by John
M. Gaus'

introduction of the term "ecology" to public

administration analysis.

Lee's explanation of what Gaus

was specifying is similar to or related to Riggs' analysis
of formalism, as represented in this writing in terms of
Korea.

Lee says of Gaus that:

According to him, an ecological approach to adminis
tration explores the inter-relationship between the
physical-social environment in which people are
living, and the administrative aspects of the process
of government.
He emphasizes that changes in the
former "coerce" governmental responses, that is,
program. His seven ecological factors--people, place,
physical technology, social technology, catastrophe,
ideas and wishes, and personality--are the case in
point. (Lee, 1968, p. 41)
Riggs' presentation of his findings of the transforma
tional processes of developing countries was conceptualized
as a model, elaborated primarily in his major thesis of the
Prismatic Model (1964), discussed in this writing, following upon the suggestion derived from Gaus.

In terms of

formalism in transitional administration, as brought out in
the ecological approach to analysis, Riggs' prescribed the
following:
In modern, transitional societies, there has been a
tendency to establish formal political and administra
tive institutions, but they remain formalistic. That
is to say, effective behavior is still determined, to
a considerable extent, by traditional structures and
pressures, the family, religion, and persisting socio
economic practices. Hence it is possible to under
stand politics and administration in these countries
only ecologically, i.e., by relating these non-admin
istrative factors to the administrative. (As cited in
Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 41)
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It seems in retrospect clear that the ecological
concept of discovering the traditional bases and deep
structures influencing administrative and therefore social
and political behavior, while not actually originating with
Riggs, was developed by him in a comprehensive and system
atic way, in part through his original research of develop
ing countries'

bureaucracies.

Use of Riggs'

model in

connection with the modernization process within Korea
after World War Two has resonated in the present study with
interesting and informative corroboration.

Scholars in the

field of public administration in relation to Korean
studies, as shown in this paper, find Riggs' analysis to be
elucidative of the Korean situation.

In the analysis of

this paper, the ecological, developmental focus of Riggs
has provided three further aspects important to understand
ing Korean modernization.

The first of these aspects is

the unusual and endogenous origins of Korean modernization,
and correspondingly how this modernization was simulta
neously arrested, crippled, and in some sense redirected
through exogenous Japanese influence and prolonged domina
tion of at least the outward aspects of Korean society.
The second of these aspects is the telling importance of
the 1945 Liberation experience in terms of providing Korea
with a second opportunity to fulfill what had come to seem
its destiny, of democratic, egalitarian, and communal form
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of self-generated development and modernization.

And the

third is the importance of how and to what extent the
traditional character of Korea and her people, carried
forward over many centuries, has interacted with forces of
modernization and global cultural interaction to create the
new, modernized, though not fully diffracted, in Riggs'
terms, contemporary society which is Korea today.
H. B. Lee (1968) has suggested certain drawbacks to
Riggs' model, as perceived by some critics, which may be
pertinent to applying Riggs to Korean modernization, in
terms of this paper and its focus on U.S. with Korean
bureaucratic interaction,

1945-1953.

Critics of Riggs

apparently view his ecological model as suspect in applica
tion to modern development analysis because of a static
nature of theoretical composition. Riggs' model emphasiz
es, in this view, a "strict culture frame of reference"
(Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 42) which in turn creates an exagger
ated sense of "cultural incompatibility, preconditions, and
dysfunctional consequences of administrative borrowing" (p.
42).

H. B. Lee's critique here derives mainly from Edgar

Shor, who has suggested that the ecological perspective
works to "'magnify the relevance and recalcitrance of the
traditional framework and obscure the dynamic and complex
character of modernization process'"
1968, p. 42).

(as cited in Lee,

What I believe this refers to, most impor-
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tantly here, but among possibly other aspects of Riggs, is
that the bureaucratic interaction of the exo-prismatic
influencing modern with the traditional or fused structure
of the society will,

by virtue of the new prismatic

structure

created,

necessarily

result

in

bureaucratic

dysfunction, at least in terms of goals and ideals, which
in turn leads to dysfunction of all aspects of the society,
with the overall outcome of delaying and circumventing the
advent of modern political process.

The logic of how this

happens, according to Riggs' analysis, in terms of the
Prismatic Model,

and in terms also of Korean national

development, has been analyzed in this paper from several
perspectives.

H. B. Lee (1968), citing Shor, suggests that

the actual empirical circumstance of the modern and the
factors of contemporary change are both more subtle and
dynamic

than

Riggs'

model

has

been

able

to

reveal.

Although I do not agree with this evaluation concerning
Riggs and think that it may demonstrate some shallowness in
approach and understanding of the critics, in relation to
Riggs' theory,

the positing of concern for how Riggs'

theory corresponds to subtle and dynamic issues of modern
ization process in developing countries is well taken.
Examination of these issues as specifically related to
Korean modernization will provide the basis of the next and
concluding section of this study, Chapter V, which is taken
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up directly.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Bureaucratic interaction between the U.S. and South
Korea was importantly based on an assumption of almost
immediate unification between North and South Korea during
the postwar period.
realized,

U.S.

Even when such an ideal was not

bureaucratic

influence

remained

more

important than any that Korea had received since Confucian
ism from the Chinese.

For Korean society and government,

the role of bureaucracy is anciently and pervasively
ingrained.

It is essential to a uniquely Korean response

to the world and to its sense of human interaction.

U.S.

pragmatic intervention created dramatic change for Korea.
The Korean with U. s. interaction has been as uniquely
productive as any in history.

Korea adopted and conse

quently transformed U.S. bureaucratic practice.

U.S.

bureaucratic influence helped to change Korean education,
government,

military,

production,

land

distribution,

political process, world view, and global presence.

The

years 1945 through 1953 were profound in all aspects for
Korea, and prepared Korea for later change and assumption
of a global economic and political role.
The conclusion of Chapter IV suggested an important
193
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criticism made of Fred Riggs' analysis of administrative
and bureaucratic development in terms of modernization
taking place within 20th Century transitional societies.
The criticism fundamentally suggested that Riggs' theory
was static in nature, in that it pointed up faults and
incongruities that were administratively, socially, and
politically inherent and problematic in virtually all 20th
Century instances of development, and which could stultify
meaningful and worthwhile development of a society when the
traditional form of that society was interfaced with
interventions

for

modernization.

Riggs'

theory,

the

criticism suggests, because of its own inflexibility cannot
incorporate within itself the dynamic, unique, and various
ly

manifested

properties

and

country's modernization process.

manifestations

of

each

From this view, Riggs'

theory tends to over-emphasize many things in the tradi
tional format as favorable,

or workable,

and to view

modernization, because of its attempt to inappropriately
match components from societies with entirely different
cultural

and

historical

experience,

as

saddling

the

developing society with a bureaucratic structure which
rides over that society in a tyrannical fashion, allowing
for unprecedented elite exploitation and manipulation, so
that the average citizen would have had basic life needs
better met within the traditional society, which Riggs
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designates as the fused form.

The criticism is well taken

because Riggs largely says all of the above, but, more
importantly,

the theory can be born out in historical

development data of many if not most countries.

Korea has

been examined here and has been shown to follow this model
in many, actually very many and important respects.

In

other words, the modernization experience of developing
countries in the 20th Century has given us reason to be
circumspect in our witness to the ongoing changes and to be
realistic and sober in our judgments concerning the value,
the redeeming qualities of both process and result.
experience of Korea has provided a case in point.

The

Scholar

ship in public administration and political science has
suggested that Korea has provided an almost perfect labora
tory circumstance for examining national development since
World War Two.

It has also provided similarly an object

lesson in terms of Riggs' analysis of Prismatic Society.
This study, as well as some scholarly commentary from the
field

of

public

administration,

suggests

the

Korean

administrative development experience corresponds to Riggs'
analysis in important respects.

The kind of emphasis on a

negative fruition from the prismatic interplay between
traditional and modern, or fused and diffracted, as the
critics have pointed to, may perhaps be most essentially,
and one might say, caustically displayed in the summation
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of one Korean commentator concerning his country's Prismat
ic experience:
Korean bureaucrats may actually want modernization,
but they are imbued with a value system which is
incompatible with modernization.
Further, they are
unwilling to make the necessary effort for moderniza
tion. They may attempt to achieve various goals in
the name of modernization, but their value system and
behavior allow them only minimal rewards. They lack
the fighting spirit, not to mention the scientific
They do not try
spirit, to challenge their fates.
persistently to solve problems.
They desperately
avoid risk and adventure, adhering always to routine
practices. They usually base decisions and ensuing
policies on intuitive judgment or on rough calcula
tion, rather than on a thorough and systematic effort
to perceive and comprehend objective reality. They do
not recognize their own faults or misjudgments even
when policies turn out to be empty. Their loyalty to
such primary groups as family, kin, school, and
province results in the ineffective utilization of
human as well as material resources.
When it is
necessary to fi11 a vacancy, they ask where the
applicants came from, what school they graduated from,
and their lineage, before examining capacity and
intelligence. Their attitudes and values ignore the
demand that the modern bureaucratic organization
stress impersonality, impartiality, and rationality.
In this situation, any notion of social justice or
equality of all people before law is nothing but a
desk theory.
Contemporary Korean bureaucrats think
that they can manipulate the common people as they
like.
Neither the delegation of authority nor group deci
sion-making exists, and therefore, most decisions are
made by someone far removed from the actual problem.
Korean bureaucrats like subordinates who show humili
ating servility toward them. They usually perceive
everything in the simplistic terms, either rejecting
an opinion or idea totally, or accepting it wholly
without evaluating its advantages and disadvantages.
If problems are unavoidable, they try to solve them by
drastic resolution.
They approach policy-making in
this way without recognizing its possible incremental
nature, that is, incremental in the sense that deci
sions build on their forerunners. They believe that
any innovation or change can be made once and for all.
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Furthermore, their main concern is not how they
improve the performance of their job, but how they
maintain proper relations with their superiors.
Rights and duties defined in terms of job descriptions
or job titles are meaningless because the actual power
always lies in the hands of some small clique formed
around a powerful figure.
The values and work ways of the Korean bureaucrats are
geared to the preservation of status quo by upholding
the existing rules of game.
They are not action
oriented or program-oriented. They champion fulfill
ment of the legal requirements of governmental opera
tion, but they do not perceive the public policy goals
or "managerial character" of government. For them the
main task of administrative service is that of main
taining accustomed procedure, not solving problems.
Only in the recent years has the political leadership
taken action to revamp and remold the psychological
orientations of bureaucrats. In this regard, we hope
for the successful consummation of the clean-up drive
in the immediate future. (Paik, 1982b, pp. 87-89)
Such conclusion undoubtedly must stand as testimony to
the kind of negative disposition the critics of Riggs
believed his model would precipitate.

It is, however,

important to note also Paik's (1982b) optimism for a better
future.

This better future is what Riggs also points

toward and importantly elucidates in his prismatic analy
sis, from several perspectives, though not without some
cautionary remark, especially brought forward in the later
revision of his model (Riggs, 1973, The Prismatic Society
Revisited) discussed earlier in this paper.
analysis

The present

will turn also for conclusion to such more

positive understandings, primarily in the future sense, as
Riggs' analysis serves to bring out for our understanding.
The primary weakness and danger of modern development
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can be summarized in two dimensions:

first, loss of spir

itual value and context of living for the sake of purely
material reality; and second, domination of all life func
tions of the society by a powerful and manipulative bureau
cratic elite for the sake of its own control and dominance
and at the ultimate expense of depletion of satisfaction
from those without communication and access to the elite
power structure. These things are an old story in terms of
20th Century political experience.

They are in many and

probably most national instances true, and continue to be
so, within varying limits even in countries which have
reached advanced states or conditions of development, such
as Korea, or even the U.S. To some extent, as Riggs' model
demonstrates, the structure of interaction between tradi
tional and modern forms creates disjunctions and disequi
libriums, virtually as necessary aspects of development.
However, such disjunction is recognized as clearly favor
able, in terms acceding to monopolization of raw power and
material control,

by the elite class.

The state of

disjunction, the prismatic state, remains in place, because
of advantages to those who have power to maintain it as a
permanent condition.
development.
sense

is

the

Such disjunction is not the goal of

The goal of development in the contemporary
fully diffracted society,

which

means,

essentially, the society within which each function will
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correspond to, and arise from only one structure.

In this

condition, from Riggs' structural functionalist point of
view, class dominance would be impossible, and bureaucratic
administration of all social functions would be according
to egalitarian principles and according to degrees of
reward precisely commensurate with ability and effort, with
adjustment for only actual handicap, intellectual, psycho
logical, physical, social, and so forth.

Additionally, for

modernization to lead to full diffraction and to maintain
itself in such a configuration as would maximize both
societal and individual outputs and satisfactions, another
criterion must be met:

coordination amongst diffracted

societal functions must be maximized.
modernization,

Thus, the process of

in Riggs' theory, would lead to maximum

functional diffraction with maximum coordination.

Such an

end state of modernization depends on, ultimately, politi
cal development wherein the power selection and discrimina
tion

potential

society.
above,

is

dispersed

maximally

throughout

the

It is clear that for the many reasons described

the prismatic bureaucracy acts to block social

diffraction and political development. Positive moderniza
tion is undermined through elite power manipulation and
focus on measures to preserve a kind of power monopoly at
all costs.

Such manipulation and power preservation have

been, with all good initial intentions, the plight of Korea
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and all developing nations, and as Riggs (1962, 1964, 1973)
has demonstrated, very much the plight of even the most
advanced and diffracted societies.
Questions concerning the modernization and development
theory of Riggs, as encapsulated within his Prismatic Model
of

Administrative

Development

(1964),

have

not

been

entirely resolved in this study, in terms of U.S. bureau
cratic interaction with Korea and in terms of Korea's
overall modernization process, during its formative period,
1945-1953.

All of the components mandatory 'tor doing so,

however, albeit in necessarily annotated form, are never
theless in place.

To accomplish such resolution,

the

matter of U.S. bureaucratic interaction will be returned to
first.
Riggs' prismatic analysis proceeds according to its
demonstration from objective data that critical explanatory
factors or causal variables relative to 20th Century
modernization development process can be determined as
generalizable across cultures.

They can be isolated from

the much broader and possibly richer, deeper, and more
variable

spectrum

characteristics.

of

culturally

specific

identifying

In terms of explanatory power concerning

development modernization as largely an outcome of bureau
cratic administrative transformation, culturally specific
data which fall outside the empirically identified and
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generalizable or nomothetic scope of criteria are likely to
mostly add confusion rather than elucidation.

Riggs'

assumption is that for his purpose the prismatic model will
provide necessary explanation and will clearly guide our
inquiry

into

development

transformation.

Moreover,

confidence in the validity and reliability of application
of his model suggests that conflicting culturally specific
findings do not detract from the relevance of the model
when the selected, pertinent development factors are in
place and can cogently be demonstrated and viewed as having
carried forth the situation of development under examina
tion.

This present study, while illustrating how Riggs'

model demonstrably applies to the Korean situation, has
gone significantly further, in attempting to demonstrate
that other often commonly accepted explanations, such as
the influence of indelible Confucian identity limitations
within the mass of the Korean populace, a quite culturally
specific direction of thought, produce difficult explanato
ry conflicts, as for example is the case with juxtaposition
of Confucian identity with Korean inherent,
democratic and egalitarian tendency.

long-term,

When, added to this

difficulty in accepting Confucian identity or tendency as
explanatory

for

stultification

of

Korean

democratic

development, we consider the factors of the model of U.S.
victorious democracy acting as reagent both to· Korean
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frustration

built

up

during

centralized

bureaucratic

Japanese colonial suppression and to Korean
mass

democratic

consciousness

manifested

burgeoning
also

during

suppression, with each released in the virtually pluralist
hotbed democratic party competition immediately at the 1945
Liberation, the Confucian explanation that democracy is
somehow beyond the Korean character, identity, and societal
goal seems, really, more than just a bit ludicrous.

To say

that the democratizing of Korea was inhibited because the
mass of Koreans did not comprehend, did not want, and could
not adapt to the formats of democracy is rather slighting
of Korean identity as a people, though this explanation, as
indicated in this study, has been resorted to at times by
Koreans themselves.
In terms of U.S. bureaucratic interaction with Korea,
this too in itself has been offered as explanation for the
frustratingly protracted democratic development process
under investigation here.
view, u. s.

From the socialist and Soviet

intervention intentionally and strategically

suppressed activation of developing democratic tendency
coming to rapid fruition in Korea in 1945.

The U.S. acted

thus to stultify democracy simply because democracy was by
and large turning toward socialism and in fact opting for
communism

(Hart-Landsberg,

1993);

and,

therefore,

a

strategic piece among the Pacific dominance design of the
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U.S. was about to be lost.

What's more, that loss would

have been to emergent superpower rival, the Soviet Union,
which, now that victory had been gained, could be viewed
more satisfactorily, in terms of U.S. elite agenda, as not
merely rival for world power dominance, but more convinc
ingly,

in the Churchillian sense of moving and shaping

world opinion,

as the enemy of freedom and democracy.

Therefore, according to this socialist world view,

the

entire U.S. Cold War agenda was cooked up on the spot in
Korea because of Soviet presence and indication of commu
nist success in winning the minds and hearts of the
developing world, thus eventually shutting the U.S. out of
the action and betraying the grand world capitalist design,
formulated, including conceptualization of the U.N., well
before the War's end.

As with any of the most clever and

diabolical lies, a grain of truth is contained in this
interpretation of U.S. betrayal of democracy.

In a "real

politick" sense, the U.S. acted against Soviet penetration
into Korea and its early political organizing of Korea, to
cut its losses and to build up what defense it could
against its former soviet ally as rapidly as possible. The
role of Machiavellian manipulator, however, for the U.S. as
shown earlier in this paper hardly fits the facts.

The

U.S. interaction was clearly blundering, ill-informed, and
less than fully committed at first to bearing the burden of

204

support democracy seemed to demand in Korea.

But it was

hardly Machiavellian, as most poignantly evidenced in the
early departure of the U.S. after Rhee was installed (and
he was at the time the consensus choice of Koreans not
withstanding his later ultra conservative and repressive
transformation), only to be forced to hastily return in
stronger military array a mere two years later to halt the
communist attack. The facts suggest urgent measures to put
in place representative democratic and egalitarian formats
in Korea and then to withdraw to allow Korea to develop in
relative independence.

The U.S. would not fully develop

its Cold War posture nor its entire Pacific agenda until
later.

It would clearly take the shock of the Korean War

itself to transform the U.S.' rather idealistic world view.
The U.S., in fact, simply in serving as victorious demo
cratic

model,

in

liberating

Korea

from

totalitarian

repression, in initiating democratic reforms, in land and
education, primarily, in setting up some emergency bulwark
against the new totalitarian structure of communism, and in
returning to be sure at least half of Korea could be
independent to develop toward democracy, acted to clearly
inspire and support Korea in its long-term modernizing,
democratic quest.

Clearly, U.S. bureaucratic interaction

stands as the least satisfactory accounting for Korean
democratic processing stultification.
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What the U.S. accomplished more accurately corresponds
to the prismatic model's concept of exogenous modeling or
instigation or formulation of democracy.

As suggested in

several ways, incorporation of the U.S. model of democratic
process on the part of the Korean elite and then through
endogenous transmutation from the elite and among the mass
of Korean people, and finally through implementation in the
structures of Korean society itself, however precarious and
protracted in its engendering, presents the most satisfying
and successfully explanatory concept of U.S. with Korean
bureaucratic interaction.
suitably

with

conceptual

Riggs'

formation

Such explanation corresponds

theory
of

in

terms

dissociation

of

referencing

among

intention,

formal structure, and result and ensuing practice.
readily

envision

U.S.

idealism

finding

We can

difficulty in

realizing full pragmatic expression and result within the
difficult, prismatic Korean development complexity. We can
moreover conceptualize how U.S. tendency toward optimistic
democratic

prognostications

might

exacerbate

certain

negatively prismatic developments in South Korea, if not in
fact actively betray Korean democracy itself.
Reconsideration of U.S. bureaucratic interaction with
Korea, 1945-1953, and incorporation of its events within
the prismatic cosmos begin in themselves to suggest how
formulations of Korean modernization other than Riggs'
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prismatic model,

may be inadequate.

The preponderant

tendency is for explanations of Korea's modernization to
look to inherent characteristics within the mass of Korean
people or within the Korean culture as causal to the key
fact demanding explanation:

Korean postwar democratization

within the modernizing process was stultified and in es
sence misdirected, if not entirely betrayed. Such cultural
relativist explanations produce more conflict than compre
hension of variables.

Their rejection, though not neces

sary for acceptance of Riggs' theory and explanation, make
such acceptance that much more conclusive and satisfying.
Certainly, to Koreans, it is enlightening and rewarding to
view their own democratic modernization process, replete
with difficulties and drawbacks, as what might have been
expected even perhaps under the best of circumstances, with
such circumstances not of course having been the case for
Korean postwar experience, excepting for the strong pres
ence of the U.S. and Korea's own insistence upon and per
sistence concerning democratic formation at conclusion of
the war.

The prismatic model as outlined in this paper

offers a viable understanding of Korean modernization in
terms especially of offering satisfactory comprehension of
all influencing and, often as not, conflicting variables
surrounding the modernization process, as brought forth in
this study.

Clarification of the conflictual U.S.-Korean
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bureaucratic

interaction,

which

nevertheless

set

and

secured Korea's modernization course, is provided through
acceptance of the prismatic model's conceptualization of
how modernization initiates:

through exogenous modeling

example; and then quite ineluctably, through structural
more

than

ideational

factors

generating unprecedented

bureaucratic and thereby elite power, which in turn acts to
corrupt democratic political processing and to stultify or
freeze modernization democratic development, at a point
where elite bureaucratic manipulative power seems most
certain

of

maintaining

and

defending

its

hegemony.

Prismatic theory offers structural and process explanation
which directs us to a balanced and rational interpretation
concerning all interacting postwar factors, without need
for

discovering

strategies

or

predetermining
experienced.

conflicting

ancient
the

superpower

character

modernization

manipulation

formations

as

wholly

difficulties

Korea

Korea's experience was structurally similar

to and virtually in conjunction with that of all developing
postwar

societies.

Clearly,

however,

more

detailed

examination of the interrelationships among, first, Riggs'
prismatic model; second, Korean modernization democratic
development; and third, U.S. with Korean postwar bureau
cratic interaction seems to be called for than that which
the present study has been able to provide.

Nevertheless,
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the viability of connections made among these three factors
or themes,

as well as their connected importance, to

analysis of Korean development, has been suggested in this
study.

Such viability it is hoped has been somewhat

substantiated.

The study hopefully will induce further

examination, by both this investigator and others, into
what is determined here to be a fruitful research context.
The bureaucratic interaction between Korea and the
U.S. upon the closing of the Second Great War was propi
tious and seemingly fated.

Just as the U.S. as democratic

leader of the free world would act as vanguard for world
democratic development in the post-World War Two modern
age, Korea would struggle, with the support of the U.S.,
throughout her modernizing experience to finally after long
suppression discover and realize at least in part her
essentially

democratic,

egalitarian,

and

spiritually

integrated identity. The Confucian emphasis on four major
values of virtue and righteousness, purity and caution,
justice and fairness, and sincerity and diligence are still
maintained within the Korean identity as part of the
modernized world order.

The struggle for egalitarian

principle and modernization of society and political,
bureaucratic administration, begun in the 19th Century in
Korea, but as manifestation of a more ancient spirit, was
reasserted with Korea's liberation and democratic develop-
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ment with the U.S. in 1945 and in years following, as
Wright observed, some 20 years ago:
In the years following the Second World War, Western
derived liberal democratic ideas have had a phenomenal
impact on the leaders of Korea, as on those of other
developing nations throughout the world.
Public
proclamations of these leaders have spoken of a new
era for their nations within a democratic political
framework. (Wright, 1975, p. 3t
Wright himself identifying the strong traditional
strain within the Korean character as creating "resultant
inner struggle between liberal Western ideas and tradition
al Korean behavior" (p. 3) assumes this struggle as mani
festing "barriers to progress," which from such assumption
had restrained and inhibited Korea's leadership (1975). It
is clear that especially for Westerners the assumption that
Korean consciousness and psychohistory are at odds with
democratic acceptance is an easy one to make.

The present

study has shown there is much to be discovered in Korean
experience to contradict such facile conclusions.

Korea's

postwar political development, the central concern of this
study, has not simply resulted from the fact that "Western
democratic perspective has made inroads into the Korean
political consciousness [while] it is equally clear that
traditional

factors

still

contribute

significantly

to

Korean political behavior" (Wright, 1975, p. 4). Riggs has
provided us greater explanatory power and comprehension of
variables to view Korea as it "remains a transitional
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society--between old and new, traditional and modern"
(Wright, 1975, p. 4). Wright, possibly without identifying
an element of conflict with his earlier assessment, after
citing instances of how apparent zeal for efficiency and
rule of law among the bureaucracy often leads to withdrawal
of programs or abandoning of laws, provides the following
commentary:
It seems relevant in this regard to refer to the
western concept of "rule of law," a principle which
westerners feel is little recognized in Korea••••one
Korean legal scholar, Hahm Pyong-choon, has pointed
out that "the rule of law has never been a desirable
goal of politics in Korea." This is because tradi
tionally in Korea "Law" was seen as "an agency of
rigid political regimentation.... The rule of law
advocated by the legalists, as popularly understood in
the Korean political tradition, was little different
from a rule of punishment or a rule by autocratic
decree."• . • [T]his idea of law is a corruption of
both the western view as well as the proper Korean
perspective. •
•
According to the latter, the
Confucian-derived concept of Li refers to a "moral
expression of the way of the Universe." "When both
the ruler and the ruled act according to Li, harmony
prevails•••. The virtuous live by it.••• [W)hen a
society is ordered by Li, its members not only behave
properly but also know shame. Li and law are thus
mutually exclusive." (Wright, 1975, pp. 5-6)
The spirit of Li suggests that if one or the other,
the rulers or ruled, the elite administration or the
majority of the populace, do not abide by principles of
social harmony, then corruption, exploitation, and injus
tice, on the one hand, or disorder and dissention on the
other, will prevail.
population

has

been

In the situation of Korea, where the
well

ordered,

in

general

highly
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productive and zealous in applying itself to productive and
economic transformation, it seems clear that the mass of
people had been upholding the principle of

Li,

though it

may be clear also that the ruling elite may not have been.
Riggs' explanation has to do with effects of inherent pris
matic structural reality.

Cultural relativist theories and

explanations tend to place a kind of double burden on those
who are not part of the dominant elite.

Such theories

acknowledge that "the Koreans have flung themselves with
vigor and determination into the process of economic devel
opment," (Wright, 1973, p. 4), while accepting the bureau
cratic elite's assessment of this same mass of the people
(as in the following provincial official view):

"that the

'intellectual level of the ordinary citizen is not so high •
. the ordinary citizen has little long-range percep
tion,' and he is quite dependent on centralized authority"
(p. 7).

To what extent, not having been at least somewhat

informed by the prismatic model, might we too easily accept
such facile elite commentary, basing our assumptions as
does Wright (1975) and undoubtedly most others on the
insight of "community leaders" (p. 8)?

Riggs demonstrates

that the ruling elite in developing, modernizing, newly
industrializing countries, may not be the most objective
sources for inquiries made into the nature of that develop
mental process, into the causes of disruption in democratic
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processing, or into the reasons for apparent failure of a
society

to

systems.

Explanation of bureaucratic inter- action between

developing

move

beyond

societies

and

hierarchically
their

authoritarian

respective

exogenous

development models; analysis of conflicts among expressed
goals, laws, ideals and pragmatic realities; and insight
into the relation of historical cultural experience to
bureaucratic and political structure demand an internally
consistent analysis, as this study has hopefully suggested
the possibility of.

To some extent, this study may have

demonstrated that democratic modernization conflict in
Korea's postwar experience was not so certainly due to the
Korean people's expressed need for rule which was "essen
tially hierarchical, personalized, and authority-oriented"
(p.

8) ,

though many,

believe it was.

past and present,

would have us

Application of Riggs' nomothetic analysis

has revealed a dramatically different explanation from that
generally offered through culturally specific orientation.
Moreover, application of prismatic hypotheses, drawing us
to expect to discover specific underlying causal struc
tures, which we in fact can readily uncover in the Korean
case, in turn then led us to reexamination of the very
psychocultural bases of presumptions which had depicted
Koreans as democratically disabled or debilitated due to an
ingrained

mass

adherence

to

central

autocratic

rule.
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Examination of that history, importantly as it is currently
being pursued within Korean public administration scholar
ship, suggests a psychocultural and psychopolitical reality
much different from that interpretation or set of assump
tions attempting to portray Koreans as willing participants
in their own autocratic subjugation.· That radically dif
ferent perspective has been explored here in detail and
from the vantages of many scholars.

It may be valuable to

point out that the reexamination of relevant data was
instigated through application of nomothetic, empirically
derived theory to the Korean development context.

Insight

provided through that theory application suggested inter
pretation of Korean experience at odds with culturally
specific or relative positions derived from certain gen
eralizations concerning Korean identity.

Reexamination of

relevant historical data appeared to not support the
culturally specific generalizations attempting to explain
postwar democratic stultification in terms of ingrained,
mass Korean character traits or embedded cultural tenden
cies.

Reexamination tended to suggest that Riggs' struc

tural-functionalist,

nomothetic

coherent explanation and,

interpretation

moreover,

offered

pointed to causal

factors in the Korean development experience (primarily
elite manipulation in response to structural bureaucratic
and other social institution opportunity created within the
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prismatic situation) which had not been well perceived nor
well attended to in the course of alternative views.

Thus

in offering satisfactory explanation which tended to make
Korean postwar experience more coherent and congruent with
that of other similarly developing societies, application
of the prismatic model in turn,

and possibly to even

greater benefit, encouraged reexamination of culturally
specific and pertinent data.

This reexamination suggested

generally accepted explanations of Korean development which
appeared contradicted by application of Riggs' analysis had
also little basis in historical, social, and political data
concerning Korean long-term development process.

Assump

tions concerning Korean acceptance and desire for autocrat
ic rule and dominance seemed especially ill-founded and
derived from shallow suppositions.

Remarkably,

Korean

experience and cultural formation concerning democratic
institutionalization, political independence and moderniza
tion,

pluralist democratic impetus,

and resistance to

authoritarian central rule provided a basis for cultural
and political identity which, while fitting well enough
with Riggs'

explanatory model,

seemed to suggest the

irrelevance and misleading nature of most other explanation
as was still applied to the Korean situation.
Despite the strong suggestion as carried forth in
several ways through this writing that Riggs' model has
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indeed proved revelatory and eye-opening in the Korean
modernization, development, diffraction instance, it may be
well to balance the interpretation through attending to
whatever the prismatic society might entail which does not
suit the Korean case quite so well.
A facet of Riggs'

theory,

the concept of pariah

entrepreneurs, or those members of the prismatic society
who develop economic wealth and power somewhat outside of
the purview of the bureaucratic and social elite, presents
The pariah class in Riggs' model are outsiders in the sense
of being incorporated only very tenuously into the prismat
ic social and political arrangement while remaining in
essence alien to the social structure in terms of actual
penetration to sharing in communal interaction.

The pariah

identity as outsiders establishes a certain advantage for
them in relation to the prismatic elite.

The advantage, on

the surface the negative one of not being as a class able
to penetrate to and join themselves with the core of the
society, allows the pariah class to concentrate on economic
development and accumulation of resources, not outside of
the discretionary control of elite manipulation, but more
or less freely at the indulgence of the elites, since the
pariah class is not viewed as threatening due to its lack
of access to social power structure.

The prismatic elite

can indulge the pariah class and concomitantly exploit its
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wealth accumulation more or less at will.

The pariah class

functions purely at the discretion and forbearance of
ruling prismatic elite power; its survival depends upon
sustaining positive elite regard.

Up to a point, the elite

maintains a purely exploitative relationship with the
pariah

class,

harboring

elite

capacity

to

sever

the

relationship and eliminate pariah power virtually without
notice.

In Riggs' analysis, however, as alluded to earlier

in this writing, it is through the economic advancement of
the pariah or outsider class that the eventual erosion of
the elite rule and reversal of prismatic stultification of
development will be founded.

The elite downfall essential

ly emanates from the kinds of economic agreements entered
into via the elite-pariah arrangements, specifying merely
transitory

working

agreements,

allowing

similarly

for

pariah survival secured only by elite indulgence,

and

sustained primarily by elite access to the pariah economic
production,

and in substantial portion.

earlier in this study,

As mentioned

economic cooperation eventually

leads to decision center access, thus spreading governing
dominance beyond the elite's exclusive power range, and
thus re-initiating the power structure diffraction process,
which is, in Riggsian terms, synonymous with modernization,
democratization process.

In allowing through economic

arrangement specific access privileges to the pariah class,
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in terms of economic structuring for wealth, and doing so
because the pariah class is at once readily exploitable
while also not perceived as threatening due to its social
structure detachment, the elite creates, metaphorically,
the Frankenstein's monster of its own demise.
The phenomenon of the emergence of the pariah class as
a critically influential economic, then strategic political
factor is essential to the wholeness of Riggs' model, as it
is essential also to modern development process.

Operation

of the pariah class throughout 20th Century development
instances can be consistently shown, with both Chinese and
Indian minority populations carrying out the pariah func
tions perhaps most notably, and with greatest frequency.
The difficulty in the Korean situation is that due to the
near total homogeneity of the Korean population virtually
no minority having anything approaching the wherewithal,
initially in terms of mere numbers, to act as a pivotal
economic factor exists.

Yet in this writing it has been

suggested that Korea in many ways, and in substance more
than any other developing society,
prismatic model.

has adhered to the

In terms of the pariah entrepreneur, it

can be shown that Korea follows with continuing consistency
Riggs'

formulations.

Moreover,

just as Riggs' model

suggested the appropriateness of reexamination of Korean
developmental,

political,

and psychocultural formation,
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both in the long and in the short terms (reexamination in
terms of not only analyses contained in this paper, but
also such reexamination as made within a major current
emphasis of Korean public administration scholarship),
since findings discovered through application of Riggs
strongly

indicated

discrepancy

and

weakness

amongst

typically accepted generalizations derived from assumptions
purportedly based on culturally specific data and analysis,
the model would from a different tendency suggest that some
construct corresponding to the pariah entrepreneur was
operating within the Korean situation and that consider
ation and pursuit of such a construct would prove valuable.
Thus the indication of Riggs'

model concerning pariah

entrepreneurship would induce reconsideration of the Korean
economic development phenomenon designated as Jaebol.
While not of course designating anything pariah in the
sense of alien or foreign to the native milieu, since by
all relevant consideration the intensity of Korean popula
tion homogeneity would logically forbid such a possibility,
the suggestion that Jaebol and pariah entrepreneur are
highly correspondent designations encompassed equally well
within Riggs' model, with the one for Korea, the other for
most other similar development phenomena, allows another
avenue of analysis, opened through application of Riggs,
which indicates the possibility of other whole ranges of
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interpretation,

analysis,

and logical reconstruction of

Korean development process.

For example, in perceiving

that Jaebol development corresponds to entrepreneurial
enterprize of a pariah class or group of sorts, one sees
first of all the remarkable division between ruling and
ruled classes which had persisted for many centuries in
Korea and had then apparently received tremendous revital
ization within the constructs of postwar Korean prismatic
realm.

The division historically and in renewal had

manifested in a chasm of separation so as to render non
elite classes, though economically viable and productively
incommensurable, as so much outside the presumptions of
power and privilege and social dictates as to transfigure
them as alien, or pariah in their extent of subordination
to elites.

Thus, in this instance, application of Riggs'

model extends to stringent clarification of continuing
Korean class division. More importantly, however, concomi
tant appraisal of Jaebol formation as the Korean equivalent
of a pariah class perpetuation, forces near total restruc
turing of thinking concerning this now dominant Korean
economic class.
pariah

and

In the sense that relationship between the

elite

ultimately

transforms

bureaucratic,

administrative power so that modernization, development,
democratization,

and

diffraction

are

reinstigated,

a

positive interpretation of Jaebol development and longer
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term process of establishing administrative and political
power access is made possible.

Recent diffraction in

Korean bureaucracy power structure toward more equitable
and egalitarian power distribution and greater democratiza
tion process can be viewed, following Riggs, as necessary
emanations derived from Jaebol compromises of elite long
term prismatic power bases and barriers.
Thus, even as an ostensibly important weakness in
application of Riggs' prismatic model to Korean develop
ment,

the

considered,

implication

of

pariah

entrepreneurship,

is

the end result becomes greater opening to

understanding of the Korean situation to Riggs' method of
analysis based on empirical approach and nomothetic design.
For the understandings of this writer and within the scope
of the present writing, it seems premature at this juncture
to suggest instances of inappropriate application of Riggs
to Korean development.

For the understanding at present of

this writer, application of Riggs constitutes virtually the
emergence of a new paradigm concerning Korean development
phenomena.

It seems that in the thinking likely to emerge

from such application, at least for now, as the paradigm
unfolds,

the present writer will continue to see new

possibilities of discovery and meaning in Riggs, rather
than instances of anomalies or voids in application.

Thus

in closing, further application of Riggs to the Korean
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development situation, as this writer hopes to later make,
offers

apparently

multiple

dimensions

of

meaning

and

reevaluation concerning the situation's many interrelated
aspects.
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